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This dissertation analyzes the experience of unemployment in 
contemporary Argentina, emphasizing its multidimensional, heterogeneous, and 
dynamic character. It examines the perceptions, impacts and responses to 
unemployment on different dimensions of individual and social life in a context 
characterized by a sharp worsening of the labor market, pervasive job insecurity 
and uncertainty regarding the future. Argentina, which used to have a privileged 
position in Latin America is going through the sharpest crisis in its history. 
Previous certainties, based on stable and formal employment and well-established 
channels of social mobility are no longer present. Its entire social and 
occupational structure is collapsing. It is precisely this background what 
constitutes the particularity of the Argentinean case. 
 viii
The research strategy combines quantitative and qualitative analysis as a 
way to grasp the complexity and dynamic character of the unemployment 
experience. Quantitative analysis, based upon the Argentinean Permanent 
Household Survey for Greater Buenos Aires during the period 1990-2000.  
provides a broad picture of the worsening of the labor market during the 1990s, 
identifying the main changes experienced during this period, their nature and 
incidence, and the groups most affected by them. Qualitative analysis relies on 59 
in-depth interviews to unemployed people of different ages, gender, social 
classes, and family status conducted in two contrasting locations of Greater 
Buenos Aires in terms of economic history and profile, social structure, and 
location in respect to Buenos Aires city. 
The main findings of this research show that the disruptive impacts of 
unemployment at the individual and social levels acquire particular dimensions 
under the present Argentinean context because the basis of previous frames of 
reference of work, social belonging, and social mobility have vanished. The 
mounting constraints that households experience to cope with their present 
situation and the increasing depletion of the few resources available in a context 
of an unprecedented crisis result in an overwhelming sense of vulnerability and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. OBJECTIVES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
The general purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the experience of 
unemployment in contemporary Argentina, emphasizing its multidimensional, 
heterogeneous, and dynamic character. It examines the perceptions, impacts and 
responses to unemployment on different dimensions of individual and social life 
in a context characterized by a sharp worsening of the labor market, pervasive job 
insecurity and uncertainty regarding the future.   
Argentina is currently experiencing the most severe crisis in its history. 
The new century is witnessing the collapse of its economic and social structure, 
which used to place the country in a privileged position in the Latin American 
context. Previous certainties, based on stable and formal employment and a 
dynamic social structure have been replaced by widespread labor precariousness 
and the impoverishment of vast segments of the population. Social mobility 
opportunities appear now to be just memories of a golden past. These processes, 
together with the dismantling of the social protections provided by an incomplete 
welfare state, have resulted in a marked erosion of the social fabric. 
Unemployment has emerged as a major social problem during the 1990s, showing 
a striking increase as a consequence of the long five years recession the country 
has experienced since 1998.  
This study seeks to contribute to three main research questions. First, it 
explores the meaning and experience of unemployment when it   occurs not as a 
 2
result of economic cycles or a gradual change in economic and social structure, 
but in the context of the disintegration of a well-established social and 
occupational structure.  Among Latin American countries, Argentina has had the 
largest and most solidly established middle class and the largest and most solidly 
established working class.  These social certainties and the mobility opportunities 
that they represented are no longer present. Nor are there clear alternatives.  
Secondly, it has the more general aim of exploring the relation of open 
unemployment to other forms of labor underutilization, such as underemployment 
and informal employment. It is these latter forms of labor underutilization that 
have received most research attention in Latin America.1 The complexity and 
dimensions of the ‘unemployment problem’ has been underestimated not only by 
official statistics, but also by studies on Latin America, which have tended to 
subsume unemployment under poverty. Finally, it aims to qualify the dominant, 
mainly European, literature on unemployment by exploring the experience of 
unemployment in a societal context characterized by an almost complete absence 
of social protection against misfortunes in the labor market. 
While in other Latin American countries during the 1990s total 
employment rose at a pace somewhat slower than, but close to that of the labor 
supply, partially due to informal employment, in Argentina there was a striking 
                                                 
1 There was, at least until the late 1970s, a widespread tendency to dismiss open unemployment as 
a relatively unimportant issue. Underemployment was considered as the main form of labor 
underutilization among the poor in Latin America, while unemployment tended to be 
conceptualized as a “luxury” of secondary wage earners –mainly young people- in relatively 
affluent households waiting to find a suitable job (PREALC, 1976, 1981). However, some studies 
showed that  recession in Latin America in the 1980s presented a different picture of 
unemployment: the largest rises in open unemployment were found among the poor male-heads of 
households with low skills and educational levels who had previously been in work (Rodgers, 
1989; PREALC, 1987, 1991; Infante, 1993; Humphrey,1994 ) 
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increase of open unemployment. This was a singular development within Latin 
America. In fact, only in Argentina was unemployment much higher, on average 
in the 1990s as compared with the 1980s.  Parallel to an economic restructuring 
that reduced the capacity to generate stable employment, consecutive reforms 
introduced in the labor legislation since 1991 weakened the protection provided 
by previous labor codes. The most affected group were low-income populations 
with low levels of education. Middle class sectors that had previously enjoyed a 
stable and formal insertion into the labor market also began to be hard hit by the 
changes in the labor market, experiencing a marked decline in their living 
conditions.  (Minujin, 1992; Beccaria and Lopez, 1997b; Roffman, 1997; Godio 
et al., 1998; Marshall, 2000).  
In contrast with other Latin American countries, in Argentina 
unemployment is a clear and recognizable category. The Buenos Aires labor 
market has been traditionally more formal than that of other Latin American 
cities. This more formalized environment affects the ways in which work and 
unemployment are experienced and defined, and creates particular problems for 
the unemployed. 
This dissertation focuses on two main issues. First, it analyzes the 
experience, meanings, and perceptions of work and unemployment in a context 
where a work culture traditionally centered on formal work contrasts with a 
generalized process of job insecurity. Secondly, it explores the impacts of the 
spatial organization of the city, and particularly of local labor markets, on the way 
in which people perceive and cope with unemployment and job insecurity. It 
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involves issues such as the cost of seeking jobs and the institutional barriers to 
getting informal jobs.  
Two crucial characteristics of unemployment are emphasized in this 
research: its dynamic nature and the variable character of the unemployment 
experience. On the one side, unemployment represents a dynamic process rather 
than a static, stultifying, limbo-like state (Howe, 1990; Gallie and Paugam, 
2000b). On the other, far from being a homogeneous group or an ‘underclass’ 
sharing similar experiences, values and attitudes, the unemployed are a rather 
heterogeneous group.2 Sources of variation are related to different social 
backgrounds, work experiences, skill levels, age, gender and household 
characteristics, as well as the structures of opportunity and constraint provided by 
the local areas where they live. 
 
1.2. THE PARTICULARITY OF THE EXPERIENCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN 
ARGENTINA  
The particularity of the Argentinean experience is probably the extension 
of unemployment and job insecurity in a context where formal and stable 
employment, even after a decade of sharp deterioration of labor conditions, is still 
perceived as “normal”. Far from being concentrated in particular ‘depressed’ 
regions, insecurity is spread throughout the entire social and economic structure, 
                                                 
2 Focusing in particular on the long-term employed in six British local labor markets, Gallie 
(1994) examines the relevance of the concept of an ‘underclass’ for understanding the situation 
and experiences of the unemployed. He argues that past work history experiences and the current 
work and sociopolitical attitudes of the unemployed failed to fit both the conservative and radical 
versions of the ‘underclass thesis’, concluding that it veils the close interconnection between 
unemployment and the employment structure.     
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being particularly harsh in those urban areas that used to be the most dynamic in 
terms of employment and social mobility opportunities. Moreover, job insecurity 
is experienced under a situation of structural crisis where future prospects do not 
appear to be particularly promising.  
 Some studies have argued that in contexts of highly generalized 
insecurity, the unemployed show lower levels of dissatisfaction, altering the way 
in which unemployment is viewed because of the reliance on the informal 
economy as a means of coping with poverty and providing protection against 
cumulative disadvantage (Gallie, Jacobs, and Paugam, 2000). Thus, one could 
easily conclude that precisely where the “problem” of unemployment and 
insecurity is more extensive it is not perceived and experienced as a problem. The 
underlying assumption is, then, that in these contexts people are habituated to 
insecurity because it is their “normal” situation. 
However, this is not the case of Argentina and it is precisely this 
‘exceptionality’ that constitutes the point of departure of my dissertation research. 
In fact, many of the people I interviewed –even those living in contexts of 
widespread poverty- defined themselves as unemployed even when they were 
doing some kind of odd job or changa, the Argentinean concept to express what a 
job is not. They defined their current employment status in reference to their last 
“stable job”, even when they had lost it several years ago. Moreover, the 
opportunities for self-employment generation have shrunk during the last years, 
and those who attempted to run their own small business experienced dramatic 
failures. Thus, the unemployed do not seem to have many ‘alternatives’ to cope 
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with joblessness. They do not seem to be habituated to unemployment or more 
‘satisfied’ than their European counterparts, and the symptoms of depression are 
as extensive as job insecurity.  
A recent study on Argentina (Isla, Lacarrieu, and Selby, 1999) concludes 
that the striking rise in unemployment since the mid-1990s has resulted in the re-
emergence of work, tied to ‘dignity’, as an essential value in the constitution of 
subjectivities, families, social relations and social identity of the popular and 
middle classes. Kessler (2000) points out, also in reference to the present 
Argentinean situation, that a redefinition of the external world is needed in a 
period of individual and social disorganization if any kind of strategic practice or 
arrangement is to be implemented.  This redefinition is a way of establishing a 
new kind of relationship to the external world, some kind of certainty of what can 
be and what cannot be done to cope with daily urgencies.  
It is against this background that I analyze the experience of 
unemployment in contemporary Argentina, which represents a profound 
challenge not only for people trying to cope with it, but also for the researcher 
trying to explain it.        
 
1.3. METHODS AND DATA  
The heterogeneity and multiple dimensions of unemployment require the 
combination of different methodological strategies as a way to grasp its inherent 
complexity. To that end, I decided to combine quantitative and qualitative 
techniques. Quantitative analysis provides a broad picture of the worsening of the 
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labor market during the 1990s, identifying the main changes experienced during 
this period, their nature and incidence, and the groups most affected by them. 
However, while giving a representative account of the characteristics associated 
with general trends, statistics do not provide information on a crucial issue, which 
is the experience of unemployment, or in other words, how people think, feel, and 
cope with job loss. Qualitative analysis facilitates the understanding of longer-
term processes as well as meanings, attitudes, perceptions and the impacts of 
unemployment on different aspects of individual and social life. 
 
1.3.1. Quantitative analysis  
Quantitative analysis is based upon a representative employment survey, 
the Argentinean Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, 
EPH) for Greater Buenos Aires during the period 1990-2000. The EPH is a 
representative household sample gathered in 28 metropolitan areas. In the Greater 
Buenos Aires the sample includes 4,300 private households. The survey contains 
information on demographic, occupational, migration, housing, educational and 
income characteristics of private households. It is a continuous survey collected 
two times every year, with one fourth of the respondents replaced every six 
months. 
My quantitative analysis relies upon cross-sectional data and short-term 
longitudinal data. Two main issues have been analyzed through cross sectional 
data. First is the worsening of the labor market during the 1990s in terms of the 
evolution of labor supply, the quantity and quality of employment generation, and 
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income deterioration. Secondly, is the issue of the main expressions of labor 
market adjustment (unemployment, unprotected employment, and self-
employment) and of the groups affected by them. Together with descriptive 
statistics (cross-tabulations), inferential statistics (binomial logistic regressions) 
were used to provide a comparison of the characteristics associated with 
vulnerability to unemployment and unprotected employment.     
Short-term longitudinal analysis aimed at identifying four main issues: 
changes in employment status and the direction of such changes; the most 
vulnerable groups; the kinds of jobs leading to and obtained after unemployment; 
and the impacts of unemployment of the head on household poverty and income 
levels. I constructed one panel that included 50% of the original sample 
interviewed on October 1999, and re-interviewed in the following two waves, 
May 2000 and October 2000. 
 
1.3.2. Qualitative analysis 
Qualitative analysis is based on a comparative standpoint provided by 
choosing fieldwork sites in Greater Buenos Aires that contrasted in terms of 
economic history and profile, social structure, and location in respect to the 
capital3: Florencio Varela and Lanús.  
Florencio Varela is homogeneously poor –in fact, one of the poorest 
municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires- with little industrial tradition, very 
                                                 
3 In Argentina, ‘capital’ refers to the municipality of Buenos Aires, which is the federal capital. I 
will use ‘the capital’ to distinguish this area of almost 3 million from the other municipalities of 
the metropolitan area. 
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limited employment opportunities at the local level and is relatively spatially 
isolated. In contrast, Lanús is a municipality neighboring the capital, which is 
more heterogeneous in terms of its social structure and with industries that used to 
provide an important source of employment for local residents.4  
During an eight-month period of fieldwork (from June 2000 to January 
2001) I made a total of 59 tape-recorded in-depth interviews, all of which were 
conducted by me and none of them were paid. The sample was selected 
analytically based on the following criteria: age, gender, social class, family 
status, and being out of work at the time of the interview or having experienced 
unemployment during the recent past. People who have recently experienced an 
unemployment spell and were employed at the time of the interview were 
included in order to obtain information on the conditions and characteristics of 
labor re-insertion. The sample was limited to those with previous labor 
experience, excluding first time job seekers.   
  In a context of widespread job insecurity a clear-cut distinction between 
open unemployment and the different forms of underemployment becomes 
extremely difficult.  Thus, a broader definition of underemployment and a flexible 
strategy for identifying the unemployed was utilized. After I had provided an 
explanation on my research, interviewees were selected according to their self-
perception of their employment status. Sampling was based on a snow ball 
technique that included the most varied range of strategies and social networks: 
from more ‘formal’ organizations such as the local university, municipalities, 
                                                 
4 More detailed information on the socio-economic profile and general characteristics of both 
locations is provided in chapter 3. 
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political parties, NGO’s involved in social programs, and community 
organizations, through more informal networks emerging from long walks 
through the neighborhoods, talks with taxi-drivers and neighbors, and off course, 
the references provided by the interviewees themselves. Interviews were 
conducted in different neighborhoods of Varela and Lanús and in the most varied 
settings, ranging from the interviewees’ homes and community organizations to 
bars, remiserias (taxi agencies) and an office kindly provided by the University of 
Lanús, among others. The composition of the sample as well as a list of the names 
of the interviewees (which have being changed respecting their anonymity) and 
some relevant characteristics such as age, education, family status, number and 
age of children living at home and previous occupation are given in the appendix.  
The method of data collection involved semi-structured in depth 
interviews framed in order to produce a life-history analysis, which concentrated 
on issues specifically related to employment. A topic guide was designed which 
formed the basis of each interview. The guide included topics such as family and 
job history; unemployment events, perceptions and impacts at the individual and 
household level; job search strategies and obstacles for getting a job; perceptions 
of socio-economic changes and social mobility; and future expectations. 
Questions were open-ended and adapted to individual circumstances. The length 
of the interviews was varied, ranging from 45 minutes to two hours. 
All interviews were tape-recorded and electronically transcribed. For the 
analysis of the interviews I used the qualitative computing software package QSR 
NUD*IST4, which allows not only a detailed coding and the possibility of 
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reviewing the categories created during the process of analysis, but also of 
grouping and linking coded categories. The Index System was made up of 14 
nodes and 156 sub-nodes, and the index search (linked categories) included 164 
combinations.   
 
1.4. ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
This analysis of the unemployment experience in contemporary Argentina 
is organized in two parts. The first part of the dissertation includes four chapters 
and provides a general picture of the problem highlighting new and old issues in 
the unemployment debate. It identifies the main changes experienced in the 
Argentinean labor market during the 1990s, the nature, direction and incidence of 
such changes and the most vulnerable groups affected by them.  
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on unemployment, emphasizing 
their contributions to the understanding of the Argentinean experience. This 
chapter is concerned with both the similarities and differences that the experience 
of unemployment in contemporary Argentina presents with respect to the way in 
which unemployment is perceived and experienced in different societal contexts. 
It discusses the dominant, mainly European literature on unemployment, 
highlighting its contributions, insights, and limitations for the understanding of 
the Argentinean experience. Finally, it identifies the emergence of new issues 
resulting from changes in the nature of labor markets, the family, and the State. 
 Chapter 3 analyzes the main trends in labor market dynamics before the 
1990s, as well as the profound imprints of the economic policies applied during 
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the last decade on the Argentinean social and economic structure. The analysis of 
the characteristics of the labor market previous to the 1990s, distinguishes two 
main periods. The first, from 1950 to 1975, highlights the particularities of 
Argentina that placed it in a privileged position in the Latin American context, in 
terms of social inequality, labor protection and social mobility opportunities.  The 
second period, from 1975 to 1990, marks the beginning of a process of a 
progressive deterioration of its social structure in terms of employment 
conditions, growth in social inequality and poverty levels. There was also a 
profound erosion of previous channels of social mobility, which resulted in a 
“Latin Americanization” of the Argentinean labor market. Finally, the 1990s saw 
not only a deepening of previous trends but the implementation of a new 
economic model that represented a definite break with the past and a radical 
transformation of the country’s social and economic structure.   Argentina became 
a paradigmatic case of economic failure and of the crudest experiment of 
economic orthodoxy in the contemporary Latin American context. 
Chapter 4 examines the worsening of the labor market during the 1990s, 
focusing on the evolution and characteristics assumed by unemployment, job 
insecurity, and self-employment, arguing that the relationships among these 
phenomena lead to a process of cumulative disadvantages both for individuals and 
households. Three main issues are analyzed in this chapter. First, are the causes of 
unemployment, highlighting the evolution of the labor supply and employment 
generation both in the formal and informal sectors. Secondly, is the incidence of 
the main forms of the deterioration in employment conditions -unemployment, 
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unprotected jobs and self-employment- identifying the groups most affected by 
them. Thirdly, income decline is analyzed according to the capacity of employed 
individuals to support one or more members of their households.  
Using panel analysis, Chapter 5 provides a more dynamic picture of job 
insecurity by showing changes over a one-year period. It focuses on changes in 
employment status -from employment to unemployment and vice-versa-, 
identifying the direction of such changes, the most vulnerable groups, and their 
impacts at the individual and household levels. Individual impacts are analyzed in 
terms of the kinds of jobs leading to unemployment and obtained after 
unemployment. At the household level the analysis focuses on the impacts of the 
unemployment of the head on household poverty and income levels, and on the 
employment strategies developed by the family to cope with financial hardship. 
The second part of the dissertation, based on in depth-interviews, explores   
people’s experience of unemployment. After identifying the general trends that 
characterized the worsening of the labor market during the 1990, this part assesses 
the   real impacts of these macro-processes on ordinary people. It deals with the 
perceptions, attitudes, reactions, and impacts of unemployment on different 
aspects of individual and social life. In sum, this part tries to understand 
unemployment ‘from within’, or in other terms, how do people think, feel and 
cope with job loss. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the labor trajectories of the unemployed, providing a 
longer-term perspective of the working lives of individuals and on the real 
impacts of unemployment on subsequent labor careers, which appears to vary 
 14
according to the type of jobs previously held, earnings levels, and job satisfaction 
attached to them. Labor trajectories are analyzed in terms of gender and social 
class as the most useful parameters for analyzing the labor trajectories of the 
unemployed.  
Chapter 7 analyzes the different ways in which individuals and households 
cope with unemployment, affected by the opportunities and constraints provided 
in three main spheres: the market, the state, and the family. Two main issues are 
explored in terms of the labor market. First are the characteristics of local labor 
markets, and how they affect the perceptions of, and the responses to, 
unemployment. Secondly are the mechanisms for and the obstacles to finding a 
job.  In terms of the state sphere, the chapter assesses the experiences of 
participants in public programs of direct employment creation targeted to the 
poorest sectors, and shows the profound lack of protection faced by the middle 
class unemployed. Finally, household responses are analyzed showing how 
resources coming from different sources are combined, as well as the obstacles 
households face in mobilizing the scarce resources available.     
Chapter 8 focuses on the perceptions, meanings, and impacts of work loss 
both at the individual and the household level. It explores   perceptions of work 
and unemployment and analyzes the impact of job loss on the private sphere, 
emphasizing its psychological effects as well its consequences for family relations 
and the domestic division of labor. Finally, this chapter assesses perspectives on 
the future, arguing that the deterioration in employment, economic recession, and 
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the profound erosion of previous mechanisms of social mobility blocks the 
possibility of thinking about the future beyond the immediate constraints. 
Chapter 9 contains the conclusions, which highlight the main findings of 
the dissertation, as well as its implications for policy and future research. 
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PART I: THE WORSENING OF THE LABOR MARKET: 
BASIC ISSUES, CONTEXT AND TRENDS  
Chapter 2: Understanding the Experience of Unemployment: 
Continuities and New Issues 
Unemployment is by no means a universally applicable and unambiguous 
category. Born out of the objective conditions of modern capitalist development, 
it was understood, contested and defined subjectively, acquiring its present 
meaning through a process of ideological and institutional contingency and 
contestation. After its birth as a category, it continued to be the subject of a 
continuing gap between reality and representation, and a matter of contrasting 
political agendas, images, policies and struggles (Perry, 2000). 
It is linked both to the idea of full employment and to the modern 
conception of paid work that emerged in industrial societies. Consequently, its 
meaning varies depending on the degree of industrialization and economic 
development. Besides, the conception of what unemployment is in a particular 
society will also depend on who the unemployed are, or in other terms, to what 
extent it affects those who are considered to have the responsibility of ensuring 
the protection and survival of their families (Gallie and Paugam, 2000b). 
This chapter is concerned with both the similarities and differences that 
the experience of unemployment in contemporary Argentina present with respect 
to the way in which unemployment is perceived and experienced in different 
societal contexts. Through exploring similarities, the literature review attempts to  
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indicate which features of the Argentinean case are likely to be universal. 
Through pointing differences, I aim to show the particular form that 
unemployment takes under the current Argentinean situation.  
Taking into account the previous considerations, this chapter discusses the 
dominant, mainly European literature on unemployment, highlighting its 
contributions, insights, and limitations for the understanding of the Argentinean 
experience. Four main points are analyzed here. First, the chapter briefly explores 
the emergence of unemployment as a problem in its own right, separated from 
that of poverty, and its political and conceptual implications. Secondly, going 
back in history I review the experience of unemployment and the forms taken by 
unemployment during the interwar years. The former appears as particularly 
relevant for the understanding of the disruptive impacts of unemployment in a 
context that, like contemporary Argentina, was characterized by almost inexistent 
mechanisms of social protection. Thirdly, the chapter highlights the main 
contributions and weaknesses of the interwar European and US literature for the 
understanding of the impacts of unemployment at the individual and household 
level. Finally, it identifies the emergence of new issues resulting from changes in 
the nature of labor markets, the family, and the State. The acknowledgement of 
the unequal distribution of the relative risks of unemployment between countries 
has resulted –basically in Europe- in an emphasis on comparative studies that 
highlight the importance of different forms of social regulation. These studies 
focus on how different approaches and policies on welfare provisions affect the 
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experience of unemployment (Clasen et al, 1998; Lawless et al. 1998; Lind and 
Horneman Moller, 1999; Gallie and Paugam, 2000a). 
The way in which social risks are managed between the state, the market, 
and the families makes a huge difference because of the variable capacity of the 
three institutions to manage and pool social risks (Esping Andersen, 1999). 
Moreover, the more social risks are generalized, the more likely it is that market 
and family will ‘fail’, rendered incapable of adequately absorbing risks (Ibid). 
The emergence of new issues has shown the increasing complexity of the 
unemployment problem, whose understanding requires to build upon the 
perspectives of the 1930s. 
    
2.1. REVISITING THE ‘UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM’: OLD AND NEW 
QUESTIONS  
The acceptance of unemployment as a social problem coincided with the 
emergence of mass socialist parties in a number of European countries in the 
nineteenth century and with the political threat that they represented. In the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, the political demand for the ‘right to work’ in 
Europe, as well as demonstrations by the unemployed, protest and riots in the US 
were crucial to the development of unemployment as an idea (Perry, 2000). 
By the closing decades of the nineteenth century unemployment was 
becoming both more widespread and more recognized as a problem in its own 
right, distinct from that of poverty (Burnett, 1994). The features of industrial 
capitalism, its structural changes (including the periodic devastation of older 
sectors), its dynamism, its business cycles, all distinguish unemployment from 
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earlier forms of poverty (Perry, 2000). In Europe, social legislation replaced the 
Poor law provisions; unemployment became a new source of poverty requiring 
novel measures. Beveridge’s view of unemployment as a ‘problem of industry’ 
(1909) by the early twentieth century marked this shifting in thinking that 
gradually began to recognize the social origins of unemployment. Britain 
pioneered the first unemployment insurance scheme in 1911; by 1925 there were 
15 national insurance schemes in Europe (Whiteside, 1991; Burnett, 1994; Perry, 
2000). 
Whiteside (1991) emphasizes that an historical perspective helps demolish 
some myths still attached to the unemployment question, mainly those related to 
economic growth and labor market deregulation. First, high rates of economic 
growth do not provide an automatic solution to the problem. Beyond the impacts 
of new industries on labor demand, a vast segment of the unemployed is unlikely 
to benefit from this process: they tend to live in the ‘wrong places’ and cannot 
afford to move to more prosperous areas; moreover, they may not posses the 
required skills. Hence, it is possible to generate new jobs without reducing the 
numbers of out of work (Ibid). Secondly, it is certainly highly questionable that a 
free labor market provides the best solution to the unemployment problem. The 
first attempts to increase state regulation in Britain by the end of the nineteenth 
century were the result of the recognition of ‘the problem of the unemployed’, of 
unemployment as ‘the fundamental problem of modern society’ (Whiteside, 1991; 
Burnett, 1994). The social crisis of this period therefore steered official opinion 
towards more interventionist policies in place of former beliefs in individualism, 
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self-help and personal responsibility. The demolishing effects of the myth of the 
“self-regulating market” on the social fabric, particularly when it is applied to 
labor, were presciently stated by Polanyi fifty years ago. 
In disposing of a man’s labor power the system would, incidentally, 
dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity “man” attached to 
that tag. Robbed of the protecting covering of cultural institutions, human 
beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as 
the victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and 
starvation […] No society could stand the effects of such a system of 
crudest fictions even for the shortest stretch of time unless its human and 
natural substance as well as its business organization was protected against 
the ravages of this satanic mill (1957:73). 
 
In the same direction Rubery (1996) points out that current trends toward 
flexibility, fragmentation, precariousness and individualization are not the 
inevitable concomitants of the late 1990s.  They are the likely outcome if there are 
no serious political attempts to rethink and replace labor market institutions, 
which have either outlived their usefulness or have been destroyed by recent 
political struggles within the labor market. 
Much of the labor market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, more than   
innovations, seems to be a regression to the situation pre-1945, a revival of old 
assumptions and principles. The means testing of benefits, the rhetoric of the 
impossible growth in the cost of social services, the scare stories of abuse, the 
virtues of the market are repeated now as then (Whiteside, 1991; Perry, 2000). 
Moreover, the extension of precarious forms of employment during the last 
decades does not represent a completely “new” phenomenon but, at least in a 
great part, a return to older practices. Thus, it is worth briefly exploring some of 
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those practices to understand the changes and continuities in the ways in which 
work and unemployment are experienced nowadays. 
 
2.1.1. The Interwar Period 
Unemployment during the Great Depression was experienced in the 
context of economic turmoil and political instability. Across most of continental 
Europe and the US there was a generalized collapse of middle class savings, 
banking collapses, decimation of small and medium businesses and millions of 
farmers and peasants faced ruin  (Perry, 2000). 
Fluctuations in the trade cycle were still a major cause of the exceptionally 
high rates of unemployment between the two world wars.5 But what was new in 
the 1930s was that even in the best years there remained a hard core of the ‘out-
of-work’ of around 10%, and much more in the old staple industries centered in 
the ’distressed areas’. By then long-term employment of more than a year had 
emerged as a new phenomenon, affecting around a quarter of the jobless total, 
consigning tens of thousands of men in middle life to lengthy, even permanent 
unemployment (Burnett, 1994).  
In contrast with the Argentinean case, where unemployment and job 
insecurity permeates the whole economic and social structure, the unprecedented 
levels of unemployment during the Depression years were mainly concentrated in 
certain areas where declining industries were localized. However, other areas -
                                                 
5 Between 1921 and 1939 the average unemployment rate in Great Britain was 14%, and at the 
worst it reached 22%, but it was never less than 10%.  Cyclical movements were violent but 
relatively short term, and most of the unemployed were likely to be out of work for less than six 
months at a time, though that might be a recurrent disaster (Burnett, 1994). 
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especially where the newer industries based on electrical power and prosperous 
home demands were located- were highly dynamic. People who stayed in work 
experienced a substantial rise in wages and improvement in living standards. The 
impacts of the Great Depression, then, were clearly related to where people were 
located geographically, occupationally and socially. As Burnett points out, “for 
the eight or nine million people who depended on an ungenerous dole in the early 
thirties, these were unquestionably the worst of the times; for the burgeoning 
middle classes buying their new semi-detached house on mortgage, running a 
Ford or Baby Austin car and enjoying the radio, the cinema and paid holidays, 
they were probably the best to date” (1994: 202). 
In trying to account for the unprecedented levels of unemployment it was 
evident that the automatic match between labor supply and demand assumed by   
classic economics had broken down, and most economists of the period -from 
Beveridge to Keynes, and Pigau- stressed the centrality of long-term structural 
factors such as an overvalued currency, excessive development of staple 
industries and too high levels of wages, as against the traditional cyclical, 
seasonal, frictional, and personal explanations of unemployment.   
Although governments responded in a number of ways, unemployment 
policy acquired two basic forms: unemployment relief (assistance or insurance) 
and public works. In the former case, while the value of benefits and coverage 
varied nationally and regionally, states in general failed to foresee the sharp 
increases in the numbers of the jobless and the length of unemployment spells. 
Problems arose when a large part of the unemployed had exhausted their right to 
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benefits.6 Public works, with the exception of the program of the Swedish Social 
democratic government in 1933, did not follow a Keynesian approach. They did 
not seek to increase aggregate demand through government budget deficits, but to 
maintain balanced government finances and provide earnings to the needy. This 
continued the tradition of the European Poor Law, which required paupers to 
perform work tasks in order to discourage malingering (Perry, 2000). In the 
United States, there was no state or federal assistance for the unemployed, so help 
was based on charity, the workhouse and local poor relief that varied from place 
to place. Given the scale of hardship –there were 15 million unemployed by the 
spring of 1933- these measures, together with self-help networks of family and 
neighbors, were clearly insufficient and fell short of reaching all those impacted 
by the crisis. American business viewed the British model of unemployment 
insurance as an unnecessary intrusion and a socialist menace. The unemployed 
suffered hunger and humiliation, and relief carried a host of petty indignities: 
from the bread-line and relief queue to the home visit of the social workers and 
the use of food vouchers instead of cash.  Those in public assistance were deemed 
‘loafers’ or chisellers’ and those in public works were labeled as ‘work-shy’ or 
‘shovel-leaners’ wasting taxpayers ‘money on meaningless tasks (Ibid). In fact, 
the ideas of deservingness are –now and then-a fundamental part of individualistic 
explanations since they furnish an interpretative framework for the evaluation and 
labeling of the behavior of unemployed people (Howe, 1990).  
                                                 
6 Benefits levels were far from generous, and important groups were excluded from the insurance 
scheme –such as agricultural workers, domestic servants, teachers, nurses, civil servants, the 
police, armed forces and the railways (Burnett, 1994). 
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The stigmatization of the unemployed during this period, was 
accompanied by abusive practices from employers toward young workers through 
the use of apprentices as cheap labor, providing little or no training and 
dismissing them as soon as they qualified for skilled wages (Burnett, 1994). Even 
at their most employable age in their twenties or thirties men and women might be 
told that their years were against them, particularly for semi-skilled factory work 
where cheap juvenile labor was preferred and readily available. Age also operated 
against getting a job among those skilled whose trade had been made redundant 
by mechanization –such as woodworking, tailoring, boot and shoemaking, etc. 
Male unemployment in the inter-war period was much higher than female 
unemployment.7 However, these differences in terms of the gender composition 
of the unemployed have to be set against the fact of lower levels of female 
participation in the labor force and against their under-representation in official 
statistics of unemployment, especially among married women. This attitude 
toward working women was not simply the result of traditional perspectives on 
gender roles, but mainly the result of a family-centered approach that prevailed 
during this period. As Perry points out: 
The reassertion of the family at the time of the depression reflected the 
fact that the family unit constituted the cheapest way of housing, feeding 
and clothing the depression-hit working class. In this light, the household 
means test and the campaign against women workers were two sides of the 
same strategy, which sought to place the upkeep of the unemployed on 
                                                 
7 In 1934, women made up only 18% of the registered jobless in eight European countries -
Austria, Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, Italy, Poland and Switzerland (Perry, 2000). In 
Britain, after legislation in 1931 women ceased to qualify for unemployment benefit unless they 
could show a ‘reasonable expectation” of obtaining insurable work, and that their chances were 
not impaired by the fact of marriage, which probably operated as disincentive to register as 
unemployed (Burnett, 1994).  
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other members of the family –be that their husbands, their parents or even 
their adult children. By this route, the working class were kept alive at the 
lowest possible cost to the state (2000:178).   
 
2.1.2. The Experience of Unemployment  
Long-term unemployment and its concentration in declining industrial 
towns inspired a number of pioneer and classic studies on unemployment. Much 
of the literature on the unemployed condition during the interwar period focused 
on male unemployment within the skilled and unskilled working class 
experiencing joblessness for more than one year.  
Despite their valuable insights on the experience of unemployment in the 
private sphere, these studies tend to remove the individual from his or her context 
of changing political and economical events. Moreover, most of these studies are 
based upon a conception of regular, formal, and stable employment, assumed to 
be the “normal” form of work.  At the same time, they have tended to disregard 
the question of gender. Female unemployment has not only tended to be 
underestimated in official statistics, but women’s time outside paid employment 
has also tended to be seen as “voluntary”, and family roles as alternative sources 
of identity and fulfillment. In fact, female unemployment as a phenomenon with 
its own characteristics has only been recently acknowledged and incorporated in 
social research on unemployment (Morris, 1990; Gershuny and Marsh, 1994; 
Gallie and Alm, 2000; Russell and Barbieri, 2000). 
Focusing on how the attitudes of the unemployed  changed with time out 
of work, Jahoda, Lazarsfeld and Zeisel (1972 [1933]) studied the small Austrian 
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textile factory village of Marienthal, devastated by unemployment, where three 
quarters of the families depended on relief payments. They discovered a 
systematic change in orientations to life as a result of being out of work (shock, 
optimism, resignation, despair, apathy) linked to increasing lengths of 
unemployment and decreasing levels of income. Searching for work was an 
increasingly dispiriting occupation as days, weeks and even months passed 
without result, whether for skilled workers who anxiously waited for the postman 
to bring a reply to a letter or for the unskilled who retraced well–trodden routes in 
widening circles from home (Burnett, 1994).  
Some years later, with the appearance of Eisenberg and Lazarsfeld’s 
(1938) work on the psychological effects of unemployment the “stage model” 
acquired the status of a general law in subsequent studies.  The model mostly 
ignored the extreme circumstances of the Marienthal case and the varieties of 
reactions unemployment can generate. According to this perspective, the 
unemployed pass through a series of psychological stages, forming a pattern or 
model. Shock is the initial reaction to job loss; this is followed by optimism while 
the person is looking for work; pessimism supplants optimism when no job is 
found. Finally the individual becomes fatalistic and adapt himself to this new state 
but with a narrower scope, until, for some a final stage of apathy and despair 
results in a total lack of initiative, self-confidence and hope, which is called the 
‘broken’ stage (Ibid). In her latter work, Jahoda (1982) developed the 
“deprivation theory” to explain the socio-psychological consequences of 
unemployment. She highlights the importance of the latent functions of “modern 
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forms of employment” beyond its manifest function of producing income. These 
functions are related to life-structure and ties with the community. Employment, 
Jahoda argues, provides an enforced pattern of activity and gives people a clear 
time structure for the day.  It is a source of social contacts outside the household. 
It gives people a sense of participating in a wider collective purpose and it is a 
source of social status and identity (Ibid). 
 Without ignoring the importance of the latent functions of employment, 
we have to be aware of the risks of overestimating and generalizing about what 
work really means or provides. The impacts of unemployment cannot be fully 
understood without reference to previous employment experiences when at work; 
work does not necessarily represent a universally rewarding and structured 
activity. In his research on Algeria in the early 1960s, Bourdieu describes the 
experience of employment among unskilled workers on precarious jobs, which 
clearly contrasts with Jahoda’s description. 
The daily routine divided between searching for work and improvising 
work, the week or the month broken up into working days and idle days 
by chance hirings and lay-offs –everything is stamped with 
precariousness. No regular timetable, no fixed place of work; the same 
discontinuity in time and space (Bourdieu, 1972:66). 
 
In his study The Unemployed Man (1933), E. Wight Bakke reported data 
from a six-month stay in the London borough of Greenwich, which was not a 
depressed area. The extent of unemployment was average for the country as a 
whole and was mainly intermittent not long term. Among other issues he 
examined the effect of unemployment insurance on the willingness and ability of 
workers to support themselves. He found little evidence supporting the 
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‘dependence culture’ thesis, pointing out that “hunting a job is the “job” of the 
unemployed worker. It is the most important part of his self-maintenance efforts” 
(1933:129). His work also provides interesting insights on the different reactions 
to unemployment and in the adjustment to unemployment among different 
categories of workers, on family circumstances and material resources, on 
dominant work-based ideas of gender roles and on the source of personal identity. 
In his further work (1940) in the American town of New Haven, Bakke reaffirms 
his previous findings on the impact of unemployment on male breadwinners, for 
whom the experience of being out of work not only represents a challenge to their 
masculine identity, but also an erosion of their status in the family and the 
community.8 The wife’s role as keeper of the household income and her capacity 
of stretching resources through changes in consumption patterns is another 
important finding of his study. The importance of older children’s contribution is 
also noted, as well as the possibility of a wife’s employment, which tends to 
present important variations according to ethnic identity and appears to be a 
source of marital tension (Bakke, 1940). 
At around the same time as Bakke’s research, following the social 
psychological tradition of most studies of the period, Komarovsky (1940) focuses 
on a homogeneous group of 59 men (long-term unemployed native-born 
Protestants, skilled manual or white collar workers in nuclear family households) 
                                                 
8 In fact, the dual aspect of the breadwinner role –working and providing- contains a potential 
conflict of values and standards. As Jordan et al (1992) points out being a worker involves the 
development of certain work and social skills in a men’s world of reputation and competition; it 
can also be intrinsically enjoyable or at least satisfying in retrospect. Being a provider involves 
delivering income to a family; a man’s earnings are seen in terms of a ‘family wage’, even though 
actual rates of pay and conditions of employment do not easily correspond with a notion of an 
income sufficient to meet weekly household needs (Ibid). 
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located in a large industrial city outside of New York. As in Bakke’s case, the 
study of Komarovsky (1940) emphasizes the relationship between the man’s role 
as economic provider and his authority within the family, particularly how a 
work-based gender identity is disrupted by male unemployment. In terms of the 
disruptive effects on family relations, he points out that unemployment brings out 
existing strengths and weaknesses in the family (Ibid). In these studies, for which 
the parameters of “normality” were the nuclear family and the male breadwinner 
role, wife’s employment is mainly analyzed in terms of its impact on the 
husband’s self-esteem. Later research, in the context of the profound changes 
experienced during recent decades in family structure, present a more complex 
picture, in which the impacts of unemployment on family dynamics tend to vary 
according to the economic situation of the household, the family stage in which 
unemployment is experienced, the preexisting domestic division of labor and 
family conceptions, among other factors. (Morris, 1990; Roberts, 1991; Jordan et 
al., 1992; Gallie, Marsh and Vogler, 1994; Pedersen et al., 2000; Gallie and 
Paugam, 2000; Russel and Barbieri, 2000). 
The Pilgrim Trust survey of unemployment in six British towns in 1938 
reaffirms Bakke’s findings regarding the importance of the worker’s former status 
in his attitude and ability to adjust to joblessness. The adjustment was found to be 
more difficult for the skilled worker, who had pride in his work, and often in his 
firm, than for the unskilled who had little interest in the job and no regular time 
routine. In its unusual inclusion of a section on women’s unemployment, the 
study points out that unemployment affects women not just directly but in their 
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position as wives of unemployed men. Moreover, the variability of the experience 
of unemployment when considering local labor market conditions, categories of 
workers, and household stages, among other factors, appear as one of the most 
important issues highlighted by this study.   
 
2.2. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE ‘UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM’: THE 1980S 
AND 1990S 
In contrast with the 1930s, unemployment was not a major source of 
sociological research during the period of economic prosperity that followed the 
war. From 1945 to the early 1970s, the OECD countries enjoyed a ‘golden age’ in 
terms of their labor market performance, an era of full employment job security, 
rising real incomes and increasing social equality in economic welfare and 
opportunity (Martin, 1998). Up to the 1970s, research was mainly focused on the 
effects of technical, social and cultural change on the social structure of Western 
societies. Since the late 1970s, after the second ‘oil shock’, unemployment rose to 
levels that were unprecedented since the great inter-war recession. Most 
employment certainties were undermined, and the labor market became 
characterized by increasing uncertainty, insecurity, risk and inequality. In the US 
massive job losses in the manufacturing sector in the 1980s coincided with the 
Reagan administration’s reductions in federal domestic spending, with the 
tightening of eligibility for public assistance, and the rise of the philosophy of 
laissez-fare and community self-help (Zippay, 1991).  
This context of crisis marked a new phase of research on unemployment. 
During the 1980s a vast number of studies were conducted in Europe and the 
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United States focusing on changes and continuities in the unemployment 
experience, generating an important debate on the strengths and weaknesses of 
categories and explanations generated five decades ago. 
Most European studies have suggested that conditions in the 1980s were 
different from those of the inter-war years particularly as a result of the 
improvements in the welfare system, which has removed much of the risk of total 
economic destitution. In fact, the system of welfare provision for the unemployed 
is central not only in the definition of unemployment 9 but also in most research 
generated since then. Moreover, most of the studies on the effects of 
unemployment continued to be focused on long-term unemployment. 
In countries, such as Argentina, where the existence of social rights was 
tied to employment, and specifically to formal employment, the use or misuse of 
almost inexistent unemployment benefits is certainly not the case. Moreover, 
long-term unemployment in face of very weak social protections is a phenomenon 
that, while important among certain groups, is much less extensive than in 
Europe. Downward mobility and community dislocation as a consequence of 
unemployment has been highlighted in some studies focused on blue-collar towns 
experiencing plant closings.10 However, the particularity of the current scenario in 
Argentina is that these processes are not localized in particular depressed areas 
                                                 
9 The conventional definition of unemployment in most European countries is to deem 
unemployed anyone whom the social security system recognized as unemployed for the purpose 
of obtaining benefits (Gallie and Marsh, 1994).   
10 In Argentina, Roffman and Peñalva (1995) analyze the impacts of the closing of SOMISA, the 
former state-owned steel company -which employed 12,000 workers- on the locality of San 
Nicolas in Buenos Aires province. In the US, Zippay (1991) focuses her study in the Shenango 
Valley in Pennsylvania, once a center for steel and manufacturing and fabrication, where an 
estimated 6,700 mill workers lost their jobs as a consequence of a series of plant closings in the 
early 1980s.   
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but in a context where the whole social and occupational structure seems to be 
collapsing. 
 
2.2.1. Job Insecurity and Unemployment   
The extension of job insecurity during the last decades has eroded the 
clear-cut difference between employment and unemployment. It is argued that 
most people need a certain amount of security in order to be able to maintain a 
psychologically meaningful existence. In fact, labor market insecurity –where 
unemployment is an extreme case- appears to be a major mechanism generating   
psychological distress (Burchell, 1994). It has been found that there is no 
significant difference between the levels of stress among the unemployed and  
those in precarious employment. For the unemployed, it is not just the fact of 
getting a job but getting a secure job that appears to improve their psychological 
well-being (Ibid). Moreover, the frequent combination of unemployment and 
precarious employment raises a number of problems, especially as to its 
consequences for the shaping of occupational and social identity, which requires 
extensive qualitative social research (Yepez del Castillo, 1994). 
Work and employment remain as the most important determinants of life-
chances for the majority of the population.  However, as work and employment 
change, so will the manner in which these life chances are constructed (Crompton 
et al., 1996). Rubbery  (1996) suggests that the major change that is taking place 
in the labor market is that previously advantaged groups are sharing in the risks of 
 33
instability, unemployment and low income previously faced only by secondary 
sector workers.  
In Europe, wage employment represented the stepping stone of social 
integration. In this context, occupational precariousness –insecure jobs and 
unemployment- is viewed as an accumulation of disadvantages –in terms of 
education, training, employment, housing, and financial resources- that can lead 
from a zone of integration to a zone of precariousness, vulnerability, and finally to 
social exclusion (Castel, 1992; Paugam, 1995; Rodgers, 1995; Paugam, 1995; 
Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1999). Two main processes contributing to exclusion have 
been differentiated in the European literature: on the one hand, unemployment 
and job precariousness for groups of people who were fully integrated before, and 
on the other hand, the difficulties in entering the labor market to enjoy the social 
bonds associated with it (Castel, 1997; Berghman, 1995).11  
 Persistent unemployment in Europe has made employment the dominant 
social policy issue. The protection afforded by the state against destitution, which 
has led –with a wide range of variation among countries- to the 
decommodification of labor (Esping-Andersen, 1990), has reduced the 
dependence on the labor market. Recently, the importance of state provisions in 
contributing to a process of de-familialization has also been recognized (Esping 
Andersen, 1999; Gallie and Paugam, 2000). State provision implies a 
commitment to collectivizing the weight of family responsibilities or in other 
                                                 
11 Manual and unskilled workers together with young labor force entrants, the less educated, 
ethnic minorities and older workers, are among the most affected by long-term unemployment 
(one year or more), which in 1994 affected 5 out of ten unemployed in the European Union 
(Martin, 1998). 
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words, lessens individual reliance on the family, thus facilitating the participation 
of household members -especially women- in paid employment. The nature and 
forms of intervention of the state to protect individuals from misfortunes in the 
labor market is related to the system of employment benefits, the extent of 
development of active employment policies and the availability of specific 
policies to assist women’s employment –such as the provision of childcare (Gallie 
and Paugam, 2000). According to these criteria it is possible to distinguish at least 
four ‘unemployment welfare regimes’ in Europe: the sub-protective regime, the 
liberal/minimal regime, the employment centered regime, and the universalistic 
regime (Ibid).12  
Where neither market, nor welfare state offer an affordable or adequate 
alternative, households are compelled to produce their own personal and social 
welfare, which does not guarantee that welfare will actually be provided (Esping-
                                                 
12 A sub-protective regime  -predominant in Southern European countries- is a system that offers 
the unemployed less than the minimum level of protection needed for subsistence. Few of the 
unemployed receive benefits, and when they do the amount is low. Active employment policies 
are virtually non-existent. In this type of regime, it could be expected that the unemployed will 
experience severe financial difficulty and live under the poverty threshold. It reveals a chronic 
absence of organized and planned intervention by the state. The liberal/minimal regime (UK and 
Ireland) provides a higher level of protection than the sub-protective, but provides a low level of 
financial compensation and there is a little development of active employment policies. It reflects 
an explicit political will not to intervene too heavily in the protection of the unemployed so as not 
to undermined the laws of the market, and there is a strong risk that the unemployed will suffer 
from poverty. Given the emphasis on mean-tested household income unemployed married women 
is the group least protected. The employment centered- regime (France, Germany, The 
Netherlands, and Belgium) provides a much higher level of protection than the previous one, but 
the coverage remains far from complete, given that the principles of eligibility for compensation 
are primarily defined in terms of previous employment experience. Vulnerability to poverty tends 
to vary depending on the status of the unemployment and length of time they have been employed. 
Women and young people could be expected to have lower levels of protection given that they are 
less likely to have either lengthy or continuous employment experience. Finally, the univeralistic 
regime (Denmark and Sweden) offers a comprehensive coverage of the unemployed, a much 
higher level of financial compensation and a more ambitious active employment policies. It is the 
regime that discriminate the least between unemployed people in terms of either sex or age. (Ibid) 
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Andersen, 1999). In weak welfare systems the lack of safety nets implies that 
individuals are forced to look for survival through precarious jobs because they 
cannot afford to remain unemployed for long periods (Rodgers, 1989; Bhalla and 
Lapeyre, 1999).  
Different studies point out a growing spatial patterning of poverty (Morris, 
1987; Massey, 1996; Wilson, 1987, 1996). Concentrated poverty, which tend to 
be associated with joblessness, follows from any process that gathers poor people 
together in space and then impedes their socioeconomic and residential mobility 
(Massey, 1996). Morris (1987) highlights the spatially related nature of 
socioeconomic polarization in deprived local labor markets. In the Latin 
American context, processes of residential segregation experienced since the 
1980s appear as a result of the expulsion of the poor toward the outskirts of the 
city as a consequence of their limited opportunities of achieving a relatively stable 
insertion in the labor market (Katzman, 2000). Roberts (1989) points out that the 
increasing importance of precarious forms of employment is likely to make 
people more dependent on community ties for meeting economic needs. Social 
isolation for these workers (either unemployment, self-employed, or unprotected 
wage workers) is likely to be more costly than for those in full-time formal work 
who can draw on workplace relations. An increasing social heterogeneity and 
sense of localism are likely to reinforce the spatial factor in the class relations of 
the working class. I such contexts it is expected that issues of housing, social 
infrastructure, and communal welfare, and the solidarities and divisions generated 
by these become the bases of action of these segment of workers (Ibid). However, 
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in situations of extended job insecurity such as the one that characterizes 
Argentina today, it is also expected an erosion of community ties. Tensions both 
between and within households may increase as people compete, as well as 
cooperate, to obtain scarce resources. 
 
2.2.2. The Household and the Labor Market 
The household has increasingly become a key unit of analysis for the 
study of the impacts of unemployment, emphasizing the relationship between the 
household and the labor market. The rise in job insecurity and income decline 
mean that both low and middle-income households are finding it increasingly 
difficult to make ends meet, making more imperative for households to place 
more than one wage earner on the market (Roberts, 1991).  
The household, however, is not necessarily a consensual unit, and power 
relations certainly influence decisions concerning employment (Morris, 1990; 
Jordan et al., 1992; Selby et al., 1990; Moen and Wethington, 1992) Moreover, 
labor market decisions are based upon the expected roles of men and women (as 
husbands and wives), and the norms that are attached to these roles. Some studies 
suggest that together with a decrease in the proportion of employed heads of 
households and the increasing importance of women’s work in order to offset low 
male earnings, there has been a decline of households with multi-earners (Smith, 
1997). Special emphasis has been given to the consequences of unemployment for 
household relations, basically with respect gender roles, in terms of financial 
decision-making and domestic work as well as the consequences of job insecurity 
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on the stability of marital relationships (Morris, 1990; Jordan et al. 1992; Gallie 
Gershuny and Vogler, 1994; Lampard, 1994).  
 
2.2.3. Gender and Unemployment 
Most of the available research on unemployment focuses on males, while 
joblessness among women has been neglected. Moreover, women’s 
unemployment appears as a sharply contested terrain. It has been assumed that for 
women unemployment is a less problematic experience than for men because of 
the availability of both an alternative source of identity rooted in their domestic 
role and alternative means of support –through the male breadwinner. These 
arguments have been applied in a universalistic way, ignoring its validity in 
different cultural contexts and considering women’s unemployment as a 
homogeneous experience. In contrast with the argument outlined above, recent 
studies have found no evidence that unemployment was any less harsh in its 
effects on unemployed women than on unemployed men (Gallie and Vogler, 
1994). Research on unemployment is increasingly taking into account the gender 
issue (Morris, 1990; Gallie and Vogler, 1994; Smith, 1997; Gallie and Alm, 2000; 
Russell and Barbieri, 2000) 
 Given that women still retain the primary responsibility for childcare and 
housework, the decision to obtain employment and related factors (i.e. hours of 
work, type of job and location of employment) cannot be examined without 
further reference to the structuring effect of the domestic division of labor and 
gender relations within the household. This effect is structured by an 
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interrelationship of economic, social, ideological and political constructs (Smith, 
1997). Some studies reveal that while very few men of working age ever describe 
themselves as inactive, periods outside employment tend to be classified, in 
women’s accounts, largely into periods of inactivity rather than unemployment 
(Gershuny and Marsh, 1994). However, women’s perceptions on their 
employment status varied in different social contexts. Cerrutti (1997) found that 
that in contrast with Mexico City, where most women who are not working tend 
to consider themselves out of the labor force, in Buenos Aires women from poor 
households who are not working are more likely to be looking for a job.  
Women’s domestic role in the home can operate both as an incentive and a 
constraint for work. Dissatisfaction with the domestic role may motivate women 
to gain employment (Yeandle, 1994). However, the negative attitude of husbands 
toward wife’s employment, based in the traditional conception that a woman’s 
place is the family and not the labor market, may result in a disincentive to 
participate in paid work (Yeandle, 1984; Smith, 1997). Moreover, limited 
childcare provision reinforces women’s perceptions that their role should be in the 
home. There are, thus, a variety of tensions in the attitudes towards domestic 
duties and employment. Various factors associated with gender relations in the 
home may structure the employment/unemployment of married women and may 
contribute towards economic deprivation (Smith, 1997). 
While the importance of women’s earnings appear to be a fundamental 
source of income for keeping the household out of poverty, some studies provide 
evidence of that the husband’s ego and breadwinner status is not diminished by 
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women’s employment. In her work on married, unemployed blue collar women, 
Rosen (1987) found that even when women were providing half of the household 
income they continued to define their work as “helping” husbands, defining their 
earnings as supplementary. 
 
2.2.4. Social Class and Unemployment 
Most research on unemployment has focused on working-class 
occupations, where work of itself is unlikely to be fulfilling or to become the 
focal point of life, and where more traditional conceptions of gender roles are 
more likely to be found (Morris, 1990). However, it is also worth noting that 
across classes, male gender identity is strongly bound up with paid work.  Non-
financial motives such as personal fulfillment and career commitment as well as 
less traditional household arrangements are, however, more likely to be found 
among middle-class women (Hertz, 1986). In general terms, Morris (1990) 
suggests that middle class unemployment is more likely to represent a greater 
challenge to identity and more social stigma than among the working classes, but 
possibly more material support and access to savings, even when it can result in a 
strong disruption of previous life-styles.13 While little research has been 
conducted on unemployment among both working and middle classes, studies 
show that class may affect perceptions of unemployment, and that social classes 
                                                 
13  Ethnographic research conducted by Preloran (1995) in La Matanza -the biggest municipality 
of Great Buenos Aires- during 1991 points out the lack of upward mobility perspectives among 
middle-class unemployed men. Regarding their reinsertion in the labor market, most of them 
became self-employed in services and commerce after losing their stable jobs, getting  lower 
incomes than in their previous employment. 
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may differ both materially and culturally in their ability to deal with the 
unemployment experience.  
 
2.2.5. Social Networks and Unemployment 
The impacts of unemployment on patterns of sociability have been 
revisited.  Studies have found that, in contrast to the picture provided by the 
interwar literature of virtually complete social withdrawal, there is no general 
tendency of the unemployed to withdraw into inactivity. Moreover, 
unemployment appears to affect the structure of social networks, which become 
segregated (i.e. a high proportion of a person’s friends who are also unemployed), 
more than their extensiveness (Gallie Gershuny and Vogler, 1994; Gallie, 1994).   
The strength and nature of social links are different from country to country.  In 
societies where unemployment and precarious wage employment has persisted for 
many years, and is linked to weak economic development, as is the case in several  
countries and regions in Southern Europe , unemployment is unlikely to deeply 
affect social relations (Paugam and Russel, 2000). Because precarious wage 
earners and the unemployed form a broad social class, rather than a strictly 
defined underclass, they are not heavily stigmatized. Their standard of living is 
low but they remain part of social networks, which stem from family and the 
immediate neighborhood. In contrast, in countries such as Germany and France, 
which have seen a big increase in unemployment after a period of full 
employment, the unemployed are more likely to experience social 
disqualification, developing an overriding sense of failure accompanied by the 
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belief that everyday behavior will be interpreted as an indication of social 
ineptness or inferiority, and in extreme cases as a social handicap (Ibid).  
In contexts of extended insecurity and deep economic crisis -such as the 
Argentinean case- social networks become less effective and solidarity and 
reciprocity become seriously eroded. Focusing on impoverished middle classes, 
some studies analyze how the profound deterioration in the standards of living of 
these sectors has resulted in the progressive exhaustion of the social capital 
accumulated in the past  (Kessler, 1998; 2000 ).  
 
2.3. SUMMARY 
This literature review has showed the complexity and variability of the 
unemployment experience. Work histories, gender, class, household structure and 
dynamics as well as spatial factors -among others- appear as fundamental issues 
that contribute to explain the heterogeneity of the problem.   The extension of job 
insecurity during the last decades has eroded previous clear-cut differences 
between work and unemployment.  Work can be as disruptive as joblessness. The 
emergence of new uncertainties in the face of profound transformations in the 
structure of the labor market and their implications for household dynamics 
require a new emphasis on the analysis on how social risks are managed and 
distributed between the state, the market, and the family. This latter issue is 
particularly relevant in contexts where the stagnation of the market and the retreat 
of the state from the social arena are exerting an excessive pressure on the 
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household, resulting in a profound deterioration of living standards and in a 
marked erosion of the social fabric. 
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Chapter 3: The Context of Unemployment: The New Economic 
Model and the Deterioration of the Socio-Economic Structure in 
Contemporary Argentina  
Argentina is currently going through the deepest crisis in its whole history, 
affecting not only its social and economic structure, but also its political stability. 
The long and profound recession that began in 1998 has resulted in new increases 
in unemployment, poverty and inequality. The new administration – the Alianza- 
took office in the midst of a recession, maintained the existing system of 
convertibility, and focused its economic policy on the reduction of a growing 
fiscal deficit, which reached $7,000 million (2.4% of the GNP) in 2000, in the 
face of the withdrawal of external financing (ECLAC, 2000). Unable to halt a 
four year recession, in the midst of a financial crisis, with a unemployment rate 
almost reaching 20% and the freezing of bank deposits, President Fernando de la 
Rua stepped down in December 2001 after two years in office in the midst of a 
political turmoil and popular mobilization – from supermarket lootings and road 
blockages demanding food and work, to “cacerolazos” (pot-banging 
demonstrations) of middle classes claiming their savings. The provisional 
government that took office declared the default of most of the $148 billion 
foreign debt, and devalued the peso, ending a long decade of convertibility.14 
The dimensions and causes of the present crisis cannot be understood 
without a longer-term perspective that takes account of the old Argentinean socio-
                                                 
14 During the first trimester of 2002, GNP dropped around 11%. Between February 2001 and 
February 2002 industrial activity fell 15.9%, construction 42.8%, consumption of public services 
14.1%, and sales in shopping centers 29.6% (INDEC, Sintesis de Coyuntura, 4/9/002). 
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economic structure   and the processes and policies that led to its present profound 
erosion. The emergence of unemployment as the main employment problem 
during the 1990s, as well as the ways in which it is experienced by different social 
groups can only be fully grasped in reference to Argentine labor traditions. These, 
while sharply undermined in the present, constitute the reference framework 
through which people perceive and experience work and unemployment.  
This chapter analyzes the main trends in labor market dynamics before the 
1990s, as well as the profound imprints of the economic policies of the last 
decade on the Argentinean social and economic structure. The analysis of the 
characteristics of the labor market previous to the 1990s, distinguishes two main 
periods. The first, from 1950 to 1975, highlights the particularities of Argentina in 
the Latin American context, characterized by its relatively low levels of social 
inequality and of un- and under-employment, an extended system of public 
education, and a labor tradition based on formal work. In terms of social 
stratification, the emergence of a strong middle class in this period and the 
consolidation of a urban proletariat further contribute to understanding the 
privileged position that the country used to occupy in the region.  The second 
period, from 1975 to 1990, shows a process of increasing worsening of 
employment conditions, growth in social inequality and poverty levels, as well as 
a profound erosion of previous channels of social mobility, making the 
Argentinean labor market more akin to the rest of Latin America. Finally, the 
1990s witnessed not only a deepening of previous trends but the implementation 
of a new economic model that radically changed the basic rules of the game of the 
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ISI model, representing a definite break with the past. Convertibility, 
deregulation, and privatization became the axis of the new economic strategy, 
which alongside its success in terms of inflation control, resulted in 
unprecedented levels of unemployment, job insecurity, poverty and inequality. 
The new century found Argentina with a radically transformed social and 
economic structure that, in contrast to the privileged position it used to enjoy until 
the mid 1970s, became a paradigmatic case of economic failure and of the crudest 
experiment of economic orthodoxy in the contemporary Latin American context 
during the 1990s. 
 
3.1. LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS BEFORE THE 1990S 
3.1.1. The 1950-1975 period 
 Until the mid-1970s, Argentina was one of the few Latin American 
countries –together with Chile and Uruguay- that did not experience serious 
employment problems in terms of labor underutilization (PREALC, 1981; 
Beccaria and Orsatti, 1990; Beccaria, 1993; Llach and Llach, 1998; Altimir and 
Beccaria, 1999a). Because of its moderate levels of unemployment and 
underemployment, the expansion of wage labor, Argentina did not have high 
levels of redundant labor despite migration from border countries (see table 3.1 ). 
The lower levels of demographic growth15, accompanied by higher levels of 
urbanization16 and the early extension of public education contributed to explain 
                                                 
15 Annual population growth in Argentina was 1.7% during the period 1950-1970, while the mean 
growth for Latin America was 2.7% (ECLAC, 1983). 
16 Latin America, apart from the southern cone, was still predominantly agricultural by the mid-
century, contained a substantial peasant population, and had a weakly developed internal market 
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the particularity of Argentina in the Latin American context17 (Beccaria and 
Orsatti, 1990; Torrado, 1992; Beccaria, 1993; Tokman, 1997; Beccaria and 
Lopez, 1997a; Altimir and Beccaria, 1999a). 
Between 1950 and 1975, real wages remained at an approximately 
constant level. Relatively strong unions had been generally able to preserve the 
purchasing power of wages (Marshall, 1992, 1998). Urban poverty was less 
extended than in the rest of Latin America: in 1970, 5% of urban households were 
considered poor, which contrasts with an average 22% in the rest of the region.18 
Until the mid-1970, Argentina had one of the least unequal patterns of income 
distribution in Latin America. The Gini coefficient of household income 
distribution was 0.41 both in 1953 and 1961, compared with 0.57, 0.54, and 0.52 
in Brazil, Mexico, and Costa Rica respectively during the same period (Altimir 





                                                                                                                                     
(Infante and Klein, 1991; Roberts, 1996; Roberts and Oliveira, 1998). Because of its high levels of 
urbanization and per capita income by the 1940s, Argentina, together with Chile and Uruguay, 
were “early developers” in the region (Roberts,1996). Population in localities with 100 thousand 
or more inhabitants increased from 41.7% in 1950 to 55.6% in 1970; by 1970 the Greater Buenos 
Aires concentrated 36.1% of the total population (ECLAC, 1983).  
17 While employment problems were less severe in relative terms, they were by no means absent. 
The levels of unemployment and underemployment responded to economic fluctuations, affecting 
mainly the demand side (Beccaria and Orsatti, 1990). In fact during the recession of 1962-1963 
unemployment increased to 8%. In contrast during the expansive period of 1973-75 the levels of 
both unemployment and underemployment diminished.    
18 This information has been taken from ECLAC figures for ten countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Households in 
conditions of poverty are defined as the percentage of households having incomes of less than 
twice the cost of the basic foods shopping basket. (ECLAC, 1990:45) 
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Table 3.1.  Labor Market Characteristics in Latin America. 1950-1980. Selected 

















      
1950 43.5 53.6 14.1 25.7 30.1 46.5 
1980 64.0 58.9 18.3 38.2 44.6 42.2 
Argentina       
1950 72.0 71.3 24.5 42.1 56.8 22.8 
1980 84.4 72.2 21.0 54.6 65.0 25.7 
Brazil       
1950 39.2 50.7 12.8 16.6 9.1 48.3 
1980 62.1 54.6 19.3 32.0 17.9 44.5 
Chile       
1950 62.9 42.1 13.1 17.7 40.8 31.0 
1980 74.2 43.9 14.4 28.2 54.1 28.9 
México       
1950 34.5 51.1 11.2 20.4 21.6 56.9 
1980 61.5 63.4 19.0 36.1 39.5 40.4 
Uruguay       
1950 77.8 73.7 (1960) 10.8 33.5 34.7 19.2 
1980 82.3 72.9 18.8 49.0 62.6 27.1 
 
a Wage employment data correspond to the period 1950-1970, except Uruguay 1960-1970 
b Services include commerce, transportation, and services. 
c Defined by PREALC as those categories of the urban EAP not included in the urban informal 
sector. 
d Defined by PREALC as the sum of the informal urban sector (non-professional self-employed 
workers, unremunerated family workers, and domestic servants) and traditional rural workers. 
Source: Mercado de Trabajo en Cifras. 1950-1980, PREALC, Santiago de Chile: OIT 
 
The distinctiveness of Argentina in the Latin American context was based 
on several characteristics: the emergence of a strong and dynamic urban middle 
class -made up of professionals, white-collar workers, small-scale entrepreneurs, 
and independent craft workers; the consolidation of a urban proletariat employed 
in large and medium-size enterprises-; a middle class and a proletariat that were 
mostly of European origin (Torrado, 1992; Roberts and Oliveira 1998); 
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educational-linked mobility opportunities; a labor tradition centered on formal 
work; and the legally quite formal  profile of self-employment.   
 
3.1.1.1. Formal Labor Tradition 
During the post second- world war period, formal employment became the 
axis around which membership and social rights were organized in Latin 
American societies (Bayon, Roberts, and Saravi, 1998). Employment was the   
basic criterion for inclusion in the social security system and wages were the main 
mechanism of financial contribution.  During the Peronist governments of the 
1940s and 1950s, the “urban industrial worker” was the paradigmatic image of 
full citizenship. With the exception of education and public health services, which 
formally were universal, most of the social security services were tied to being 
formally employed.19 Social security benefits, such as health insurance, pension 
rights, or housing provision, were extended first to state employees, and mainly to 
white-collar workers.20 Key manual worker groups, such as railroad or the energy 
sector workers, who often were state employees, received such benefits next. In 
the 1950s and 1960s benefits were extended to many sectors of the urban working 
class, especially those working in large-scale enterprises.21 The access to social 
protection was accompanied by a growing regulation of the labor market, 
providing relatively established parameters in terms of employment security, 
                                                 
19 In the Constitution of 1949 –approved during the first Peronist administration and derogated by 
the military dictatorship in 1955-  the basic benefits of a social security system -social prevision, 
health insurance, etc.- were included and categorized as “worker rights”. 
20 According to the 1980 National Census figures, the public sector employed 52% of non manual 
workers. 
21 See Mesa-Lago, 1997 
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minimum wages, and health and safety requirements. By the mid 1970s wage-
workers protected by the labor code accounted for over 70% of the Argentinean 
labor force -a very high figure by Latin American and international standards 
(Marshall, 1998).  
The centrality of occupational status, however, resulted in the exclusion of 
those involved in the informal labor market from access to social rights. Social 
policies (apart from education and health care) were linked to formal employment 
and ignored the informal and poor sectors.22 In part this was a consequence of the 
low levels of unemployment during this period and the belief that continuous 
economic growth would increasingly “formalize” the labor market  (Martinez 
Nogueira, 1995). As Grassi et al. (1994) point out, the until recently popular 
phrase en este pais no trabaja el que no quiere (in this country the one who 
doesn’t work is because he doesn’t want to) comes from this period. 
This incomplete system of social provision, close to the Bismarckian 
welfare regime model, according to the classification proposed by Esping 
Andersen (1990), established a particular type of state-society relationship. 
Access to the benefits of the welfare state by the excluded sectors was also mainly 
obtained through clientelistic relationships. The complex set of patron-client 
networks with state bureaucrats or political leaders became one of the main 
sources of social capital for the marginalized and informal sectors (Bayon, 
Roberts and Saravi, 1998). Although the rules may say that benefits are rights of 
citizenship, de-facto decision-making structures ensured that many if not most 
                                                 
22 Social programs were generally oriented to “the mother and the child”, the disabled, etc. and 
even when the access to them was many times conditioned to the “unemployment of the head”, 
their implementation was highly selective (Grassi et al.1994) 
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low-income people were enrolled as clients of some intermediate-level patron; 
therefore, the relationship of popular sectors with the state was expressed more in 
terms of clientelism or paternalism than in terms of citizenship, rights and duties 
(Malloy and Parodi, 1993; Jelin, 1996). 
 
3.1.1.2. The Importance of Self-employment 
A significant part of what PREALC classifies as the informal sector23 was 
traditionally a relatively prosperous activity in Argentina and did not have the 
typical characteristics of a “refuge” activity.  It provided stability, moderate levels 
of productivity, and relatively adequate levels of income (Beccaria,1993; 
Marshall, 1992; Gallart et al., 1990, 1991; Torrado, 1992; Cimillo, 2000). The 
marked increase in self-employment during this period was accompanied by a 
proportional decline in the participation of wage-workers in total employment. 24 
Torrado (1992) clearly illustrates the kind of self-employment activities 
that grew under the ISI model 25, in the context of a dynamic internal market and 
the growth of the middle classes. Between the mid-1940s and 1970 almost half of 
the increase in self-employment activities was due to small commercial 
businesses that provided a middle class income and status. In fact, the growth of 
                                                 
23 Defined as owners and workers of enterprises of five or less employees and the non-
professional self-employed. 
24 According to Census data, while the former grew from 7.9% to 17.8% between 1947 and 1980, 
the latter decreased from 46% to 32.8% during the same period (Monza,1993;  Roberts and 
Oliveira, 1998). 
25 From the 1940s to the 1950s industrial growth was the result of import substitution of basic 
consumer goods –such as textiles, food and drink, and shoes, which made an intensive use of 
labor. However, by the 1960s, the phase began to exhaust itself, leading to the production of 
consumer durables, intermediate and capital goods, that, in contrast with the previous period, was 
based upon a more intensive use of capital, leading to linkages with multinational companies. 
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small commercial businesses accounted for four fifths of middle class growth 
during this period.26 In 1970, 47.5% of the self-employed were middle-class, and 
52,5% working class (Torrado, 1992). Among the latter, employment in 
manufacturing declined substantially, while construction and personal services – 
especially repair activities in mechanics, electricity, and electrical appliances- 
acquired greater weight.27  
Some authors have emphasized the “over-tertiarization” of the 
Argentinean economy -experienced with more intensity during the 1960s- and its 
consequences in terms of under-employment. According to Monza (1993) 
tertiarization was closely linked to the expansion of self-employment. He suggests 
that the increase of the informal component in the service sector represented an 
important mechanism of labor market adjustment during this period (Ibid). 
Likewise, Llach and Llach (1998) argue that an important part of the increase in 
activities related to non-tradable goods and services -such as construction, 
commerce, restaurants, and social and personal services- during this period was 
due to labor supply, resulting in low levels of productivity.  
The informal sector, however, is more than the simple translation of 
surplus labor into survival activities (Portes and Schauffler, 1991). Torrado (1992) 
argues that in the Argentina situation non-wage employment did not imply the 
exclusion of the self-employed from the standards of living shared by analogous 
                                                 
26 Urban density, the extension of the city, transportation facilities and costs, the established 
systems of distribution as well as the high popularity of small grocery stores among the population 
were some of the factors that contribute to explain the low presence of supermarkets during this 
period (Marshall, 1978). 
27 The higher costs of industrial goods compared with its repair costs explain the increase of this 
kind of activities during this period, when the automobile industry as well as electrical appliances 
were the leading industries (Marshall, 1978) 
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groups in the large and medium-scale sectors of the economy.28 A study 
conducted by the Ministry of Labor in 1980 29 in the metropolitan area showed a 
high level of labor satisfaction among the self-employed. These workers 
perceived their activities as well-paid, demanded by the market, as well as an 
upward mobility step; only a very low proportion of these workers had began in 
self-employment because of the lack of opportunities in the formal sector. 
According to Cimillo (2000), the greater segmentation of income among 
the self-employed in 1974 was due to the low incomes obtained by those workers 
placed in the lowest-income decile of this sector.  She asserts that by the end of 
the ISI period, marginal, self-generated employment of low–productivity among 
secondary workers was a small proportion of self-employment. In contrast, wage 
workers employed in micro-firms (five workers or less) were the most unstable 
segment of the labor market, receiving wages 28% below those of formal workers 
and 25% less than the self-employed (Ibid). The heterogeneity of the informal 
sector during this period was due mainly to differences between incomes received 
by the self-employed and wage-workers on the one side, and between formal and 
informal wage employment on the other. In terms of skills, while the self-
employed –basically those in manufacturing or repair activities- were relatively 
high skilled, micro-firms concentrated a greater proportion of low-skilled and 
non-unionized workers, who received little protection in terms of social benefits 
(Cimillo, 2000). 
                                                 
28 According to Census data, in 1980, living standards indicators –in terms of housing, health, and 
other basic needs- of the self-employed -both middle and working classes- were higher than those 
of their peers in wage employment (Ibid). 
29 Cited in Cimillo (2000) 
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3.1.2. The 1975-1990 period  
The 1980s were by and large years of economic crisis in Latin America, 
during which most of the region’s economy had either negative rates of growth or 
lower than 1% annually.30 The economic crisis, and the consequent adjustment, 
sharply impacted the labor market in terms of employment generation, 
deterioration in the quality of jobs created, and fall in real wages. Open 
unemployment became an issue to an extent that it had not been previously.31 
Unemployment, labor instability, and the reduction in wages resulted in an 
increase in the proportion of poor households during the decade from 25% in 
1980 to 31% in 1989 (PREALC, 1991; ILO, 1992). 
The privileged position of Argentina in the region experienced radical 
changes from the mid 1970s, when the growth of income inequality and labor 
instability generated a much more “Latin-Americanized” social and economic 
structure. As table 3.2. shows there has being an increasing process of 
concentration of income opportunities since the 1980s in the highest levels of the 
                                                 
30 One economic indicator after another registers the decline during the so-called “lost decade”: 
GDP per capita in 1990 was 10% lower than in 1980; consumption fell by 6%; the rate of 
investment fell from 21.2% of GDP in 1975-80 to 17.8% in the 1980s; inflation reached an 
average of 1,500% in 1990, and the countries of the region became net exporters of capital to the 
industrialized countries (ILO, 1992). 
31 Between 1980 and 1985 unemployment in the region increased more than 8% annually, which 
means an expansion of almost 50% during this period, when urban unemployment increased from 
6,9% to 11.1% (PREALC, 1987). While the sharp increases in open unemployment were 
experienced during the period of recession (1980-1983), its downward trend during the phase of 
economic expansion was relatively slow; indeed from 1983 onward it took six years to reach 5%, 
a rate similar to the historical level. 
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distribution, as well as a marked growth in the gap between the lowest and richest 
households.  
The 1975-1990 period presents two main characteristics. On the one side, 
with the progressive exhaustion of the ISI model the industrial expansion 
experienced in previous decades came to an end; on the other, the ending of ISI 
marked the beginning of a long period of decline accompanied by pervasive 
inflation. The neoliberal economic policy of the military government (1976-1984) 
was an attempt to overcome the constraints faced by inward oriented 
industrialization (market size, external restrictions, high levels of protection) in 
the context of the new international order. The economic program was based on 
financial reform, trade, market liberalization, and control of wages as the means 
to foster growth, modernize the economy, increase external competitiveness, and 
bring inflation under control. Wage policy was the means to control the labor 
force, and was accompanied by breaking-up the trade union structure.  
The highly negative impacts of these policies left a longer-term mark on 
the socio-economic structure. Firstly, trade liberalization lead, together with the 
overvaluation of the Argentinean currency and high interest rates, to a very deep  
crisis in manufacturing, resulting in the dismantling of local manufacturing 
industries (Kosacoff, 1993). Secondly, easy international credit contributed to an 
unprecedented growth of external indebtedness that was matched by capital flight 
rather than by increased domestic investment (Marshall, 1998). Mounting external 
indebtedness has operated as a major conditioner of subsequent economic policy. 
Finally, the wage freeze decreed in 1976 resulted in a decline of about 30% in real 
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wages that was not to be recovered (Ibid). The sharp drop in real wages 
contributed to an extended process of impoverishment that particularly affected 
the middle classes, which began to experience a sharp decline in its conditions of 
life. Furthermore, previous channels of social mobility were eroded. 
 
Table 3.2.  Income Inequality Indicators, Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-1997  
 1974 1980 1991 1997 
     
Gini Coefficient     
Total Household Income 0.356 0.411 0.430 0.446 
Per Capita Household Income 0.342 0.382 0.447 0.475 
     
Total Household Income Distribution     
Deciles 1-3 11.4 9.4 8.6 8.2 
Deciles 4-6 22.9 20.3 19.9 19.0 
Deciles 7-9 38.9 39.6 38.9 38.9 
Decile 10 26.9 30.6 32.6 32.1 
     
Per Capita Household Income Distribution     
Deciles 1-3 15.0 13.2 13.6 10.9 
Deciles 4-6 25.0 22.0 21.2 21.0 
Deciles 7-9 38.3 38.7 36.6 38.8 
Decile 10 21.7 26.0 28.4 28.4 
 
Note: Figures are based on the EPH, Greater Buenos Aires (October).  
Source: Altimir and Beccaria (1999b , on the basis of Tables 1, C-1, and C-2 
 
Following the military government, the Radical Party administration 
(1984-1989) was faced with the double challenge of shoring up the economy and 
meeting urgent social demands. Neither of these problems was resolved. A series 
of stabilization plans, characterized by a high degree of policy inconsistency 
(Lloyd-Sherlock, 1997) proved unable to control the acceleration of the rate of 
price increases; investment continued to fall, and capital flight could not be 
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deterred. The Radical administration suffered from a weak political base, fear of 
military intervention, and mounting resistance from the Peronist party. The 
government’s term concluded in the midst of political turmoil, with the deepening 
of the crisis and hyperinflation, which peaked at 4923.8% in 1989. 
Between 1976 and 1989 the GNP decreased at an annual rate of 1.4%. 
From 1974 to 1990 the industrial GNP fell 25%, industrial employment dropped 
40%, and labor’s share in the GNP dropped from 45% to 32% as a result of the 
erosion of real wages (Marshall, 1998; Katz et al., 1995; Beccaria, 1993). Figures 
from Greater Buenos Aires show that the minimum salary experienced a decline 
of 48% in real terms between 1974 and 1991, and the mean wage fell 34.5% 
during the same period (Altimir and Beccaria, 1999b).  
The transformation of the industrial structure during the period post-1976 
resulted in a regressive restructuring that has not yet been reversed (Notcheff, 
1994). Restructuring consisted in the growth and consolidation of capital 
intensive industries, producing goods that had low levels of differentiation, which 
were either mature or in decline at the international level –assembly activities or 
ones based upon a relatively simple use of natural resources.  There was also a 
simultaneous process of decline in the skill-intensive industries. In this context, 
issues related to technological and industrial innovation, which were never top 
priorities in previous periods, disappeared from the political agenda (Ibid).      
Numerous studies have pointed out the effects of these processes on the 
social structure and on the living conditions of vast segments of the population by 
the early 1990s (Minujin, 1992; Minujin and Lopez, 1994; Minujin and Kessler, 
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1995). They clearly show the impacts of adjustment policies on income 
distribution, which resulted in a process of increasing polarization and 
diversification of poverty situations (Minujin, 1992).  In 1980 11.1% of 
households in the Greater Buenos Aires received earnings below the poverty line. 
This percentage reached unprecedented levels as a consequence of hyperinflation: 
38.2% of households and almost half of the population (47.3%) in the Greater 
Buenos Aires were poor in 1989 (SIEMPRO, 1999). An important proportion of 
the extension of poverty during the 1980s resulted from the impoverishment of 
the middle class sectors, which experienced a progressive decline in their income 
levels (Minujin, 1992; Minujin and Kessler, 1995). Simultaneously poverty 
became more heterogeneous with the emergence of the so-called “new poor” and 
the deepening of poverty among those sectors who were already poor. While in 
1980 the mean income of poor sectors was 28% under the poverty line, in 1989 it 
was 45% (Beccaria and Lopez, 1997b). 
 
3.1.2.1. The “Latin Americanization” of the Argentinean Labor Market 
In spite of economic crisis, unemployment rates remained comparatively 
low during the 1980s (see table 3.3), despite a substantial fall in output. In fact, 
labor market adjustment was concentrated in a sectoral re-composition that, 
together with an absolute reduction in industrial employment, resulted in a sharp 
worsening of labor conditions. 
Most studies of the Argentinean labor market during this period emphasize 
the worsening of labor conditions as the main employment problem of the decade.  
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According to some scholars the “fragility” of the jobs generated is basically 
explained by the decline in wage labor and the increase in self-employment and 
domestic service (Llach and Llach, 1998). Most authors emphasize the low 
quality of the wage employment that was created, given that the bulk of it was in 
small enterprises -both formal and informal- and not registered in the social 
security system (Beccaria and Orsatti, 1990; Gallart et al. 1990; Marshall, 1992; 
Altimir and Beccaria, 1999a). Unprotected employment was the most extended 
form of precarious employment, which in the GREATER BUENOS AIRES 
increased from 19% in 1974 to 29% in 1990 (see table 3.5). The growth in wage 
employment was exclusively accounted for by the service sector –basically social 
and personal services, where wage employment increased from 28.9% to 36.7% 
between 1980 and 1990 (INDEC- EPH, 2000) Deindustrialization intensified the 
tertiarization of the occupational structure that had begun in the 1960s. In Buenos 
Aires, the main industrial center of the country, the share of manufacturing in 
wage employment plummeted from 41% in 1974 to 35% in 1984; and 28% in 
1990 (INDEC- EPH, 2000). 
The positive evolution of employment was accompanied by a decrease in 
the productivity rate32, which fell 25% between 1980 and 1990. The latter was 
associated  with the increase of informal employment and the deepening of the 
tertiarization of the economy (Llach and Lach, 1998; Altimir and Beccaria, 
1999a; Cimillo, 2000). In the metropolitan area, employment increased 11% 
                                                 
32 During the 1980s, non-agricultural GNP decreased 1.4% annually, while the employment rate 
grew 1.4%. Employment increase during this period was similar to the rate experienced between 
1960 and 1970, when GNP experienced an annual rate increase of 5% (Altimir and Beccaria, 
1999a). 
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between 1980 and 1990, mainly explained by the growth in low-productivity 
activities (17%) –informal sector and domestic service-, contrasting with formal 
employment, which increased only 6% (Cimillo, 2000). 
 
Table 3.3.  Urban Unemployment in Latin America. Selected Countries, 1970-
1989 (Average annual rates) 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 
      
Argentina 4.9 3.7 2.6 6.1 7.8 
Brazil 6.5 - 6.2 5.3 3.3 
Chile 4.1 15.0 11.7 17.0 7.2 
Mexico 7.0 7.2 4.5 4.4 2.9 
Uruguay 7.5 - 7.4 13.1 8.6 
 
Source: ECLAC, 1990, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
While part-time work did not show significant changes during the 
decade33, the proportion of involuntary part-timers among the employed 
population more than doubled between 1974 and 1990 from 3.8% to 8% (table 
3.4). In contrast with European countries, the weight of the merely occasional 
work in part-time (as opposed to regular part-time employment) is larger, and the 
shares of both men and involuntary part-time work are greater, and strongly 
associated with lack of social protection (Marshall, 1992). 34   
Low levels of open unemployment during this period can be attributed to 
two main factors: a decrease in the rates of labor force participation and the rise in 
                                                 
33 Among wage earners in the GREATER BUENOS AIRES, the percentage of those working less 
than 35 hours a week increased from 16.8% in 1980 to 17.6% in 1987 (Marshall, 1992: Table 1). 
34 According to 1987 figures, among wage-earners in the GREATER BUENOS AIRES, 47.5% of 
the underemployed did not receive any of the legal social benefits, against  30.5% of voluntary 
part-timers and 16.8% of the those in full-time employment (Ibid)  
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self-employment. During the 1970’s and early 1980s labor-force participation 
rates tended to decline (see table 3.4). In the first part of the decade this decline 
has been attributed both to an “income effect” –in a context of growth of 
employment and wages- as well as the extension of pension benefits, reducing the 
participation of the oldest segments of the EAP (Altimir and Beccaria, 1999a).35  
In contrast, since 1976, the withdrawal of certain groups from the labor market 
was partly due to a “discouraged worker effect”36 in a situation of slowdown in 
labor demand and a fall in real wages (Beccaria and Orsatti, 1990; Lach and Lach, 
1998; Marshall, 1998; Altimir and Beccaria, 1999).  
The rechanneling of labor demand from manufacturing to services, 
affected mainly the employment opportunities of low educated male heads of 
households but also slashed female employment in manufacturing.37 The 
stagnation of the overall female participation rate was the result of offsetting 
trends between a drop in the participation of the youngest and oldest segments 
and the increase of adult women aged 25-54, mainly spouses, as a result both of 
the job hardships of male heads and continued demand in female-oriented service 
occupations, such as domestic service (Cortés, 1997; Marshall, 1998).38 At the 
                                                 
35 Between 1974 and 1980  the activity rate of males older than 60 years dropped from 30% to 
24.6%, while female participation in the same age group increased from 6% to 6.6% (Altimir and 
Beccaria, 1999a: Table 2). In the late 1970s pension benefits had deteriorated somewhat less than 
wages (Marshall, 1998).  
36 “Discouraged workers” are those who say they want to work, are ready to work, but do not 
expect to find work, and are not looking for it in a context of job scarcity. This category is not 
categorized as “unemployed” by official statistics, but as ”inactive” or “out of the labor force”.  
37 The share of employed women with principal jobs in manufacturing dropped from 24.8% in 
1980 to 18.9% in 1991; for men this share decreased from 35.3% to 29.3% during the same period 
(Cortés, 1997). 
38 In the Greater Buenos Aires the labor force participation of heads of households decreased 
6.3% while spouses slightly increased their participation by 0.6% between 1976 and 1983. From 
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same time, the fall in employment and wages resulted in a reduction in the flow of 
migrant workers to industrial centers (Orsatti and Beccaria, 1990; Marshall, 1992, 
1998; Cortés, 1997).   
As table 3.4 shows, since the mid-1980s labor supply began to increase, 
mainly due to the growth in female participation and of the oldest segments of the 
population as a result of a sharp fall in the real value of pension earnings.39  
The rise in self-employment was the result of both a reduction of formal 
employment opportunities and increasing deterioration of wage income. In 
Greater Buenos Aires, self-employment increased from 18.5% in 1974 to 25% in 
1989 (INDEC, EPH). In contrast with the previous decades, the informal sector 
operated as an alternative to unemployment, resembling in this way the mode of 
operation of labor markets in most Latin American countries (Beccaria and 
Orsatti,1990; Torrado, 1992; Marshall, 1992; 1998; Cimillo, 2000). In Greater 
Buenos Aires informal employment grew 2.8% annually between 1980 and 1990 
(compared with a 2.4% increase in non-waged workers), while the formal sector 
experienced an annual increase of 0.2% during the same period –compared with a 




                                                                                                                                     
1984 to 1989 the increase in spouses’ participation more than doubled that of heads -7.0% and 
3.1% respectively (Cortés, 1997: Tables 1 and 2). 
39 In Buenos Aires, the labor force participation rate of persons aged 60-69 increased from 23.4% 
in 1984 to 28.7% in 1990 (Marshall, 1998). 
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Table 3.4. Labor Force Participation, Employment, Unemployment, and 
Underemployment Rates by Gender, Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-
1989 (Percentage) 
 1974 1976 1980 1983 1986 1989 
 
Participation rates1  
      
   Total 40.5 39.5 39.3 37.5 40.0 40.8 
   Female  24.8 23.7 24.7 23.0 27.5 27.9 
   Male 58.0 56.5 54.4 53.2 53.7 54.2 
Employment 2       
  Total 39.5 37.5 38.4 36.3 38.2 37.9 
  Female - - 23.8 22.1 26.1 26.1 
  Men - - 54.2 51.7 51.4 50.8 
Unemployment3        
  Total 2.4 4.0 2.3 3.1 4.5 7.0 
  Female  4.1 7.3 3.4 4.0 5.0 7.2 
  Male 1.6 2.5 1.8 2.7 4.2 6.9 
Visible 
Underemployment4 
      
  Total 3.8 5.0 4.5 4.9 6.1 8.0 
 
1 Rate of participation relative to the total population 
2 Rate of employment relative to the total population 
3 Unemployment rate relative to EAP 
4 Employed population who work less than 35 hours a week and wish to work longer relative to 
EAP. 
Source: INDEC-EPH, Información de Prensa, 12/21/00 (October waves). 
 
In contrast to what happened in the 1990s, during the initial stages of 
economic liberalization –from 1976 to the early 1980s- the greater capacity of the 
informal sector to operate as a “buffer” can be explained, according to Cimillo 
(2000), by two main factors. First, given the financial character of most the capital 
flows during this period, the spaces where the self-employed developed most of 
their activities –such as commerce and repairing- were not contested by the 
formal sector.  Secondly, the elimination of price controls and the inefficiency of 
the anti-inflationary policy in controlling the prices of non-tradable goods, made 
self-employment income more attractive than wage labor (Ibid).   
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Changes in the informal sector, however, were not just related to its size, 
but to its composition. Self-employment, traditionally a relatively prosperous 
sector, now incorporated a sizable segment with characteristics much more 
similar to the precarious, low-income activities widespread in other Latin 
American countries.40 The generation of precarious employment not only 
operated as the main mechanism of adjustment in the labor market, but also 
contributed to the increase in income inequality during this period. Both the 
productive structure of the formal sector and activities in the informal became 
increasingly heterogeneous in terms of productivity and earnings. On the one side, 
one of the main components in income differences among wageworkers was 
based on differences between similar occupations in different types of firms, even 
within the same sector (Beccaria, 1992). On the other, the informal sector also 
increased its internal income inequality due to the growth in refuge-type or 
subsistence activities, characterized by low productivity and income levels -see 
table 3.6. 
In contrast with the previous decade, the recession and the inflation  at the 
end of the 1980s, had a sharp impact on informal workers -in part due to the 
inclusion of formal workers in collective bargaining agreements reinitiated in 
1988 and due to wage increases in big firms (Cimillo, 2000). 
 
                                                 
40 A study conducted in 1985 (Gallart et al.,1990) concluded that in Greater Buenos Aires around 
40% of the self-employed would be performing informal activities (e.g. domestic service, 
peddling, construction labor, and garment homework) characterized by low levels of income, low 
skills and educational levels, labor instability, and lack of social security protection. 
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Table 3.5. Labor deterioration among the employed population, Greater Buenos 
Aires, 1974-1990 
 1974 1980 1990 
    
Informal Sector 1 37.6 42.1 44.4 
Formal Sector 62.4 57.9 55.6 
Wage employment 75.7 70.3 69.7 
Unprotected 
employment 2 
18.8 17.1 28.9 
 
1 Includes employers and wage workers in firms of no more than five employees, non-professional 
self-employed, family workers and domestic service. 
2 Wage workers without pension benefits 
Source: Cimillo, 2000: Table 2; Altimir and Beccaria, 1999a. 
 
The strong decline in the minimum wage, which dropped 47.8% in real 
terms between 1980 and 1991 (Altimir and Beccaria, 1999b) as well as the higher 
levels of unemployment among wage workers in micro-firms seriously affected 
their capacity to maintain their income levels. Fall in income among the self-
employed -basically in the lowest levels of the distribution- resulted in a greater 
inequality within this group (table 3.6). The fall in the self-employed levels of 
income, as well as the increase of unemployment among them increased their 






                                                 
41 In the Greater Buenos Aires the percentage of self-employed workers living in poor households 
increased from 2.6% in 1980 to 15% in 1990 (Cimillo, 2000:187). 
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Table  3.6. Gini Coefficients by Occupational Category. Greater Buenos Aires, 
1974-1990 
 1974 1980 1990 
Formal  
wage workers 
0.279 0.356 0.365 
Self-employed 0.312 0.348 0.388 
Informal 
wage  workers  
0.295 0.328 0.328 
Total 0.325 0.387 0.406 
 
Source: Cimillo (2000) on the basis of the EPH (October).  
 
In a context of wage repression, high inflation, and increasing 
unemployment, income evolution during the 1980s was highly negative for all 
workers -wage earners and self-employed- resulting in an average lost of one third 
in real terms by the early 1990s. The fall in real income was accompanied by an 
increasing inequality in income distribution, due to falling wages, the growth of 
income from profits, and a greater dispersion in the distributions of both wage 
earnings and the income of the self-employed.  Wage differentials between 
workers with different levels of schooling increased between 1974 and 1990.42  It 
was accompanied by a widening in the wage gap between manual workers and 
low skilled employees and professional and highly skilled non-manual personnel, 
managers and executive.  (Marshall, 1998; Altimir and Beccaria, 1999 a, b). 
The balance of the decade was highly negative for vast segments of the 
working-population, which became increasingly vulnerable: income inequality 
had risen, open unemployment and underemployment had continued to grow, 
                                                 
42 Relative wages increased among those with the highest educational levels (tertiary or more), did 
not experience changes among those with secondary complete, and decreased among the lowest 
educational levels (Altimir and Beccaria, 1999a)  
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wages and living standards had increasingly deteriorated, and social security and 
labor standards benefited fewer workers and were under assault. 
 
3.2. THE 1990-2000 PERIOD 
The 1990s found Argentina with a social structure characterized by 
growing inequality and higher poverty levels.43 During this decade there was not 
only a deepening of previous trends but the implementation of a new economic 
model that resulted in an increasing vulnerability for vast segments of the 
population. Transformations experienced during the previous decades, while 
resulting in a sharp worsening of the economic and social structure, had not 
radically changed the basic rules of the game of the ISI model. In fact, until the 
1990s, none of the main state-owned enterprises had been privatized and labor 
market regulation had not experienced major changes; the new economic strategy 
assigned a new role to the state and represented a real break with the past 
(Beccaria, 1993; Marshall, 1998).  
 
3.2.1. The Axis of the New Economic Model: Convertibility, Deregulation, 
and Privatization  
The new economic measures were implemented during the two successive 
terms of President Carlos Menem (Justicialist Party) from 1989 to 1999, and were 
consistent with the general tenets of the new right-wing orthodoxy (Lloyd-
Sherlock, 1997).  
                                                 
43 The latter were particularly high in during 1989-1990 because of the hyperinflation experienced 
during this period. 
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After several failed attempts at reducing inflation, a new economic 
program was applied beginning in 1991.44 The stabilization program had two 
central elements. The first was the convertibility of the Argentinean currency. It 
included the use of the nominal exchange rate to anchor domestic prices. The 
nominal exchange rate was fixed and Congress quickly made the measure a law. 
The new parity between the dollar and the peso was established at one peso to the 
dollar. The second element was a new legal framework regulating the process of 
money creation, greatly narrowing the Central’s Bank autonomy to conduct 
monetary policy and to supply credit to the government. Congress barred the 
Central Bank from printing money to cover budget deficits unless new issues 
were completely backed by gold or foreign currency. In this way, the 
monetization of the fiscal deficit was prohibited and the evolution of money 
supply was closely tied to the evolution of the private sector’s demand for 
domestic assets (Lloyd-Sherlock, 1997; Fanelli and Frenkel, 1998).  
Together with convertibility, reduction of the fiscal deficit -both by cutting 
expenditure and by increasing tax revenues- and the deregulation of markets 
constituted the pillars of the new economic model.  Although wages were not 
controlled directly by the state, wage policy encouraged decentralization of wage 
bargaining and subordinated wage increases to productivity increases. 
The Convertibility Plan proved to be a powerful anti-inflationary policy: 
between December 1992 and December 1993 consumer prices rose by only 7.4% 
                                                 
44 There had been two hyperinflationary surges (in mid-1989 and in late 1980-early 1990). A 
program based on a floating exchange rate coupled with a tight monetary anti-inflationary policy 
(between April 1990 and March 1991) had failed. Its breakdown was reflected in a 287% rise in 
consumer prices, high real interest rates, the appreciation of the exchange rate, and a recessive 
trend (Fanelli and Frenkel, 1998). 
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although certain prices, such as private services45, continued to rise visibly. 
During the rest of the decade Argentina had the lowest rates of inflation in Latin 
America.46 Although convertibility reduced price increases, inflation differentials 
between the U.S.A. and Argentina led to a steady overvaluation of the domestic 
currency47, undermining Argentina’s export potential. The radical transformation 
in the functioning of the economy was accompanied by changes in the 
international context.48   
In contrast with the stagnation of the economy during the previous decade, 
between 1991 and 1999 the GNP grew 4.7% annually against the negative rates of 
-0.3% during the period 1982-1990. In per capita terms the GNP variation was     
-2% during the 1980s and 3.4% during the 1990s (Heymann, 2000). The 
evolution of the Argentinean economy during the 1990s can be divided in two 
phases: a first phase of expansion from 1991 and 1994, and a second long phase 
of contraction, which began in early 1995, and has sharply deepened from 1998 
until now. While the end of the expansionary phase is usually attributed to the 
Mexican crisis, some authors (Fanelli and Frenkel, 1998) suggest that the relevant 
recessive trends were already present in 1994.49  
                                                 
45 Private services include renting, private education and health, tourism, domestic services, and 
personal care.  
46 The rate of variation in consumer prices kept low after 1994, achieving   deflation between 
1998 and 2000. From 1996 this variation was below 1% and in 1999, in the context of a profound 
recession the CPI experienced a negative variation of -1.8% (ECLAC, 2000). 
47 Between April 1991 and late 1994 the domestic currency had lost 40% of its real value against 
the U.S. dollar (Lloyd-Sherlock, 1997) 
48 Particularly Argentina was affected by the increase in the interest rates in the U.S. during the 
first part of 1994, and   by the financial effects of the Mexican devaluation by the end of that year. 
Moreover, the financial instability and slowdown of the Brazilian economy at the beginning of 
1999 also had important effects on the local economy (Heymann, 2000).     
49 When interest rates started to increase in the U.S. in 1994, changes in the trends of some key 
financial and real variables occurred. On the financial side, capital inflows dropped approximately 
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From 1991 to 1994 domestic demand grew by 38% and the GNP by 32% 
(table 3.7).50 A key point in understanding the nature of the phase of expansion is 
the expansion of credit as the major factor behind the huge increase in demand.  
Generalized reductions in import duties facilitated a massive entry of imports 
stimulated by the access to international financing. Low inflation rates, 
expectations of a long-term stability, and the access to credit for consumer 
durable goods encouraged a sudden surge in domestic demand. The most 
important consequence of the simultaneous financial and trade deregulation in the 
context of a ready supply of foreign funds   and currency appreciation  was the 
marked increase in the trade  deficit (Marshall, 1998). This deficit was propelled 
by a booming demand for imports which multiplied imports six-fold between 
1990 and 1994. In sum, the phase of expansion during the first part of the decade 
was based on international financing. Actually, the external debt, that represented 
32.3% of the GNP in 1991 increased to 51.8% in 2000 (table 3.7), becoming a 
permanent source of instability and a major limitation on   economic policy. The 
rapid increase in open unemployment, despite impressive economic growth and 
large inflows of capital, was a clear sign that, whatever was happening elsewhere 
                                                                                                                                     
30% in 1994 compared to 1993, while the current account deficit, which had began growing since 
1991, continued to increase in 1994. The joint effect of lower capital flows and a larger account 
deficit determined a decline in reserves in 1994 for the first time in the decade. At the same time, 
the price of long-term Argentine bonds fell more than the  American’s, implying a rise in the 
country-risk factor. On the real side of the economy, some sectors exhibited incipient recessive 
trends in the second half of the year. The chances of observing the effects of a gradual contraction 
in reserves, money and bank deposits under the new convertibility regime, however, were aborted 
by the Mexican crisis which induced a marked “discontinuity” in the evolution of the economy at 
the end of the year. (Ibid) 
50 Remember, however, that the economy had been experiencing a recessive trend since 1988 and 
in 1990 the activity level was extremely low. 
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in the economy, the bulk of the Argentina’s productive sector continued to wither 
(Loyd-Sherlock ,1997).    
The increasing vulnerability of the country to international financial crisis 
was the combined result of the kind of policies applied, their timing, and the 
complete absence of “protective” mechanisms to limit the impacts of external 
crisis on the domestic economy51.  
From 1989 successive changes in tariff structure sharply reduced import 
duties.52 Foreign trade, and, in the framework of MERCOSUR, particularly with 
Brazil53, acquired a rising weight in the Argentine economy. As table 3.7 shows, 
exports, and mainly imports, grew during most of the decade until the beginning 
of the long recession that began in 1998. While during the 1982-1990 period the 
exchange of goods and services (average of imports and imports at constant 
prices) represented less than 8% of the GNP (9.3% exports, and 6.3% imports), 
these figures for the 1991-98 period were 14.5% (12.5% exports, 16.2% imports) 
and in 1998 they were around 19%. Since then, both imports and exports have 
shown negative trends.54 Although exports grew from 1991 to 1998 the increase 
                                                 
51 Non-restrictive policies regarding capital movements –including financial flows and direct 
foreign direct investment- were maintained independent of the changes in the international and 
domestic markets. In contrast to other experiences, such as Chile and Colombia, the government 
did not resort to either capital controls or sterilization to smooth the fluctuations in real exchange 
rate, the money supply, and domestic absorption generated by variations in the magnitude of 
capital flows. Thus, the changes in the international capital and real markets were fully reflected in 
the domestic economy. (Fanelli and Frenkel, 1998) 
52 In 1989 the maximum duty on imports was reduced from 40% to 30%; in 1992 duties were 
further reduced to 22%, and in 1997 the nominal average duty on imports coming from outside the 
MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common Market) were below 14% (Heymann, 2000). 
53 In 1998, 30% of exports and 22.6 % of imports were destined to and came from Brazil 
respectively.   
54 In 1999 the value of merchandise exports fell by around 12% for the first time since 1991as a 
result of lower unit values, since the total volume of exports remained virtually unchanged. The 
reduction in the value of exports was reflected in all major categories of goods except for fuel, 
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in imports was far greater. The main increase in the volume of exports is related 
more to the integration process with Brazil than to the liberalization of trade in 
general. Besides, while those exports, which tended to increase after the opening, 
were natural-resource intensive, the exports to the MERCOSUR tended to have a 
higher labor content and to be more sophisticated technologically (Fanelli and 
Frenkel, 1998).  
The aim of policy was to tackle the fiscal deficit by curtailing expenditure 
and increasing tax revenues. To both reduce government expenditure and increase 
revenues a vast privatization program was implemented, and measures were taken 
-with the “help” of ad-hoc international loans- to reorganize and modernize the 
state structure and reduce public employment (Marshall, 1998). Under the 
framework of the Ley de Reforma del Estado (State Reform Law), a wide and 
diversified process of privatization of state-owned enterprises began from 1989 
that ranged from airlines, telephones, oil, gas, water and sewage, electricity, 
railways and the underground transit system, roads, steel works, provincial banks, 
airports, nuclear programs, etc. Between 1990 and 1999 the amount of 
privatization revenues reached 24 billion dollars, one of the highest in Latin 
America after Brazil and Mexico (ECLAC, 2000). In spite off these revenues, 
external indebtedness continued to grow during the whole decade.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
whose price trends diverge from the rest. Commodity exports fell further than the average. Grain 
sales took heavy looses, as well as exports of fruits, oil, cotton fiber, fishery, and meat. One of the 
main reasons for the decrease of non-traditional manufacturing exports was the strong downturn in 
sales of transport equipment, although there were also appreciable declines in metal 
manufacturers, electrical machinery, chemicals, textile, and paper. The decrease in imports (19%) 
was also across the board: consumer goods fell by close to 8%, which was less than intermediate 
goods (21%), and capital goods (17%). (ECLAC, 2000)  
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Table 3.7. Argentina: Main Economic Indicators, 1990-2000 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 
GDP (Annual growth rate) 
 -1.8 10.6 9.6 5.9 5.8 -2.9 5.5 8.0 3.9 -3.0 -0.5 
 
Per capita GDP (Annual growth rate) 
 -3.2 9.2 8.2 4.5 4.4 -4.1 4.1 6.6 2.6 -4.2 -1.7 
 
Total Consumption (Annual growth rate) 
  14.8 13.2 5.3 5.0 -3.6 5.9 7.9 2.1 -2.1 -0.1 
 
Consumer Prices (Annual growth rate) 
 1,344 84.0 17.5 7.4 3.9 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.7 -1.8 -0.7 
 
External trade 
Exports (Annual growth rate) 
    -3.6 -1.0 4.7 15.1 22.6 7.8 12.0 10.1 -1.1 1.8 
 
Imports (Annual growth rate) 
    80.1 65.7 14.9 21.1 -10 17.4 26.6 8.4 -11.2 0.2 
 
Trade Balance 
   -3.86 -5.58 -7.83 -0.97 -1.77 -6.54 -7.58 -4.87 -
1.77 
 
External debt  (%GDP) 
    32.3 27.4 28.0 30.4 35.2 36.9 42.6 47.1 51.2 51.8 
 
External debt (Billion U$S) 
    61.3 62.8 72.2 85.7 98.5 109.8 125.1 141.9 145.9 147.
7 
 
Fiscal deficit (GDP%)  
   -0.1 1.5 -0.3 -0.6 -1.9 -1.5 -1.4 -1.7 -2.4 
 
Source: ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin American and the Caribbean (various years) 
        
Tax reforms were based on changes in the structure of taxation, a 
reorganization of the system so as to foster registration, and a vast campaign 
among the population against widespread tax evasion.55  While changes in the tax 
                                                 
55 The VAT (value-added tax) constituted the main source of revenue  at the national level. It was 
extended to most goods and services previously exempted, and after an initial reduction (from 
15% to 13%) in 1989, it increased to 21% in 1995 (Heymann, 2000). A simplified regime, called 
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system after 1991 and the tougher policy against evasion increased tax revenues, 
they intensified regressiveness as a result of the generalization of and increase in 
the value-added tax; the average tax pressure on household income increased, but 
the increase was highest for the lowest-income groups and lowest for high-income 
families (Marshall, 1998) 
The new rules of the game had a strong impact on economic activity. 
Between 1991 and 1997, industrial activity increased 6.1% annually, in parallel 
with an important growth in productivity, which rose 7.9% annually during the 
same period (see table 3.8). 
The responses of firms to the new economic environment were certainly 
heterogeneous, but in general terms can be grouped in two kinds of responses 
(Heymann, 2000; Bisang and Gomez, 1999).  On the one side, a group of big 
firms adopted expansive strategies, based either on the availability of natural 
resources –such as the food industry- or in previous competitive advantages – 
such as the steel, paper, and chemical industry. These firms increased their export 
capacity and levels of investment, using the latter for technological 
modernization. On the other side, there was a large number of small and medium 
size-enterprises, as well as some big ones -in sectors such as electronics, textile, 
garments, toys- that were unable to face the intense competition –either in terms 
of prices or in technological levels- generated by the mounting entry of imports. 
These firms developed multiple responses that ranged from personnel reduction 
                                                                                                                                     
“monotributo” (single tax) was established for small taxpayers, including VAT, taxes on profits, 
and social security contributions in a single payment. The number of persons registered on tax 
files  increased in 1989-1992 by 78% in the case of taxes on profits and by 327% in the case of the 
VAT (Marshall, 1998) 
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and subcontracting to changes in the kind of goods produced or the marketing of 
imported products and integration with other firms. In the worst (and frequent) 
situations, unable to compete, many firms had to closed down.56 
State employment decreased after 1990 mainly because of employment 
losses in privatized enterprises. From 1989 to 1993, employment in public 
enterprises decreased from almost 350,000 to just 67,000 (Marshall, 1998). Even 
when privatized enterprises were particularly dynamic in terms of their activity 
levels, it was not accompanied by an increase in labor demand. In contrast, most 
of them sharply reduced their employment levels, and introduced profound 
changes in their recruitment policies in terms of age and skill requirements 
(Heymann, 2000). 
As table 3.8 shows, increases in production and productivity levels did not 
result in increases in employment. In contrast, rises in the productivity levels were 
the combined result of investment in technology favored by the opening up of the 
economy and massive dismissals. Privatized enterprises represent paradigmatic 
examples of the latter strategy.57 In fact the economic program was characterized 
by an “anti-employment bias” (Fanelli and Frenkel, 1997) from the very 
beginning. This was clearly expressed in the quality and quantity of employment 
generation.58 
 
                                                 
56 Textile and garment industries lost approximately 150,000 jobs between 1991 and 1995. 
(Marshall 1998). 
57 In the case of infrastructure services (electricity, gas, running water, transportation, storage, and 
communications) its product increase (7% annually between 1990 and 1998) was greater than the 
GNP (Heymann, 2000). 
58 The worsening of the labor market during the 1990s is the focus of the following chapter. 
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Table 3.8. Product, Employment and Productivity by Sector, 1991-1997   
 Rate of change in 
contribution to Gross 
Domestic Product 
(GDP)  






Total 6.2 1.5 4.7 
Subtotal Industries 6.1 -1.6 7.9 
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 4.3 0.2 4.1 
Textile and Garment 0.0 -6.1 6.5 
Wood, furniture, and other related 
industries 
9.6 -0.6 10.2 
Paper 7.8 1.3 6.5 
Oil and Chemicals 5.7 0.2 5.5 
Mining 7.2 0.1 7.0 
Metallurgical 10.0 -1.0 11.2 
Construction 11.1 3.1 7.8 
Commerce 6.5 -0.6 7.1 
Hotel and Restaurants 7.6 3.4 4.1 
Ground Transportation 4.3 4.6 -0.3 
Other types of Transportation 5.9 -3.8 10.1 
Transportation Auxiliaries 2.5 19.5 -14.2 
Financial Services 13.1 3.7 9.0 
Privatized public services 9.4 2.8 6.5 
Professional Services 8.8 5.6 3.1 
Private Education and Health 1.3 3.1 -1.7 
Government 1.0 2.6 -1.6 
Other Services 4.2 0.4 3.7 
Domestic Service 2.1 2.4 -0.3 
 
Source: Altimir and Beccaria (1999a), on the basis of table 9. 
 
 In spite of a strong expansion of economic activity, which followed 
stabilization, the unemployment rate increased from 1991, for structural reasons. 
In manufacturing, the expansion of domestic demand between 1991 and 1994 
could have led to an increase in employment creation. However, the combination 
of trade liberalization and exchange rate appreciation negatively affected the labor 
demand of tradable sectors. Firms responded to an increasing demand by 
investing in technology, dismissing workers even during the expansion phase.. 
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Manufacturing restructuring was triggered by the combination of trade 
liberalization and the appreciation of the domestic currency. Restructuring, among 
those firms that survived, followed a path of increasing capital intensity, that is 
part of the explanation of the persistence of high levels of unemployment even 
during periods of increasing economic activity. (Bisang et al., 1995, 1996; 
Marshall, 1997; Fanelli and Frenkel, 1997; Szretter, 1997; Heymann, 2000)  
 
Figure 3.1. Evolution of poverty, Greater Buenos Aires, 1990-2000 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
 
The balance of the decade in terms of poverty and inequality are the 
clearest expressions of the impacts of the Convertibility Plan on the Argentinean 















29.4% of the population in Greater Buenos Aires, were the highest since 1991 
(see figure 3.1). Besides, Argentina was among the Latin American countries, 
which experienced the fastest increases in the levels of inequality between 1997 
and 1999: the Gini coefficient59 in Greater Buenos Aires increased from 0.501 in 
1990 to 0.530 in 1997 and to 0.542 in 1999 and the ratio between the richest and 
poorest 20% rose from 13.5 to 16.4 and 15.5 during the same period (CEPAL, 
2001a)  
 
3.2.1.1. Labor Reform 
Employment protection reform was one cornerstone of post 1990 
Argentine labor policy. Reductions in labor costs as well as the greater freedom to 
terminate employment were regarded and publicized by the government as 
potential incentives to employment generation (Marshall, 1997). Changes in labor 
legislation require special attention for three main reasons. Firstly, these changes 
had together with the social security reform a strategic role in the structural 
reforms applied during the 1990s that were viewed as fundamental for the success 
of the new economic strategy as well as highly profitable for the private sector 
(Cortes and Marshall, 1999). Secondly, in spite of its declared goal of reducing 
clandestine employment, the changes fostered and intensified the deterioration in 
the quality of employment that characterized the whole decade. Thirdly, as the 
                                                 
59 Calculated on the basis of the per capita income of persons including those with income=0  
(CEPAL, 2001a).   
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dramatic growth in unemployment clearly shows, labor reform failed to stimulate 
employment creation. 
From 1991, the economic strategy   relied upon a diagnosis according to 
which labor market problems derive both from the “rigidity” -i.e. labor 
protection- of the previous regulations in terms of hiring and dismissal 
procedures, and   from “high labor costs”, considered as major obstacles to 
employment generation.60 Consequently, the changes in labor regulation since 
1991 were mainly aimed at diminishing labor costs through reductions in 
employers contributions to the social security system61, in dismissal costs, and 
amount paid for work injuries. The changes also introduced more flexibility in the 
use of working time and decentralization of collective bargaining (Golbert, 1997  
and 2000; Marshall, 1998; Cortes and Marshall, 1999; Beccaria and Lopez, 
1997a; Godio et. al., 1998; Altimir and Beccaria, 1999a; Heymann, 2000).  
The National Employment Law approved in 1991 was the first of a series 
of transformations in labor regulation. It instituted a limited unemployment 
insurance scheme62 and introduced new temporary contracts –subject to labor 
                                                 
60 In his study on labor costs and competitiveness of  Argentinean industry, Szretter (1997) shows 
that wages and the rest of labor variables have not been the main determinants of the evolution of 
unit labor costs and of the competitive advantages of the industry. In contrast, he asserts that 
relative prices and the exchange rate have being the decisive factors affecting the increase of unit 
labor costs, with the exchange rate being one of the principal causes of the competitive 
disadvantage of the Argentinean industry (Ibid). 
61 The rebates on payroll taxes clearly conflicts with the aim of controlling fiscal deficit. Actually, 
as a result of the reduction in employers contributions as well as the high levels of evasion, the 
ANSES (National Administration of Social Security) collected in 1999 $46 billion less than in 
1995 (Clarin, 12/12/2000)  
62 Inter alia, rural workers, domestic service, and public administration workers are not entitled to 
compensation; construction workers have their own separate scheme. To qualify workers have to 
have been dismissed unfairly or, due to force majeure, to have contributed to the National 
Employment Fund during twelve months in the last three years (with specific conditions for 
agency labor), and to have been registered by their employers in the social security system. Length 
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union approval in a collective-bargaining process- that included the reduction or 
total elimination of employers’ contributions, mainly with respect severance pay 
and social security.63 The law created a national employment fund to finance 
these measures.64 Unemployment insurance, limited to formal wage workers, has 
a very low coverage, achieving just 6% of the unemployed (Altimir and Beccaria, 
1999a; SIEMPRO, 2001d). 65 
In 1994 new measures were designed to heighten labor flexibility, 
resulting in the signing of the Framework Agreement on Employment, 
Production, and Social Equality (Acuerdo Marco para el Empleo, la Producción y 
a Igualdad Social) by union representatives, business people, and the executive 
branch. This agreement included a series of reforms: a statute for small and 
medium enterprises66, a bankruptcy law that annulled collective bargaining, and 
an insurance system for work-related accidents administrated by work insurers 
(ART, Aseguradoras de Riesgos de Trabajo). Work-accident compensations 
                                                                                                                                     
of compensation is linked to the duration of contributions to the fund. It consists in a monthly 
payment that varies from a maximum of 300 pesos (originally 400 pesos) and a minimum of 200 
pesos and cannot exceed a one- year period.  
63 Of the four contractual modalities, three were targeted to groups: “Employment 
Promotion”(Fomento del Empleo) was addressed to workers registered as unemployed; Practica 
laboral para Jóvenes and Trabajo-Formación were targeted to skilled and unskilled young 
workers respectively (up to 24 years old). The fourth, Nueva Actividad, was not targeted, and 
aimed to facilitate temporary contracts in the event of new activities. (Marshall, 1997) 
64 The funds primarily came from a proportion of the contributions that previously had been 
allocated for family allowances (equal to 1.5% of nominal income) and other wage taxes. 
65 In 1995 only some 17% of the unemployed in Buenos Aires were entitled to receive 
unemployment benefits, and only less than one half of those entitled were actually receiving the 
benefits (Marshall, 1997).   
66 According to the new legislation, small and medium enterprises (up to 40 workers) are 
exempted from the collective labor agreements and from the obligation to register contracts; the 
legislation introduced the possibility of making bonus payments (aguinaldo), modified   the 
established norms on vacation time, and limited  the amount of indemnity based on seniority 
(Goldbert, 2000). 
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ceased to be decided in court and were covered by  an insurance system 
(Goldbert, 2000). The latter, besides benefiting private insurers, reduced the 
amount of the compensation, diminished the list of work-related illnesses, and 
discouraged investment in the prevention of work injuries (Cortés and Marshall, 
1999; Heymann, 2000). 
In 1995 the Law on Employment Promotion introduced higher levels of 
“flexibility” in the use temporary contracts since -in contrast with the law 
approved in 1991- these contracts were exempted from the collective agreements. 
It facilitated the hiring of workers under a trial period and/or apprentice period, 
exempting employers from paying indemnity to these workers.67 Prior legislation 
had exempted the trial period from paying compensation at termination, but had 
no independent status. Labor codes (both the 1974 and 1976 laws) had simply 
stated that the threshold for being entitled to severance pay was three months of 
continuous employment in the firm (Marshall, 1997). Also part-time and 
apprenticeship contracts were established in 1995. Pre 1995 part-time contracts 
had implied pro-rated payroll taxes and social benefits, but the part-time status did 
not exist in legal terms (Marshall, 1992).68  
                                                 
67 In 1995 the trial period was extended from 3 to 6 months with previous agreement in collective 
bargaining processes. It involves the exemption of all employers and personal contributions except 
obra social (health insurance) and family allowances during the whole period. In 1998 a new 
reform reduced the trial period to one month and eliminated family allowances, so that the 
exemption from social contributions was almost total.   
68 According to a survey on labor indices by the Ministry of Labor a comparison of data from 
December 1995 to that from October 1996 shows a 6% decrease in the number of workers with 
stable contracts or contracts for an indeterminate period, while the number of those hired on 
probation grew 286% and those with contracts for a fixed period rose 79% (cited in Goldbert, 
2000). 
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In face of a steady growth in unemployment since 1992 the government 
devised some programs of direct employment creation starting in 1993. From the 
passage of the Employment Law until 1996, thirty programs were initiated under 
the aegis of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 69, characterized by their 
discontinuity, weak coverage, and limited resources. In 1996 benefits distributed 
on a monthly basis reached around 2.5% and 3% of the unemployed and 
represented less than 0.2% of the GNP (Goldbert, 1997, 2000; Marshall, 1997). 
By mid-1997 the Trabajar and Servicios Comunitarios, were the only surviving 
programs of direct employment creation.  
In May 1997, with financial and technical support from the World Bank 
the national government introduced the Trabajar II program, and expanded and 
reformed version of the previous program, Trabajar I. In the words of the World 
Bank: “firstly, by providing short-term work at relatively low-wages, the program 
aimed to self-select unemployed workers from poor families. Secondly, the 
scheme tried to allocate socially useful projects in poor areas to help repair and 
develop local infrastructure” (Jalan and Rovallion, 1999:11-12). The national 
budget is allocated across provinces by the central government, leaving provincial 
governments “with considerable power to determine how the moneys are 
allocated within the province”(Ibid). The projects are proposed by local 
governmental and non-governmental organizations that must cover the non-wage 
costs. Payments do not surpass 200 pesos per month per person and the coverage 
period is less than six months.70 This wage rate was chosen to be “low enough to 
                                                 
69 For a more exhaustive analysis of  these programs see Golbert (1997) and Marshall (1997). 
70 Since 2000 payments have been reduced from 200 to 160 pesos (SIEMPRO, 2001a). 
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assure good targeting performance, and to help ensure that workers would take up 
regular work when it comes available (emphasis added)” (Jalan and Rovallion, 
1999:13). 71  
As Marshall (1997) points out, active labor market intervention in 
Argentina seems to have resulted from the compromise between constraints on  
expenditure and the need to manage social conflict that results from pervasive 
unemployment. In contrast to universal unemployment insurance schemes –that 
guarantee income support to all those who are entitled, and for whom it is a lawful 
right- program participation is a particularistic benefit granted by the federal or 
local governments, that could be withdrawn equally easily.  The criteria for 
determining the potential number of beneficiaries are often obscure, giving 
governments the possibility of more discretionary manipulation of benefits (Ibid).   
Considering together the coverage of the unemployment insurance and 
employment programs, the levels of vulnerability of the unemployed are 
dramatic: 9 out of 10 unemployed in Argentina do not receive any kind of social 
protection from the state. 
 
3.2.1.2. Retirement Pension Reform 
The reform of the retirement pension scheme, inspired by the Chilean 
model, was approved in 1993 and came into operation in 1994. It involved two 
main innovations. First, is the privatization of the system, which was intended not 
only to reduce public expenditure but to contribute to an increase in domestic 
                                                 
71 Chapter 7 analyzes the actual implementation of these programs at the local level from the 
perspective of its beneficiaries. 
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savings, to develop the capital market and to foster investment (Marshall, 1998). 
Secondly, it transformed the “philosophical basis” of the system by moving from 
a shared (pay-as-you-go) system to one of individual capital formation managed 
by private insurers (AFJP, Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones y 
Pensiones).72 Minimum retirement ages went up from 55 to 60 years for women, 
and from 60 to 65 years for men. Besides age, the worker has to prove at least 30 
years of service and duly paid contributions to obtain full pension benefits. 
At the end of 2000, the Alianza administration introduced new 
modifications to the system through a “necessity and emergency decree” moving 
towards the elimination of the public component of the originally mixed 
Argentine pension model (Lo Vuolo, 2001). Among the main changes are the 
elimination of the universal basic benefit (PBU) and its substitution by a 
supplementary benefit73; a minimum universal mean test benefit of 100 pesos for 
people over 75 years not receiving benefits; the increase of the minimum 
retirement age for women from 60 to 65 years; and the possibility of receiving 
proportional benefits for of those contributing to the system for fewer years than 
required.74     
The new pension scheme presents serious limitations in terms of 
financing, limited improvement for the sharply reduced pension earnings -the 
                                                 
72 Four types of benefits were established: the universal basic (PBU), which would pay the same 
amount to every beneficiary; the compensatory (PC), which would recognize the years of 
contribution to the old system; the “permanence” benefit for those who choose the public system; 
and the capitalization benefit (HC), which are the payments from individual accounts. The state is 
responsible of the payment of the first three benefits, and the AFJP for the capitalization benefit. 
73 This benefit is applied in pensions up to 800 pesos; over this amount the benefit is eliminated 
(Clarin, 12/29/2000).  
74 Clarin, 12/29/2000. 
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average retirement pay is slightly over half of the mean wage- and finally, as a 
result of the profound worsening of the labor market during the last decade, only 
63% of the EAP is affiliated to the system. Among the latter, only 54% 
contributes regularly to the system. The numbers for the self-employed are even 
more dramatic, only 20% contributed to the system in 1996. (Katzman et al., 
1999; Golbert, 2000). Thus, together with the meager pension earnings received 
by the currently retired, there is a mounting number of workers that, given their 
employment instability and/or low wages, are unable to contribute to the social 
security system. These are under serious risk of not having access to retirement 
benefits at all, a problem whose dimensions will become even more alarming 
during the next years. 
 
3.2.1.3. The Deterioration and Segmentation of Health Services 
 The dismantling of the previous mechanisms of labor protection and the 
increasing vulnerability of the active and inactive population in terms of pension 
benefits have been accompanied by the progressive worsening in the quality of 
public health and educational services, as well as by an increasing segmentation 
in  access to these services. 
Health reform focused on the deregulation of the obras sociales health 
care system.  This deregulation gave workers freedom to choose the scheme to 
which they would affiliate and otherwise   promoted the competitive election of 
services. It also included the self-management of public hospitals.75 Reforms were 
                                                 
75 The Argentine health care system is divided into three segments: the public system, 
traditionally based on principles of universality and equity; the obras sociales, which is an 
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aimed at transferring workers protected by the obras sociales to the private 
system. They also sought to transform the public sector into a provider of services 
contracted by the private system and into a targeted service for the poor sectors. 
The administrative decentralization of public hospitals to the provincial or 
municipal levels occurred more than a decade earlier than economic reform.76 
According to the results of the Social Development Survey (Encuesta de 
Desarrollo Social) in 1997, 50% of the population was covered by the public 
system, 38% by obras sociales, and just 12% by the private sector (SIEMPRO, 
2001b). Moreover, there is a strong segmentation in the kind of coverage 
provided, with a clear overrepresentation of low-income sectors in the public 
system (more than half of the poorest 40% relies on public provision).   However, 
there is a also an important percentage of middle income sectors (29.3% in the 
third quintile) that only has access to the public system77. In the private sector, it 
is the richest 20% which is overrepresented. In fact, 28% of the latter is covered 
by the private system and only 10% uses the public system (Ibid) 
In face of increasing financial, difficulties, the quality of public health 
services experienced a continuing process of deterioration in terms of 
                                                                                                                                     
obligatory system of health protection for wage-workers, financed by employers and workers 
contributions and historically run by labor unions. They generally contract out to the private 
sector, even though those managed by the strongest labor unions used to provide services 
themselves. Finally, the private sector, whose services are financed both through the contracting 
by the obras sociales, and directly through their own pre-payment systems and medical plans.         
76 Public hospitals were transferred to the provinces in 1978, together with the decentralization of 
public elementary schools. Decentralization of institutions of secondary education was completed 
in 1992. Both in health and education, decentralization resulted in a greater segmentation in the 
quality and levels of coverage as a result of the lack of compensatory national policy and financial 
mechanisms oriented to diminish regional inequalities (Katzman et al., 1999). 
77 While more recent data are not available, it is very likely that this percentage has risen during 
the last years as a result of the increasing impoverishment and employment instability of middle 
classes.  
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infrastructure, scarcity of sanitary materials and medicines, wage decline for the 
professional and technical personnel, and the potential closure of some hospitals.  
In the context of rising unemployment and labor precariousness, the demand for 
public services experienced a sharp growth. However, it did not result in a rise in 
public expenditure. The worsening of the employment situation has had a strong 
impact on access to health care.  The coverage of the system of obras sociales is 
limited to a shrinking number of formal workers. Also, given their low and 
unstable income levels, most workers cannot meet the costs of private insurance, 
resulting in mounting pressures on the public system.  
The lack of preventive policies in face of an increasing impoverishment 
and deterioration of life conditions of vast segments of the population has resulted 
in the extension of social vulnerability throughout the social structure. According 
to Minujin and Kessler, “if during the last decade hundreds of thousands of people 
in our country could not avoid falling into the territory of poverty, it was not only 
the result of the kind of stabilization and adjustment policies applied, but also of 
the lack of preventive public policies as a resource on which to rely before being 
thrown to poverty and exclusion” (1995:47). As the analysis of labor policy has 
shown, and as the following chapters analyze more thoroughly, the unemployed 
are the clearest example of lack of social protection in contemporary Argentina. 
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3.3.THE SPATIAL LOCATION OF THE STUDY 
3.3.1. Greater Buenos Aires 
The research on unemployment in Argentina is focused on Greater Buenos 
Aires, the largest metropolitan area of the country, which with its 12,132,257 
people concentrates one third of the Argentinean population (36 million 
inhabitants) and less than 0.2% of the national territory. Greater Buenos Aires, 
which includes Buenos Aires city and the Conurbano Bonaerense (Buenos Aires 
conurbation), is not only the most populated area of the country, but also the most 
important center of economic activity, both in the industry and service sectors. It 
is also the most heterogeneous urban space where the richest and most powerful 
sectors of the country coexist with vast social segments living in situations of 
poverty and extreme poverty. 
Three main urban areas can be differentiated. First, Buenos Aires city, 
which is the capital of the country, concentrating 9.1% of the national population. 
Secondly, the Conurbano Bonaerense, currently made up of 26 municipalities      
-after recent divisions in three of them- which are part of Buenos Aires province, 
and concentrates 8.9 million people or one quarter of the national population.  
Thirdly, within the Conurbano two rings can be distinguished in terms of distance 
with respect to the capital city. The first ring borders Buenos Aires city while the 
second is made up by those locations more distant from the capital city. While 
having relatively good communications through an extended system of public 
transportation, the second ring has higher levels of poverty and much more 
disadvantageous living conditions than Buenos Aires city and the first ring. 
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The spatial configuration of the Buenos Aires conurbation   resulted from 
the arrival of external and internal migrants attracted since the 1930s by the 
employment opportunities, services and infrastructure offered by the city. The 
expansion of the Conurbano, especially of the first ring, is closely linked to 
import substituting industrialization. The metropolitan area became the most 
important and dynamic industrial center of the country up until the 1970s, when a 
process of deindustrialization began. Greater Buenos Aires still concentrates 
almost 60% of the shrinking productive activity of the country.  
Deindustrialization and economic restructuring had a strong impact on the spatial 
distribution of the city and in the spatial manifestations of urban poverty. In the 
first ring, the worsening of employment conditions and opportunities resulted in a 
process of impoverishment of middle and working class sectors that had been 
formally integrated into the labor market. The second ring, with much lower 
levels of industrialization and less dynamic labor markets, experienced a strong 
deterioration of poor areas as well as increasing urban segregation. Segregation 
resulted from the lack of public investment in infrastructure and from the growing 
difficulties that its residents faced in moving out of the local area because of high 
transportation costs and less employment opportunities in the city. It is precisely 
this area, which has experienced the fastest population growth during the last 
decades as the result of migration from neighboring countries and the arrival of 
impoverished residents from Buenos Aires city and from the first ring of Greater 
Buenos Aires in search of cheaper housing.   
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The heterogeneity of Greater Buenos Aires in terms of poverty levels and 
their evolution are showed in table 3.9. While the research is focused on the 
period 1990-2000, data from 2001 have been included to show the sharp 
deterioration of living conditions experienced during the last year. The second 
ring is by far the most disadvantageous area in terms of the concentration of 
poverty during the whole decade: in October 2000, four out of ten residents in this 
area were poor. However, the fastest increase in poverty levels was experienced in 
the first ring, where poverty levels more than doubled during the decade.  
 
Table 3.9. Poverty levels in the Greater Buenos Aires, 1991-2001 
 1991 1994 1998 2000 2001 
Greater Buenos Aires      
        Households 16.2 14.2 18.2 20.8 25.5 
        Individuals 21.5 19.0 25.9 28.9 35.4 
  Buenos Aires City      
        Households 6.8 5.4 4.4 6.1 6.3 
        Individuals 8.1 6.7 6.2 9.5 9.8 
  Conurbano       
        Households 21.1 18.2 24.5 26.9 33.3 
         Individuals 26.4 23.0 32.4 35.0 43.1 
      First ring      
        Households 17.0 13.0 18.2 19.0 24.5 
        Individuals 21.5 16.3 24.6 25.1 33.2 
      Second ring      
        Households 25.2 23.7 30.6 34.7 41.7 
        Individuals 30.7 29.1 39.1 43.2 51.7 
 
Note: The first ring includes the following counties: Avellaneda, General San Martin, Lanús, 
Lomas de Zamora, Moron (divided in Moron, Hurlingham, and Ituzaingo), Quilmes, San Isidro, 
Tres de Febrero and Vicente Lopez. The second ring includes: Almirante Brown, Berazategui, 
Esteban Echeverria (divided in Esteban Echeverria and Ezeiza), General Sarmiento (divided in 
Jose C. Paz, Malvinas Argentinas, and San Miguel). Florencio Varela, La Matanza, Merlo, 
Moreno, San Gabriel and Tigre. 




3.3.1.1.The selection of fieldwork locations: Lanús and Florencio Varela  
Taking into account the characteristics of the Conurbano Bonaerense,  the 
fieldwork sites were selected on the basis of their location with respect to the city 
of Buenos Aires , their economic history, local labor market opportunities and 
socio-economic structure. Fieldwork was conducted in two contrasting 
municipalities, Lanús and Florencio Varela, which clearly exemplify the inherent 
heterogeneity of Greater Buenos Aires -see map in illustration 3.1. Lanús is 
located in the first ring, and was, until recently, the third most industrialized area 
in Greater Buenos Aires in terms of number of firms and the fourth in terms of 
employment. It borders Buenos Aires city, and the system of public transportation 
–buses and electric trains- makes for a rapid connection with the capital city. It 
takes approximately 15 minutes by train commuting from Lanús to Buenos Aires. 
Florencio Varela, in contrast, is part of the second ring, and one of the poorest 
municipalities of the Conurbano. It is located 25-30 kilometers from Buenos Aires 
and connected to the capital city by a run-down system of public transportation, 
both in terms of buses and trains. In terms of quality, the contrast with Lanús is 
evident. Trains –significantly cheaper than buses- from Varela to Buenos Aires 
are usually   overcrowded, characterized by   poor maintenance, and are more 
time consuming. Moreover, the inadequate system of public transportation within 
the town and the lack of paving in many streets make it difficult to access to the 
local downtown, increasing the segregation of many areas. 
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Table 3.10. Socio-demographic Characteristics and Living Conditions in 
Florencio Varela and Lanús 








Population by place of 
birth (%) 
  
     Buenos Aires province  61.10 61.60 
     Other province 32.60 28.60 
     Border country 4.50 3.0 
     Non-border country 1.80 6.7 
Social Indicators   
Population with UBI1 (%) 31.0 14.50 
Educational levels**   
     Incomplete Primary  
     or less 
25.4 17.3 
     Complete Primary  64.1 60.2 
     Complete Secondary  9.7 20.1 
     Complete College  0.6 1.8 
Infant Mortality Rate  
(1994-1996) 
24.10 18.1 






   Wage workers with  
pension benefits 
58.4 69.1 
     Population with obra  
social (health insurance) 
50.0 64.9 
 
Note:  1 Unsatisfied Basic Needs. *Projected population for 2000. **Excludes those attending 
school. 
Source: National Census of Population and Housing, INDEC, 1991; CEPA, INDEC, 1994; 
Informe de Desarrollo Humano de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 1998; Estadistica Bonaerense 
1998, DPEPG. 
 
Lanús is the smallest municipality of Greater Buenos Aires in terms of its 
extension (45 square kilometers) but the highest in terms of population density 
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with more than 10 thousand inhabitants per square kilometer, which explains its 
low levels of population growth since the 1980s - 0.3% between 1980 and 1991. 
In contrast Varela is almost 5 times larger (206 square kilometers) than Lanús, 
and 10 times less densely populated. Forty percent of its territory is rural and the 
availability of cheap land has resulted in a rapid population growth since the 
1980s.  It grew 47% between 1980 and 1991, and approximately 37% during the 
last decade. Population growth has by no means been accompanied by a better 
provision of basic services and infrastructure: According to 1991 Census data, 
72% of houses in Lanús had sewers and water lines against the 78% of houses in 
Varela that lacked those services. In 1997 Lanús had 18.7 telephone lines every 
100 inhabitants and a total of 40 banks against 9.8 and 8 in Varela respectively. 
Differences in the composition of the population by place of birth are clear 
indicators of differences in the timing and patterns of urbanization, and, in 
consequence, of the origins of migrants. Lanús shows more European-born 
migrants, who represent almost one fifth of the migrant population. According to 
the 1991 Census data, six out of four of those coming from non-neighboring 
countries are concentrated in the 50-74 age group, reflecting the European 
migrations to Argentina in the first half of the twentieth century. In contrast 
Florencio Varela’s migrant population is basically made up of internal migrants 
and migrants from neighboring countries (see table 3.10).78 Florencio Varela 
shows far more disadvantageous conditions than Lanús both in terms of basic 
social indicators and labor protection indicators. According to the 1991 figures, 
                                                 
78 Most of the information on Florencio Varela and Lanús is based on the 1991 National Census. 
The last Census was conducted in 2001; however , disaggregated data by location were not 
available by the time this research was conducted.    
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three out of ten residents in Varela were unable to satisfy their basic needs; one in 
four adults did not complete primary education and less than one in ten had 
completed secondary school. More than 17% of the population were living under 
high sanitary risks. Forty percent of wage workers were not protected by pension 
benefits, and half had access to health insurance -obra social (table 3.10)   
 
Table 3.11. Local Labor Market Characteristics in Florencio Varela and Lanús. 
 Florencio Varela Lanús 
Occupational structure* (%)   
   Employer 3.6 7.1 
   Wage worker 59.7 62.2 
   Self-employed 21.9 22.7 
   Domestic servants 12.3 5.5 
   Family worker 3.4 2.5 
Employment by sector**    
   Manufacturing   
      Number of firms 313 2,521 
      Number of workers 6,595 24,498 
      Wage-workers (%) 91.9 83.0% 
      Non-wage workers (%) 8.1 17.0% 
Commerce   
  Number of firms 3,446 9,310 
  Number of workers 5,710 17,857 
  Wage-workers (%) 23.6 33.2 
  Non-wage workers(%) 76.4 66.8 





Note: * Figures from 1991. **Figures from 1994 . ***Figures from October 2000   
Source: National Census of Population and Housing, INDEC, 1991; Economic Census, INDEC, 




Contrasts in the local labor market are also apparent. In terms of 
occupational structure, Varela presents higher percentages of domestic and family 
workers than Lanús, as well as a lower presence of employers (see table 3.11). 
Lanús certainly has a greater concentration of manufacturing activities than 
Varela: the number of manufacturing firms in Lanús is 8 times higher, and the 
number of workers 4 times larger. The latter is a clear indicator of the greater 
presence of small and medium size firms in Lanús, and of few and larger size 
firms in Varela. Lanús used to be, until the 1980s, an important and diversified 
industrial center, which concentrated a large number of meat processing plants, 
tanneries, textile and metallurgical firms. Moreover, railways provided a 
significant source of local employment, given that the repair workshops of the 
once state-owned railway company were located in Lanús (Carnevale, 1996). 
Between 1991 and 2000, industrial employment in this area dropped from 24.6% 
of the employed population to 16.1%. 
The sharp deterioration in the labor market has resulted in high levels of 
unemployment both in the once industrialized Lanús, as in the traditionally poor 
Florencio Varela (see table 3.11). However, high levels of unemployment in both 
areas should not obscure the differences in employment opportunities still offered 
by their local labor markets, as well as the contrasting ways in which the different 





Illustration 3.1. Location of Study Area 
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Chapter 4: The Worsening of the Labor Market during the 1990s: 
Unemployment and the Informalization of Labor Conditions 
The worsening of the labor market -both in terms of the quantity and 
quality of employment generation- is a common feature across Latin America 
during the last decade. This common trend, however, should not obscure the 
different ways in which the adjustment of the labor market operated across the 
region. Factors such as the previous levels of labor formalization, changes in labor 
market participation, economic performance, and the role in the global economy –
among others- contribute to explain such differences. 
 Argentina, specifically Greater Buenos Aires, was traditionally 
characterized by a more formal labor market and a stronger system of labor 
protection than was usual in Latin America. During the nineties, unemployment 
emerges as the most salient –but by no means the only- expression of   poor labor 
market performance in Buenos Aires. Unemployment was accompanied by a 
significant rise in the levels of precarious employment, in terms of 
underemployment and unprotected labor. On the other hand, the informal sector 79 
–especially self-employment- had a lower capacity to absorb labor than in the 
previous decade, increasing the vulnerability of vast segments of the population to 
labor market exclusion.  
  Labor market problems are by no means a new phenomenon in 
Argentina. In fact, the limitations of the economy in terms of job generation 
                                                 
79 Includes employers and wage workers in firms of no more than five employees, non-
professional self-employed, and unpaid family workers. 
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preceded the sharp deterioration of the labor market during the 1990s. However, 
during the last decade the magnitude of the employment problem reached 
unprecedented levels.   
 This chapter analyzes labor market dynamics during the 1990s, focusing 
on the evolution and characteristics assumed by unemployment, job insecurity, 
and self-employment, arguing that the relationships among these phenomena lead 
to a process of accumulative disadvantages both to individuals and the 
households.  First, I analyze the causes of unemployment, focusing on the 
evolution of the labor supply and on employment generation both in the formal 
and informal sectors. Secondly, I concentrate on the main expressions assumed by 
the worsening of the labor market –unemployment, jobs lacking social benefits, 
and self-employment- identifying the groups most affected by them.  Income 
deterioration is analyzed according to the capacity of employed individuals to 
support one or more members of their households. Finally, a regression analysis 
on both unemployment and jobs lacking social benefits allows a better 
understanding of the weight of the variables affecting each of these employment 
problems.  
 
4.1. CAUSES OF UNEMPLOYMENT: LABOR SUPPLY, EMPLOYMENT 
CREATION, AND INFORMAL LABOR 
During the 1990s unemployment not only increased faster than precarious 
employment, but also became a permanent characteristic of the new economic 
model. High levels of unemployment accompanied by a deepening deterioration 
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of labor conditions, sharply changed the picture of the Argentinean labor market. 
In contrast with the 1980s, in the 1990s unemployment clearly surpassed the rates 
of the rest of the region (see figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1. Urban Unemployment Rates in Latin America and Argentina, 1980-

















Sources: PREALC, 1987; ILO, 2000; EPH, 2000 (October). 
 
While most Latin American countries experienced an increase in 
unemployment during the decade, as a consequence of declining job creation and 
increasing labor supply, labor market adjustment has primarily taken the form of 
growth in underemployment and low productivity jobs rather than open 
unemployment.80  Economic growth in the region has been accompanied by the 
                                                 
80 In periods of economic contraction- basically after the Mexican and Asian crisis- employment 
fell faster than labor supply, significantly increasing unemployment rates. During periods of 
expansion, however, unemployment has tended to decrease at a slower rate than the recovering of 
the GNP. Thus, the falling behind of unemployment recovery, more than to the intensity of 
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concentration of new jobs in the lowest productivity levels, and in general, in 
activities related to non-tradable goods -services, commerce, and construction  
(ECLAC, 1997; 1998).81 The growth of temporary employment, as well as jobs 
lacking labor contracts and social benefits has deepened and extended labor 
insecurity throughout the region.  
Higher levels of open unemployment in Argentina were the result of three 
main factors: fall in labor demand, increase in labor supply, and loss of dynamism 
in the informal sector, which, in contrast with the previous decade, did not operate 
as a “refuge” for unemployment (Beccaria and Lopez,1996; Altimir and Beccaria, 
1999a; Cortes, 2000; Cimillo,2000).  
The unemployment rate was around 6% until 1993, when it sharply 
increased, even though the economy was growing at a fast pace. In a period of 
two years, from October 1992 to October 1994, unemployment increased from 
7% to 12.2%, and the number of unemployed people grew from 800,000 to 
1,400,000 (SIEMPRO, 2000d). The impact of the Mexican crisis deepened the 
adjustment in the labor market, and unemployment achieved a peak in May 1995, 
affecting 18.4% of the total urban labor force, and 20.2% in the metropolitan area. 
Since then, while unemployment followed the fluctuations of the economic cycle, 
it maintained high levels, becoming a permanent characteristic and the most 
                                                                                                                                     
economic growth, seems to be related to the evolution of labor supply and job creation (see ILO, 
2000). 
81 Between 1990 and 2000, 60 out of 100 new jobs in Latin America were generated in the 
informal sector, which increased its participation in the total urban employment from 42.8% to 
46.4%; 83 out of 100 new jobs were created in the service sector, led by those sectors 
concentrating low-skilled jobs: by the end of the decade personal and community services 
employed 1 out of 3 workers, followed by commerce that employed one out of four (OIT, 2000).  
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visible sign of the worsening in the labor market. Between mid-1996 and mid 
1998 the growth in employment resulted in a reduction of the unemployment rate, 
which decreased to 12.4% on October 1998. Since then, however, in the context 
of economic recession, unemployment has experienced a continuing increasing 
trend. (see table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1. Evolution of the Gross Domestic Product and Total Urban 
Unemployment Rate, 1990-2000 
 Gross Domestic Product 








1991 10.6 6.0 
1992 9.6 7.0 
1993 5.9 9.3 
1994 5.6 12.2 
1995 -2.9 16.6 
1996 5.5 17.3 
1997 8.0 13.7 
1998 3.8 12.4 
1999 -3.4 13.8 
2000 -0.5 14.7 
 
Sources: ECLAC (2001); Heymann (2000); EPH (October). 
 
4.1.1.  Employment Creation and Labor Supply 
Employment in Greater Buenos Aires increased 11.5% between 1990 and 
2000, similar to population growth, but clearly insufficient to absorb the 
increasing activity rate, which grew 23% during the decade. In contrast with the 
1980s, when unemployment levels in the metropolitan area were lower than in the 
rest of the country, they have surpassed unemployment rates in the interior cities 
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since 1993. The opening up and deregulation of the economy had a sharp impact 
on the   Buenos Aires labor market (SIEMPRO, 2000a).    
 
Figure 4.2. Activity, Employment, and Unemployment Rates, Greater Buenos 
Aires, 1990-2000 (Percentage) 
  
Source: EPH (October). 
 
The increase of unemployment until 1993, in a context of employment 
expansion was mainly due to the increase in labor supply.82 Two thirds of this 
increase was experienced between 1991 and 1993 (see figure 4.2). Since then, the 
growth of open unemployment has been the result of both the evolution of the 
activity rate and the decline in labor demand.  
                                                 
82 Employment in the Greater Buenos Aires increased 10.8% between May 1990 and May 1993 







































During the last part of the decade, however, in a context of economic 
recession, unemployment seems to be more the result of insufficient employment 
generation and job destruction than growth in labor supply. Household Survey 
data support this hypothesis. First, the activity rate has been growing at a slow 
rate since 1996 (see figure 4.2), principally since the recession that began in 1998. 
This is probably associated with an increasing discouragement among the labor 
force regarding their possibilities of finding a job. Secondly, the employment rate 
remained stagnant between 1998 and 1999, with a declining trend since October 
2000. In fact, between October 1998 and October 2001 the employment rate 
decreased from 39.4% to 35.1%, and unemployment achieved 19% (more than 
one million people) in the Greater Buenos Aires, the highest level since May 
1995. 83  
The growth in labor supply has been mainly due to an increase in the 
female activity rate. The latter increased 39% in absolute terms during the decade, 
while female employment grew 23%. Six out of ten new workers looking for a 
job and not finding it in 1990 were women, increasing to seven out of ten in 2000 
-see table 4.3. The increasing pressure to enter the labor market, in a context of 
insufficient employment generation resulted in the overrepresentation of women 





                                                 
83 EPH, Indec, Informacion de Prensa, December 13, 2001 
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Table 4.2.  Activity, Employment and Unemployment Rates by Gender, Greater 
Buenos Aires, 1990-2000.  
 1990 1994 1996 2000 
     
Total activity rate1 40.3 43.1 44.9 44.9 
  Female activity rate 28.1 31.2 34.1 35.2 
  Male activity rate 53.7 56.3 56.6 55.7 
     
Total employment rate2  37.9 37.4 36.5 38.5 
  Female employment rate 26.3 26.3 26.7 29.4 
  Male employment rate 50.7 49.7 47.1 48.5 
     
Total unemployment rate3 6.0 13.1 18.8 14.7 
  Female unemployment rate 6.5 15.7 21.9 16.8 
  Male unemployment rate 5.7 11.6 16.7 13.2 
 
Notes: EAP includes the employed and unemployed population aged 15 or over. 
1 EAP relative to total population 
2 Employed population aged 15 or over, relative to total population. 
3 Relative to EAP 
Source: EPH  (October)  
 
Among men, while the increase in the activity rate (14%) was 
considerably less than for women, employment growth was minimal during the 
decade, achieving only 5%. Thus, while among females unemployment was 
mainly the result of the rise in labor force participation, among males it was 
basically explained by declining employment.  
The activity rate experienced a strong decline among the youngest age 
group (15-19) from 35.1% in 1990 to 23.6% in 2000 as a result of a longer stay in 
the school system, increasing in the rest of the groups. The faster rate of growth 
was among those aged 40 years or more, who increased their participation among 
new workers. Employment rate among women –with the exception of the 
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youngest group- increased during the whole decade, while for men the trend was 
negative for all age groups. 
 
Table 4.3. Composition of unemployment by gender, Greater Buenos Aires, 1990-
2000 (percentage) 

















         
Total 85.1 14.9 86.3 13.7 85.0 15.0 92.0 8.0 
         
Male  64.9 36.9 57.2 38.4 56.1 41.6 54.8 28.4 
Female 35.1 63.1 42.8 61.5 43.9 58.4 45.2 71.6 
 
Note: 1  The category “new workers” makes reference to first time job seekers. 
Source: EPH, October  
 
Growth in the activity rate among spouses –from 34.4% to 43.5%- and 
children –from 23.4% to 27.7%- during the decade appears as the reverse side of a 
process of increasing labor insecurity and unemployment among heads of 
households.84 The unemployment of heads increased almost 3 times during the 
decade, from 4.4% in 1990 to 11.8% in 2000. Different studies support the 
hypothesis that the increase in labor supply during the decade was mainly due to 
an “additional worker effect” (Altimir and Beccaria, 1999a, Cortes, 1997, 2000; 
Marshall, 1997). According to Altimir and Beccaria (1999a) 61% of the increase 
in the participation rate between 1991 and 1997 was due to the increase in the 
number of households with one or more members unemployed. 85 
                                                 
84 Cortés (2000) found that between 1990 and 1996 in Greater Buenos Aires among nuclear 
families (with male head and female spouse) there was a decrease in the proportion of households 
where only the head or both were employed against an increase in the proportion of households 
where only the spouse was employed, and the head unemployed. 
85 Using panel analysis, in the next chapter I analyze the impacts of labor insecurity and 
unemployment on the labor participation of household members.  
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Table 4.4. Employed Population by Sector, Greater Buenos Aires, 1990-2000 
(Percentage) 
 1990 1994 1996 2000 
     
Traditional industries 10.5 7.5 7.9 6.6 
Modern industries 14.0 13.6 11.4 9.9 
Producer Services 8.1 9.6 11.3 11.7 
Social& Community 
Services 
21.5 20.7 21.5 22.3 
Personal Services 16.2 15.0 15.1 15.6 
Commerce 16.5 17.5 17.0 17.4 
Construction 6.4 6.9 6.8 7.2 
Transportation 
 
6.8 9.2 9.1 9.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 
Note: Traditional industries include food, drink, tobacco, textile, garment, and shoe industries. 
Modern industries include chemical and oil products, metallic products, machinery and 
equipment, and other manufacturing industries Producer services include financial services, real 
state, and professional and technical services. Social & Community services include social, health, 
and educational services, public administration and defense, electricity, gas, and water supply. 
Personal services include hotels and restaurants, repair services, domestic service, and other 
personal services. Commerce includes wholesaling and retail sales.  
Source: EPH (October)  
 
Table 4.4. clearly shows a deepening of the de-industrialization process 
that began in the previous decade.86 Employment in manufacturing dropped 25% 
during the 1990s, resulting in the loss of approximately 260,000 jobs.87 At the 
same time, as it has already being pointed in chapter 3 (table 3.8) the 
incorporation of new technologies in the most dynamic sectors exacerbated the 
reduction of employment. In fact, between 1990 and 1996, 70% of industries 
                                                 
86 Restructuring in the manufacturing sector resulted in the closure of 11.5% of firms between 
1985 and 1994, affecting mainly those employing more than 300 workers, which fell by 35%, and 
lost 37.5% of employment (Cortés, 2000). 
87 Own calculations based on EPH data 
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experienced an increase in productivity and fall in employment, while only 20% 
increased their productivity without employment reduction (Katz, 1999).  
Employment generation was concentrated exclusively in the service 
sector, leaded by wage-labor. Producer services appear as the sector with the 
fastest employment growth during the decade. Its dynamism, however, has been 
slowing since 1996 - Table 4.4. In contrast with the 1980s, employment growth in 
the service sector has being clearly insufficient to absorb both jobs lost in 
manufacturing as well as the pressure of new workers trying to enter the labor 
market.  Wage employment increased from 69.2% to 73.5% between 1990 and 
2000, contrasting with self-employment, whose participation in total employment 
decreased from 24.2% to 20.6% during the same period. Wage-labor growth was 
basically explained by the dynamism of employment in micro-sized firms 
(Altimir and Beccaria, 1999a; Cimillo, 2000).    
  As table 4.5. shows female employment was highly concentrated in 
personal and social services by the end of the decade, displacing male 
employment both in personal services and commerce. The increase of male 
employment in some sectors, such as producer services and transportation, has 
being clearly meager when compared with job loses in other sectors, such as 
manufacturing and construction, where levels of unemployment reached 14.6% 





Table 4.5. Employed Population by Sector and Gender, Greater Buenos Aires, 
1990-2000 (%) 
 1990 2000 
 Total Female Male Total Female Male 
       
Traditional Industries 10.5 11.1 10.3 6.6 6.2 6.9 
Modern Industries 14.0 6.4 18.3 9.9 5.6 12.8 
Producer Services 8.1 8.6 7.9 11.7 10.7 12.4 
Social Services 21.5 32.1 15.4 22.3 31.6 16.2 
Personal Services 16.2 24.8 11.2 15.6 25.1 9.4 
Commerce 16.5 14.4 17.8 17.4 17.1 17.6 
Construction 6.4 0.2 9.9 7.2 0.6 11.6 
Transportation 
 
6.8 2.4 9.3 9.2 3.1 13.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: EPH (October)  
 
 
4.1.2. Employment in the Informal Sector 
Parallel to the low capacity of employment generation in the so-called 
modern sector, the informal sector during the 1990a did not operate as a “buffer” 
to unemployment. In fact, since 1994, while unemployment began to experience 
an increase, job creation in the informal sector began to shrink. 
The loss of dynamism was mainly due to a decline in self-employment, 
whose participation in total informal employment decreased from 40.2% to 35.5% 
between 1990 and 2000, while domestic service dropped from 20.9% to 17.7% 
during the same period (see table 4.6). As a result, wage-employment in micro-
firms increased its relative weight from 27.8% to 37.7%, becoming the category 
with the highest concentration of informal employment after 1996, representing 
one third of total wage-employment by the end of the decade. 
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Figure 4.3. Evolution of total unemployment and employment in the informal 
sector, Greater Buenos Aires, 1990-2000 (Percentage) 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
  
This transformation in the composition of the informal sector contributed 
to neutralize its capacity to counterbalance the decline of employment in the 
modern sector. Given that micro-firms adjusted to the economic cycle in similar 
ways to large-scale enterprises (i.e. laying-off labor) instead of creating 
employment) the contributed to exacerbate the process of job destruction   
Moreover, The greater weight of employment in micro-firms, characterized by 







1990 1994 1996 2000
Unemployment
Informal sector
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effect, deepening the cyclical movement of employment (Cimillo, 2000; 
SIEMPRO, 2000c).88  
 
Table 4.6. Employment in the Informal Sector by Category, Greater Buenos 
Aires, 1990-2000 (Percentage) 
Informal sector 1990 1994 1996 2000 
     
Total 100.0 (43.1) 100.0 (44.1) 100.0 (43.5) 100.0 (43.7) 
     
Employers 8.8 7.6 8.0 7.7 
Wage workers 27.8 33.2 37.5 37.2 
Self-employed 40.2 39.0 34.0 35.5 
Non-wage 
family workers 
2.3 3.5 3.6 2.2 
Domestic 
service 
20.9 16.7 16.9 17.7 
 
Source: EPH, October 
 
Commerce appears as an exception to this trend. In fact, while wage 
employment decreased from 54.7% to 47.2% in firms with five or less workers, 
larger firms increased their participation in the sector from 6.8% to 12.4% in 
those sized 26-100 and from 4.5% to 6.2% in firms employing 101-500 
employees. The expansion of large retail trade stores during the 1990s, led by 
supermarket chains, had a profound negative impact on the traditional small 
commerce that had flourished in previous decades. Both the decrease of small 
commerce and the decline in employment opportunities for certain services, such 
as repair activities -given the greater access to credit for consumer goods at the 
                                                 
88 In fact, since 1994, when unemployment began to increase, unemployment among wage earners 
in firms with 5 or less workers increased at a faster pace than the total unemployment rate. 
Unemployment in micro-firms achieved 19.5% in October 2000, surpassing total unemployment 
by 5 points. 
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beginning of the decade- showed the lower tolerance of the new economic model 
to low-productivity activities.  Self-employment generation became more difficult 
(Cimillo, 2000). Moreover, the increase in imports sharply impacted self-
employment in manufacturing, basically craft activities in the textile and garment 
industry, which traditionally represented an important alternative of self-
employment generation among women (Gallart et al., 1990).   
The consolidation of the new economic model resulted in an increasing 
deterioration of labor conditions among the self-employed and a sharp decline in 
their income.89 For the first time in the last 25 years, average incomes from the   
self-employed were lower than their equivalent in formal employment.  Those 
self-employed in the lowest levels of the distribution became the worst paid 
segment of the labor force (Cimillo, 20000). 
Among females, formal employment grew at a faster rate than informal 
jobs, whereas exactly the opposite occurred with males (Table 4.7).90 Among 
men, informal employment was concentrated in micro-firms, with the 
participation of young workers (20-29), children, and those with less than 
secondary school increasing. The rise in women’s participation in the formal 
sector was concentrated in low skilled jobs in the service sector. 
 
                                                 
89 In 1974, 38% of the self-employed were placed in the richest 25% of the income distribution, 
and only 12% were in the poorest 25%. In contrast, in 1997, 36% of the self-employed were 
among the lowest 25%, while their participation in the richest 25% had decreased to 21% 
(Cimillo, 2000).  
90 Informal employment rose among men from 40.3% to 42.1%, diminishing from 48.3% to 
46.1% among women. 
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Table 4.7. Total Increase of Formal and Informal Employment by Gender, Greater 
Buenos Aires, 1990-2000 (Percentage) 
 1990-2000 
 Total Female Male 
    
Total  
Employment 
11.5 23.0 5.0 
    
Formal Sector 10.0 27.0 1.9 
Informal Sector  13.0 18.0 9.5 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
 
  The faster increase of informal employment among men had been 
occurring since the mid-1970s (Cortés, 1997). However, during the 1990s this 
trend took place within a much more limited structure of employment 
opportunities, since poor employment generation in the formal sector was 
accompanied by a decline in self-employment. The latter mainly affected male 
heads of households, mostly older than 40 years, and with low educational levels.  
In fact, unemployment among the self-employed rose from 6.4% to 15.8% 
between 1990 and 2000, increasing their vulnerability to exclusion from the labor 
market.91 The accumulation of disadvantages among this group in terms of age, 
education, and skills, strongly limit their possibilities of re-insertion in the labor 
market once becoming unemployed.  
 
                                                 
91 In Greater Buenos Aires the loss of 154,000 self-generated jobs between 1993 and 1997 clearly 
exceeded the 95,000 jobs generated during the 1980s (Cimillo, 2000).  
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4.2. THE WORSENING OF THE LABOR MARKET: UNEMPLOYMENT, JOB 
INSECURITY AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
4.2.1. The Extension of Job Insecurity 
While unemployment has been the predominant employment problem 
during the 1990s, it has by no means been the only one. In fact, unemployment 
has been accompanied by a deep process of deterioration in labor conditions, 
especially in the form of underemployment -or involuntary part-time-, temporary 
employment and jobs lacking social benefits. 
As table 4.8 shows, the sharp increase in unemployment has been 
accompanied by the growth in underemployment. By the end of the decade almost 
one third of the economically active population was either jobless or 
underemployed. At the same time, there was a decrease in the participation of 
those in full-time and voluntary part-time jobs.  The rates of increase of each of 
these categories are a clear evidence of the rising precariousness of the labor 
market. While full-time employment increased less than 2% and voluntary-part 
time grew just 5% during the decade, underemployment rose 126% during the 
same period. Seven out of ten part-time workers in 2000 were involuntary, and 
among the latter, 71.4% lacked social benefits. While part-time employment –
both voluntary and involuntary- is higher among women, underemployment 
increased at a faster pace among males.92 According to Altimir and Beccaria 
(1999a), visible underemployment explains 90% of employment growth between 
                                                 
92 Underemployment among employed males increased from 5% to 13.2% between 1990 and 
2000, while among women it grew from 15% to 25%. Underemployment achieved almost parity 
between genders by the end of the decade (44.5% males, 55.4% females), while voluntary part-
time work maintained the same proportion during the whole decade, 70% of voluntary part-timer 
were women. 
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1991 and 1997. The whole picture of the economic active population shows that 
the fastest increase was experienced by unemployment, which grew 208% 
between 1990 and 2000. 
 
Table 4.8. Unemployment, underemployment, and social benefits, Greater Buenos 
Aires, 1990-2000 (Percentage) 
 1990 1994 1996 2000 
     
EAP by 
employment status 
    
     
Full-time workers1 76.1 67.9 60.2 62.4 
Voluntary part-time 
workers2 
9.5 8.4 6.4 7.3 
Underemployed 3 8.3 10.3 14.2 15.1 
Unemployed 4 6.1 13.4 19.2 15.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     
Waged workers     
    With 
    social benefits5 
71.1 70.8 63.6 62.0 
    Without  
    social benefits 
27.3 29.2 36.4 38.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Note: 1 Includes the employed population working 35 or more hours a week. 2 Includes the 
employed population working less than 35 hours a week and do not wish to work longer. 3 
Includes the employed population working less than 35 hours and wish to work longer. The EPH 
refers to this category as visible underemployment, which includes those “involuntarily working 
less than 35 hours a week”. 4 Includes those persons that, not having a job, have been actively 
seeking for it in the week of reference.5 Includes pension benefits. 
Source: EPH (October). 
 
The deterioration of labor conditions among wage earners is apparent in 
the loss of social benefits, which increased 56% from 1990 to 2000. The lack of 
social protection was a characteristic shared by almost 40% of wage earners by 
the end of the decade (see table 4.8). Unprotected jobs increased faster since 
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1994, when the process of deterioration of labor conditions was sharper.  The 
growth of jobs lacking social benefits is not only explained by the increased 
participation of small firms in total employment -traditionally characterized by 
lower levels of social protection - but also by a higher incidence of non-registered 
employment in medium and larger size firms (more than 25 employees) which 
grew from 10.6% to 14% between 1990 and 2000. The growth in non-registered 
employment was experienced in all economic sectors, independently of their 
dynamism in terms of employment generation or productivity, is a clear indicator 
of increasing informalization of labor conditions.  
Together with the rise in unemployment, underemployment, and lack of 
social benefits, the flexibilization of labor regulation since 1991 -analyzed in 
chapter 3- exacerbated job insecurity by promoting temporary employment 
through a generalized reduction on social security payroll taxes and indemnity 
payments. The growth in temporary employment was mainly experienced since 
1995 -when labor legislation relaxed the restrictions on its use. By the end of 
1997, according to the Ministry of Labor Survey on Labor Indicators –Encuesta 
de Indicadores Laborales 93- based on firms with more than ten workers, 
temporary contracts have increased to 11.4%, workers under trial period 4.9%, 
while permanent contracts have decreased from 91.8% to 83.2% of total wage 
employment in the Greater Buenos Aires between 1991 and 1997. In December 
1997, “flexible” forms of employment promoted by the new legislation 
represented 78.5% of the new contracts of the Greater Buenos Aires, while 47.3% 
                                                 
93 Cited on Perelman (2000) 
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of layoffs affected workers with permanent contracts. Moreover, temporary 
contracts explain 60% of the increase in registered employment between 1991 and 
1997 (Altimir and Beccaria, 1999a). According to the EPH, which tends to 
underestimate its incidence in total employment, temporary employment 
increased from 3% to 6% of total wage-employment between 1995 and 1998, 
mostly concentrated in firms with more than five employees.94 Micro-firms 
continued to rely mainly on employment of unknown duration non registered in 
the social security system (Perelman, 2000). As different studies point out, the 
new legislation resulted not only in the substitution of longer-term by temporary 
employment, but also of protected by non-protected employment (Altimir and 
Beccaria, 1999a; Cortés, 1997, 2000; Marshall, 1997; Perelman, 2000; 
Hopenhayn, 2001). 95 
Unemployment and job insecurity have represented mutually reinforcing 
processes during the decade. In 1997, according to national figures, among those 
unemployed who have previously been in wage-labor, 58% did not perceive any 
social benefits in their previous occupation, 70% was not unionized, 47% had 
temporary or occasional jobs, and 16% received atypical forms of payment 
(SIEMPRO, 2000d). These processes have been accompanied by a shrinking in 
the opportunities of self-employment generation as well as a deep deterioration of 
labor conditions in this segment of workers.  
                                                 
94 Since May 1995 the EPH incorporated a question on the duration of the employment 
relationship. The underestimation of temporary employment is given by the wide definition used 
for permanent employment, which is understood as an explicit agreement of continuity, 
independently of its degree of formalization.  
95 Remember that, as it has been pointed in the previous chapter, the new legislation was based on 




4.2.2. Unemployment, Unprotected Jobs and Self-employment 
The overall picture of the worsening of the labor market allows us a better 
understanding of the real dimensions of the employment problem during the 
1990s as well as the identification of the most affected groups and where they are 
they concentrated. 
  
Table 4.9. Precarious Labor, Self-employment and Unemployment, Greater 
Buenos Aires, 1990-2000 (percentage)  




49.9 45.9 39.8 41.2 4.4 
Precarious 
workers 2 
21.7 20.8 24.5 26.2 53.0 
Self-employed 3 21.8 19.0 15.2 16.4 - 4.5 
Unemployed 4 6.6 14.3 20.5 16.2 210.0 
      
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
 
Note: 1 Includes underemployed, voluntary part-time, and full-time wage-workers with social 
benefits. 
2 Includes underemployed, voluntary part-time, and full-time wage-workers without social 
benefits, and unpaid family workers. 
3 Non-professional self-employed, both full-time and underemployed. 
4 Employers have been excluded 
Source: EPH (October)  
 
As table 4.9 shows the main mechanism of adjustment of the labor market 
during the 1990s has been unemployment, which increased faster than precarious 
employment. The incidence of the latter, however, should not be underestimated, 
especially when considering the high degree of formalization that historically 
characterized the Argentinean labor market. In fact, in 1990, it was still 
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characterized by relatively low levels of unemployment and an important 
extension of social protection. Insufficient employment generation, accompanied 
by an increasing deterioration of the quality of the newly created jobs and 
rampant unemployment profoundly changed the picture of the Argentinean labor 
market.  By the end of the decade, if we combine the meager coverage of 
unemployment insurance, with the increasing deterioration of labor conditions -
both among wage-workers and the self-employed- the result is that almost 60% of 
the economically active population was affected by the lack of social protection.  
 
Table 4.10. Precarious Labor, Self-employment, and Unemployment by Gender, 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1990-2000 (percentage) 
 1990 2000 
 Female Male Total Female Male Total 
       
Non- 
Precarious 
45.7 52.4 49.9 38.6 43.0 41.2 
Precarious 25.9 19.4 21.7 29.4 24.0 26.2 
Self-
employed 
21.3 22.1 21.8 13.7 18.4 16.5 
Unemployed 7.1 6.3 6.6 18.4 14.6 16.2 
       
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: EPH (October)  
  
Labor market deterioration had differential impacts in terms of gender. 
While unemployment increased faster among females, labor insecurity had a 
higher incidence among males. In fact, the gap between males and females in both 
protected and unprotected jobs diminished during the decade (Table 4.10). The 
reduction in the differences in the quality of jobs held by men and women was 
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due to the worsening of the quality of jobs among males more than to an 
improvement in women’s labor conditions. Unemployment grew 268% in 
absolute terms among females and 172% among males, while unprotected jobs 
increased 62% and 45% respectively. The loss of protected jobs was concentrated 
among males, who experienced a decline of 4%. Among women, in contrast 
protected jobs increased 20.8%. Male workers –basically those older than 40 
years- have been greatly affected by the narrowing of self-employment 
opportunities. Older workers, once expelled from wage-labor, are in a highly 
disadvantageous position to exit from unemployment.96    
The deterioration of employment has been accompanied by an increase in 
the educational levels of the economically active population.97 In face of an ample 
supply of higher skills and formal education, labor demand has responded very 
poorly. In fact, the educational level of the unemployed increased at a faster pace 
than the employed population (Gómez, 2000). In a context of shrinking 
employment opportunities, the devaluation of credentials and labor conditions 
                                                 
96 Results from the Survey on Social Development conducted in 1997 show that the likelihood of 
becoming unemployed for older workers is lower than for the younger segments of the labor force; 
however, once unemployed their probability of re-employment is lower than the average, and if 
finding a job they are very likely to be excluded from social protection (SIEMPRO, 2001d). 
97 In the GREATER BUENOS AIRES, the percentage of the EAP that had completed secondary 
education increased from 26.5% to 32.1% between 1990 and 2000, while those with university 
complete grew from 11.5 to 14.8% during the same period. According to 1996 figures, the mean 
years of schooling in the population older than 25 years in Argentina, 9.44 years, was the highest 
in Latin America (IDB, 1998). However, as Filmus and Miranda (1999) point out, this mean hides 
profound social inequalities: while the poorest 40% has a mean of 7.5 years of schooling, the 
richest 10% achieves 13.6 years; among the population aged 20-25 only 14% has finished 
secondary school in the poorest 10% against 92% in the richest decile.    
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among those highly educated, was accompanied by an increasing exclusion of the 
least educated, whose employment opportunities were sharply reduced. 98 
 
Table 4.11. Educational Attainment by Labor Precariousness, Self-employment, 
and Unemployment, Greater Buenos Aires, 1990-2000 (percentage) 














         
Non- 
Precarious 
33.3 42.6 62.5 86.0 21.6 30.9 48.6 76.8 
Precarious 25.3 25.5 15.4 12.4 34.5 29.9 22.9 16.8 
Self-
employed 
33.1 24.7 15.7 - 25.4 20.8 12.3 - 
Unemployed 8.3 7.2 6.3 1.7 18.8 18.5 16.2 6.4 
         
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Note: 1 Never atended school and Incomplete Primary Education. 2 Complete Primary and 
Incomplete Secondary Education. 3 Complete Secondary and Incomplete University Education.  
4 Complete University Education.  
Source: EPH(October) 
 
Both the lack of social benefits and unemployment are negatively 
associated with education: their incidence increase with the decline in the level of 
education attained. Actually, those with the lowest educational levels experienced 
a sharp worsening in their already precarious situation at the beginning of the 
decade. As table 4.11 shows the least educated have been the most impacted by 
job insecurity: on October 2000, 5 out of 10 workers with primary education or 
                                                 
98 A recent study focused on  Greater Buenos Aires asserts that the devaluation of educational 
credentials that resulted from the generalized increase in educational levels has been fostered by 
the stagnation or even decline in the structure of skills of jobs demanded, specially in 
manufacturing, where restructuring resulted in the destruction of almost 36% of highly skilled jobs 
(Gómez, 2000).  
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less were either unprotected by social security or unemployed. Moreover, this 
segment has been the most affected by the decline in self-employment.  
Those with the lowest educational levels, however, were by no means the 
only segments impacted by this process. Those groups with middle education 
(complete secondary) became particularly vulnerable to the loss of social benefits 
and to unemployment, which affected almost 4 in 10 workers in October 2000 
(Table 4.11). In fact, the marked devaluation of the comparative advantage of 
secondary school as a means of entry into the labor market, resulted in 
unemployment rates much closer to those with primary or less education than to 
those with university level (Fimus and Miranda; 1999; Gómez, 2000). Those with 
the highest educational level, while impacted by increasing job insecurity, were 
mainly affected by unemployment, which increased 5 times between 1990 and 
2000 (table 4.11.). Thus, while access to protected jobs shows an increasing 
polarization in terms of education, unemployment emerges as a horizontal 
phenomenon that goes through the different educational levels.    
Household income distribution reinforces polarization in access to the 
increasingly scarce number of protected jobs. As table 4.12 shows, households 
placed in the poorest 40% have been the most vulnerable to the loss of protected 
jobs: less than two out of ten wage-workers in the poorest 20% had access to 
social benefits in 2000 -almost half the proportion of ten years ago. In contrast, 
the proportion of protected workers in the fifth quintile remained almost 
unchanged during the decade. There is a growing concentration of protected jobs 
among those households placed in the middle and higher levels of the distribution 
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(third, fourth and fifth quintiles), which increased from 70% to 75% during the 
decade. 
 
Table 4.12. Household Income1 by Labor Precariousness, Self-employment, and 
Unemployment  
 1990 2000 
           
 Q-1 Q-2 Q-3 Q-4 Q-5 Q-1 Q-2 Q-3 Q-4 Q-5 
           
Non- 
Precarious 
33.7 49.5 55.1 61.1 69.7 16.9 35.8 43.3 51.4 68.0 
Precarious 28.4 25.3 22.1 16.5 15.8 31.9 27.9 28.0 25.0 16.8 
Self-
employed 
23.6 15.6 17.7 19.5 12.4 21.3 17.5 14.7 14.9 10.2 
Unemployed 14.3 9.6 5.1 2.9 2.2 29.8 18.7 14.0 8.7 5.0 
           
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
1 Per capita household income quintiles 
Source: EPH (October) 
 
  Table 4.12 shows that the already precarious situation of the poorest 40%   
in 1990 deepened during the rest of the decade: in 2000 more than half of this 
segment were either unprotected by social security or unemployed. Together with 
the worsening of labor conditions among low-income households, those placed in 
the middle of the distribution (third quintile), experienced the fastest increase both 
in unprotected jobs and unemployment - 136% and 405% respectively.  
Therefore, while access to protected jobs has been increasingly polarized, 
jobs lacking social benefits have increased in the whole distribution, reducing the 
distances in the proportion of unprotected jobs held by low-middle and middle 
income households -second, third and fourth quintiles respectively (see table 
4.12). Unemployment, while still concentrated in the lower levels of the 
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distribution –65% of the unemployed belonged to the poorest 40% of households 
in 2000-  has increasingly affected the middle-classes. 
  Self-employment diminished its participation in the whole distribution 
with the exception of the second quintile. The decline, however, has been sharper 
in middle-income households. In contrast to what happened in the previous 
decades, self-employment is increasingly becoming the last resort of poor 
households in trying to cope with unemployment. However, it is clearly 
insufficient when we observe the disproportion between the increase in self-
employment and unemployment in poor households. In fact, while in the poorest 
20%, unemployment increased 328% in absolute terms during the decade, self-
employment growth was just 85%.    
 
Table 4.13. Family Status by Labor Precariousness, Self-employment, and 
Unemployment 
 1990  2000 
        
 Head 
 
Spouse Child  Head Spouse Child 
Non- 
Precarious 
55.5 45.7 43.6  46.9 39.2 36.1 
Precarious 14.6 24.0 31.9  21.3 25.9 32.3 
Self-
employed 
25.5 26.5 12.5  20.7 19.6 7.8 
Unemployed 4.4 3.8 12.0  11.8 15.3 23.8 
        
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
   
The worsening of the employment situation of heads of households is 
probably one of the most severe signs of labor market deterioration during the last 
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decade. While in 1990 only 4.4% of the heads were unemployed, by the end of 
the decade almost 12% were out of work, due both to job losses in formal 
employment and the diminution of self-employment -Table 4.13.  
The consequent pressure on other members of the households to enter the 
labor market resulted in sharp increases of unemployment among secondary 
workers, especially among spouses, where unemployment grew 4 times between 
1990 and 2000. On the other hand, the labor insertion of those able to enter the 
labor market was characterized by its precariousness: non-protected jobs 
increased 40% among spouses and 35% among children.  While the impact of 
unemployment was higher among spouses, unprotected jobs increased fastest 
among heads - 74% between 1990 and 2000. 
 
4.2.3. Income Precariousness  
The analysis of the worsening in labor market would not be complete 
without considering the sharp income deterioration experienced during the 
decade. Given the lack of an official minimum wage, income evolution will be 
analyzed according to the poverty line, trying to assess the capacity of employed 
individuals to support one or more members of their households. 
As table 4.14 shows, the situation in 1990 was one of deep deterioration of 
income. As a result of hyperinflation and the consequent fall in income, poverty 
achieved a peak in 1989, affecting 38.2% of households and almost half (47.3%) 
of the population of the Greater Buenos Aires (SIEMPRO, 1999). At the 
beginning of the decade, relatively low unemployment rates and a considerable 
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extension of labor protection was accompanied by a great increase in the 
incidence of poverty. 
 
Table 4.14. Income Deterioration among the Employed Population, Greater 
Buenos Aires, 1990-2000 
 1990 1994 1996 2000 
Able 
to support: 
    
Less than 
1 person 
0.1 2.2 5.2 6.8 
1 person 15.2 7.4 9.9 10.9 
2 persons 20.4 11.6 13.1 12.4 
3 persons 20.1 15.4 21.8 14.1 
4 or more 
persons 
44.2 63.4 49.9 55.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Note: Incomes have been calculated according to an individual poverty line, which includes a 
basic basket of goods and services (total basic basket, TBB). 
Income= TBB*Engels coefficient*Adult equivalent coefficient 
One person is an adult (male or female) aged 30-59 years 
Two persons: two adults (male and female) 
Three persons: two adults and one child in school age (7-9 years) 
Four persons:  two adults and two children in school age (7-9 and 10-13 years) 
In 2000 income required to support one person =$151,10; two persons =$262.92; 
three persons=$371.72; four persons=$487.13. Until the devaluation of the peso at the beginning 
of 2002, 1 peso=1dollar.  
Source: EPH (October) 
 
According to my own calculations, in 1990, 55% of the employed 
population, and 47% of the heads of households were unable to support a family 
with spouse and two children (see tables 4.14 and 4.15).   Since the beginning of 
the decade a single earner was clearly insufficient to satisfy the basic needs of the 
household. In fact, the activity rate of other family members (specially spouses) 
experienced a sharp increase during the whole decade.  
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The temporary improvement in income levels between 1991 and 1994 was 
due to price stabilization achieved as a consequence of the Convertibility Plan 
implemented in 1991. Since 1994, however, successive economic crises –the 
Mexican crisis on 1996 and the recession experienced since 1998- resulted in a 
deep process of income deterioration. In October 2000 poverty achieved its 
highest level since 1991, affecting 20.8% of households and 28.9% of the 
population in the Greater Buenos Aires.99  
In contrast with 1990, however, high levels of unemployment and a great 
expansion of labor insecurity now accompanied the extension of poverty. The 
percentage of workers earning the basic income needed to maintain a four 
member family decreased from 66.4% to 55.9% between 1994 and 2000. This 
means that 44.1% of those employed in October 2000 earned less than $500. At 
the same time, there was an increase in those making just enough to support two 
persons or even less, representing almost one third of the employed population in 
2000. In terms of gender, income deterioration was sharper among men. The 
percentage of those earning enough to support a family decreased from 71% to 
61.8% among males and from 50.1% to 47.2% among females between 1994 and 
2000.  
The most impacted by income deterioration have been the self-employed. 
On October 1994, 6 out of 10 self-employed earned enough to maintain a four 
family member; by the end of the decade this proportion had diminished to 4 out 
of ten. The percentage of unprotected wage-earners able to support a family 
                                                 
99 INDEC-EPH, Información de Prensa, October 2000. 
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decreased from 41.2% to 35.3% during the same period, and from 71.7% to 
70.3% among those with social benefits. Thus, those mainly affected by income 
deterioration have been precisely the most vulnerable segments of the labor 
market. 
 
Table 4.15. Family Status by Income Deterioration, Greater Buenos Aires, 1990-
2000     
 1990 1994 2000 
 Head Spouse Child Head Spouse Child Head Spouse Child 
Able to 
Support: 
         
Less than 
1 person 
0.1 0.2 - 0.6 5.8 2.9 4.1 8.6 9.6 
1 person 9.0 23.8 22.2 4.1 13.6 9.4 7.2 16.1 14.5 
2 persons 17.2 20.7 16.5 8.2 15.9 16.1 9.9 11.9 18.4 
3 persons 21.0 16.5 21.4 11.5 16.1 22.3 11.3 12.6 20.1 
4 or more 
persons 
52.7 38.8 29.9 75.6 48.6 49.3 67.5 50.8 37.4 
          
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
 
  The percentage of heads unable to support a four member family 
decreased between 1990 and 1994 -from 47.3% to 24.4%- increasing again to 
32.5% in 2000 (Table 4.15). In contrast, those heads earning just to maintain two 
people (he/she and another person) or less increased from 13% in 1994 to 21% in 
2000.  
Among spouses, there was a slight improvement between 1994 and 2000; 
those making enough to maintain a family, increased from 48.6% to 50.8% during 
this period. However, there was growth in the percentage of those earning just to 
maintain themselves –equivalent to $151 in 2000- or less, which increased from 
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19.4% to 24.7%. While the former trend is showing an increasing importance of 
spouses income for the support of the family; the latter shows that in a context of 
high unemployment spouses are compelled to accept very low wages to 
compensate the loss or fall in the incomes of the main provider.  
 Children making just to maintain themselves or less increased from 
12.4% to 24% during the decade, while the percentage of those earning enough to 
maintain at least a three member family decreased from 22.3% to 20.1%. The 
profound difficulties of children in the labor market can be interpreted in terms of 
a delay in youth transition, given the increasing difficulties of young people to 
acquire autonomy from their parents and live separately. 
 
4.2.4. Unemployment and Unprotected-Wage Employment: A Regression 
Analysis  
Logistic regression analysis on both unemployment and unprotected-wage 
employment confirms the differential impact of both employment problems on 
different categories of workers. Two models were constructed for each dependent 
variable (unemployment and unprotected wage-employment), including the same 
explanatory variables (Table 4.16 and Table 4.17). The first model (1A and 1B 
respectively) regresses “unemployment” and “unprotected employment” (both 
dichotomous variables: unemployed/non unemployed, protected by social 
benefits/non protected) on individual, household, and employment structure 
characteristics including a control variable for gender. The second model (2A and 
2B) includes interaction terms between gender and individual and household 
characteristics. The individual variables included are gender, age, and education. 
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Household variables are family status and household poverty. Employment 
structure variables (economic sector and firm size) refer to previous occupation in 
the case of unemployment and to current occupation in the regression on 
unprotected jobs. 
In terms of the vulnerability to each of the employment problems 
analyzed, regression analysis results show the following results. First, as 
previously stated, women are more likely than men both to become unemployed 
and to hold unprotected jobs if employed. Women are more vulnerable to 
unemployment than to job insecurity, with exactly the opposite occurring among 
males. 
 Secondly, children and spouses show the highest probabilities both for 
unemployment and lack of social benefits respectively. For heads, the likelihood 
of having precarious jobs is twice the probability of being unemployed. There is 
differential effect of family status by gender: the probability of heads to be 
unemployed is higher among males than among females. In contrast, the 
likelihood of being unprotected if employed is higher for female heads. Other 
household variables -not included in the model- such as the possible entry of other 
members into the labor market as well as family stage (age of children) are 
probably affecting the different results for male and female heads.  
 Thirdly, as expected, the youngest (15-19) and oldest (50-65) groups 
show the highest probability to be unemployed, the later being the most 
vulnerable group. Unprotected jobs, in contrast, appear to be less polarized in 
terms of age and concentrated in the youngest groups (15-19 and 20-29). The 
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probability tends to decrease in central ages, increasing again in those aged 50-65. 
The latter group, however, is more likely to be out of work than to be precariously 
employed. The effect of age on unemployment and lack of social benefits clearly 
differs by gender. Among the youngest (15-19 years), women have a higher 
probability than men of being unemployed. Exactly the opposite occurs with lack 
of social benefits, where the probability of having a precarious job is higher 
among men. The effect on unemployment of being 40 years or more is higher 
among men, showing that -as it has been previously mentioned- older men are 
among the most vulnerable groups to labor market exclusion. In contrast, with 
respect the lack of social benefits, the effect of being 40-49 is higher among 
women, while the opposite occurs among those older than 49 years, where the 
probability of being in a precarious job is higher among men.          
Fourthly, those who have completed secondary school are the most likely 
to be unemployed, and those with university level the least likely. The coefficients 
for the lowest and highest levels of education may be indicating the already 
mentioned process of polarization of the employment structure that increasingly 
excludes those in the middle educational levels. In contrast, once in the labor 
market the probability of being excluded from social security is clearly higher 
among the least educated. Education also has a differential effect for men and 
women. Among females, the lowest and highest educational levels -primary 
incomplete and university respectively- decrease the probability of being 
unemployed with respect to secondary school. The effect on men, however, is 
exactly the opposite:  having incomplete primary or a college degree increases the 
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probability of being unemployed.  These results could be associated, on the one 
side, with the reduction of self-employment, and the high levels of unemployment 
in sectors such as construction, where the least educated segments of the male 
labor force are concentrated. On the other hand, the effect of having a college 
degree is probably related to the previously mentioned labor instability in the 
most advanced sectors, such as producer services and modern industries, where 
professional males tend to be concentrated. With respect to the probability of 
lacking social benefits, the effect of education on females follows the general 
pattern, that is, it decreases with the increase in educational attainment. In 
contrast, among men, college education increases the probability of being 
unprotected. These results may be indicating that the effect of education on the 
quality of jobs held by men is mediated by other variables, such as sector and size 
of the firm, among others. 
Fifthly, as expected, poverty increases both the probability of being 
unemployed and excluded from social benefits. It is worth pointing out, however, 
that the causal relation here is not a simple one; that is, if poverty is explained by 
unemployment and precariousness or vice-versa. Other factors, such as the 
composition and size of the household, education, social capital, spatial 
segregation, and previous labor trajectories, among other factors, should be taken 
into account when explaining this relationship. The probability of being 
unemployed is slightly higher among poor males, while the opposite occurs with 
the likelihood of having a precarious job, which is higher for females (see Model 
2A and 2B, tables 4.16 and 4.17). 
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Finally, the employment structure by sector show that the most advanced 
sectors, both in manufacturing and services –modern industries and producer 
services respectively- with the lowest coefficients for unprotected jobs, are also 
among the highest with respect to unemployment, after construction. Thus, labor 
protection and job stability do not seem to be necessarily related. Labor instability 
in these sectors -at least for the highest skilled- is probably associated with higher 
wages, which by no means is the reality among those workers employed in 
construction or personal services, where instability is associated with lack of 
protection and low wages. As expected, there is a negative relationship between 
firm size and probability of lacking social protection. In fact, the effect of size is 
higher in small-size firms. The probability of being unemployed, however, is 
higher in medium-size firms, and the differences in the coefficients between small 












Table 4.16. Logistic Regression on Unemployment, Greater Buenos Aires, 
October 2000 
 Model 1A Model 2A  
Variables Coefficients S.E Coefficients S.E 
Intercept -2.3522 0.00711 -2.1006 0.00803 
Individual variables     
Male -0.5118 0.00393 -1.2455 0.0161 
Age: 15-19 0.3306 0.00740 0.4987 0.0107 
Male*15-19   -0.3129 0.0149 
Age: 20-29  0.19927 0.00488 0.1154 0.00686 
Male*20-29   0.1579 0.00988 
Age: 40-49  0.1877 0.00473 -0.0422 0.00665 
Male*40-49   0.4635 0.00955 
Age: 50 + years 0.4185 0.00482 -0.3021 0.00756 
Male-50+   1.2771 0.0100 
Primary incomplete -0.1065 0.00618 -0.2652 0.0101 
Male*Primary Incomplete   0.2718 0.0128 
Primary Complete -0.0531 0.00379 0.1189 0.00543 
Male*Primary Complete   -0.2668 0.00742 
University Complete -0.9398 0.00715 -1.1138 0.00922 
Male*University Complete   0.4871 0.0143 
Household variables     
Household Head -03559 0.00474 -0.2828 0.00596 
Male*Head   0.1472 0.0151 
Child 0.4643 0.00527 0.2084 0.00643 
Male*Child   0.7838 0.0157 
Poor. 1.1783 0.00337 1.1199 0.00512 
Male*Poor   0.0783 0.00681 
Employment structure 
Variables 
    
Traditional industries 0.5120 0.00696 0.4947 0.00699 
Modern industries 0.6466 0.00641 0.6256 0.00644 
Producer services 0.5232 0.00640 0.5116 0.00644 
Personal services 0.4374 0.00581 0.4421 0.00590 
Commerce 0.1307 0.00604 0.1118 0.00607 
Construction 1.3002 0.00650 1.3265 0.00658 
Transportation 0.1058 0.00745 0.0998 0.00747 
Firms 1-25 Employees -0.0281 0.00492 -0472 0.00493 
Firms 101+ employees -0.3559 0.00631 -0.1594 0.00635 
 
Reference group: female, 30-39 years, secondary complete, spouse, non-poor, social services, 
firms sized 26-100 employees. All variables are significant at 1%. 
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Table 4.17. Logistic Regression on Unprotected Jobs, Greater Buenos Aires, 
October 2000 
 Model 1B Model 2B 
Variables Coefficients S.E Coefficients S.E 
Intercept -2.2420 0.0685 -2.1379 0.00829 
Individual variables     
Male -0.2450 0.00396 -0.3899 0.0151 
Age: 15-19 1.9166 0.0103 1.5309 0.0157 
Male/ 15-19   0.5869 0.0208 
Age: 20-29  0.4208 0.00458 0.2065 0.00737 
Male/20-29   0.3669 0.00944 
Age: 40-49  -0.0626 0.00464 0.0381 0.00764 
Male 40-49   -0.1919 0.0097 
Age: 50 + years 0.1053 0.00490 -0.2697 0.00810 
Male-50+   0.5571 0.0102 
Primary incomplete 0.8552 0.00718 0.8893 0.0115 
Male-Primary Incomplete   -0.0493 0.0148 
Primary Complete 0.4266 0.00374 0.5122 0.00600 
Male-Primary Complete   -0.0946 0.00764 
University Complete -0.00337 0.00538 -0.4168 0.00725 
Male-University Complete   1.0294 0.0104 
Household variables     
Household Head -0.1693 0.00492 0.0886 0.00612 
Male-Head   -0.3757 0.0142 
Child -0.0666 0.00548 -0.2081 0.00700 
Male-Child   0.1892 0.0151 
Poor. 0.8120 0.00430 1.3263 0.00828 
Male-Poor   -0.6659 0.00980 
Employment structure 
Variables 
    
Traditional industries 0.4172 0.00649 0.4205 0.00659 
Modern industries -0.3012 0.00617 -0.2583 0.00623 
Producer services -0.0625 0.00586 -0.0347 0.00593 
Personal services 1.3393 0.00570 1.2851 0.00589 
Commerce 0.4301 0.00524 0.4470 0.00532 
Construction 0.9517 0.00742 1.0536 0.00750 
Transportation 0.8687 0.00569 0.9132 0.00575 
Firms 1-25 Employees 1.5823 0.00462 1.5869 0.00465 
Firms 101+ employees -0.1609 0.00594 -0.1977 0.00600 
 
Reference group: female, 30-39 years, secondary complete, spouse, non-poor, social services, 
firms sized 26-100 employees. All variables are significant at 1%, except university complete in 
Model 1B, which is not statistically significant.  
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4.3. SUMMARY        
During the 1990s the growth of unemployment was accompanied by 
widespread job insecurity expressed both in the rise of visible underemployment 
and in the increasing weight of unprotected jobs in wage-employment. The sharp 
increase in the levels of open unemployment were the result of combination of 
three main factors: fall in labor demand, increase in labor supply, and loss of 
dynamism in the informal sector as a result of shrinking opportunities for self-
employment generation. Until 1993 the increase of unemployment was basically 
explained by the increase in labor supply. Since then, the growth of open 
unemployment was the result of both the evolution of the activity rate and the 
decline in labor demand. During the last part of the decade, however, in a context 
of economic recession and a stable labor supply, unemployment continued to 
increase, but now as a consequence of low employment generation and job 
destruction. The fall in labor demand was the result of the loss of manufacturing 
jobs due to the deepening of a de-industrialization process that began to decades 
ago and a strategy of productive restructuring based upon the incorporation of 
technology and employment reduction. While employment generation was 
concentrated in the service sector, it was clearly insufficient to offset job losses on 
manufacturing. In this context, the informal sector –as a consequence of the 
decline in self-employment- instead of operating as a “buffer’ exacerbated the 
problem. These processes had strong and heterogeneous impacts on different 
categories of workers.  
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The deterioration of the employment situation of the heads of households 
resulted in a strong pressure of married women and daughters to compensate the 
decline of household income. Women, in increasing numbers tried unsuccessfully 
to enter the labor market, resulting in a sharp growth of female unemployment. In 
contrast, the deterioration of employment conditions grew faster among males, 
with an increasing incidence of unemployment among those in their middle ages. 
In general terms, unemployment among women was the result of their 
impossibility to enter the labor market, while among male was basically the result 
of massive layoffs and job destruction. Less and more precarious jobs were 
accompanied by higher educational requirements. Higher educational levels 
increasingly became indispensable for accessing to a scarce numbers of protected 
jobs, but by no means guaranteed getting a job, resulting in the rise of  
unemployment among the highly educated. 
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Chapter 5: Changes in Employment Status, Vulnerable Groups 
and Impacts at the Individual and Household Levels: A Panel 
Analysis  
Changes experienced in the Argentinean labor market deeply impacted the 
structure of employment opportunities during the 1990s. High unemployment and 
the extension of job insecurity were the most visible expressions of the worsening 
of the labor market. On the one hand, for a vast segment of first time job seekers –
especially women and young people- it resulted either in the impossibility of entry 
or in a precarious insertion once a job was obtained. On the other, those already in 
the labor force, experienced massive job losses and a sharp deterioration of labor 
conditions. The main attributes of those experiencing unemployment and labor 
insecurity, using cross-sectional data, have been described in the previous chapter.  
A better understanding of the processes of becoming, remaining, or 
ceasing to be unemployed, however, requires a more dynamic analysis, able to 
show changes over time. Changes in employment status -from employment to 
unemployment and vice-versa- have an impact both at the individual and 
household levels.100 At the individual level different studies have pointed out that 
the experience of unemployment has a long-term impact on job careers (Gershuny 
and Marsh, 1994; Layte et al., 2000). Two main issues deserve deeper 
exploration. The first one refers to the identification of those groups most 
vulnerable to changes in their employment status. The second question relates to 
the kinds of jobs leading to and obtained after unemployment. At the household 
                                                 
100 Given that this chapter focuses on the unemployment of those already in the labor market, 
movements from and out of inactivity have been excluded.   
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level, the permanent or temporary exclusion of one or more members from the 
labor market, particularly when it affects the principal earner, has a strong impact 
on household well-being and on decisions about labor market participation of 
other family members. The main points to be explored here refer first to the 
impact of the unemployment of the head on household poverty and income levels, 
and secondly, to the employment strategies developed by the family to cope with 
financial hardship taking into account that social security for the unemployed is 
almost non existent. 
Using panel analysis, this chapter focuses on changes in and out of 
employment during a one year-period, identifying the most vulnerable groups as 
well as the impact of these changes on subsequent jobs, household well-being and 
labor strategies.101     
 
5.1. VULNERABILITY TO UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOR INSTABILITY  
During the 1990s, the growth of unemployment was accompanied by a 
sharp increase in labor instability. Between October 1999 and October 2000, 20% 
of the EAP experienced one movement in or out of employment, or more than one 
change (Table 5.1).  If we add to this segment those who were unemployed during 
the whole year, during this period almost one fourth of the EAP (23.4%) of 
Greater Buenos Aires experienced unemployment, which is much higher than the 
mean unemployment rate for the whole period- 15.3%. By the end of the decade 
3.1% of the EAP, and 10.7% of the unemployed had been out of work for more 
                                                 
101 Longer-term changes, as well as impacts, perceptions and meanings attached to them, based on 
in-depth interviews with unemployed, are the focus of the following chapters. 
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than one year, a proportion that is certainly lower than in European countries, but 
particularly high in a context characterized by a very weak system of social 
protection for the unemployed.  
 
Table 5.1. Changes in Employment Status, Greater Buenos Aires, 1999-2000 
(Percentage) 
Changes in employment status  
  
Always employed 76.6 
From employment to unemployment 7.5 
From unemployment to employment 6.6 
More than one change 6.2 




Source: EPH (October). 
 
Men are more impacted by labor instability than women. As table 5.2 
shows, 75.2% of males were employed during the whole period, against 79.2% of 
female. Moreover, the percentages of those moving out of employment and 
experiencing more than one change are higher for males. In contrast, women are 
slightly more affected by long-term unemployment than men. Thus, while over 
represented among the unemployed, once in the labor market women appear to be 






Table 5.2. Gender by Changes in Employment status, Greater Buenos Aires, 
1999-2000 (%) 
Changes in employment status Female Male 
   
Always employed 79.2 75.2 
From employment to unemployment 6.6 8.1 
From unemployment to employment 6.3 6.8 
More than one change 4.7 7.0 
Always unemployed 3.3 2.9 
   
Total 100.0 100 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
 
Labor instability seems to be inversely related to age.  Among the 
youngest group (15-19) only 40.5% remained employed during the whole year, 
while 15% experienced more than one change (Table 5.3). Among adult workers, 
those aged 40-49 are particularly vulnerable to becoming unemployed and less 
likely to re-enter the labor force. In fact, long-term unemployment, while 
concentrated in the younger groups, tends to increase for those aged 40 or more.  
As table 5.4 shows, educational attainment is positively related to labor 
stability. Nine out of ten workers who had finished college education remained 
employed during the whole year. In contrast, those with the lowest educational 
levels (complete primary or less) were the most vulnerable to losing their jobs and 
to experience more than one change in their employment status. In contrast, long-
term unemployment –while higher among the least educated- does not 
consistently decline with higher levels of education, the least affected being those 
who have completed primary education.  
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Table 5.3. Age by Changes in Employment Status, Greater Buenos Aires, 1999-
2000 (%) 
Changes in employment status Age groups 
      
 15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 
      
Always employed 40.5 71.3 80.8 79.6 80.0 
From employment to unemployment 14.6 8.6 6.4 8.1 6.0 
From unemployment to employment 20.0 7.8 4.9 5.0 6.7 
More than one change 14.9 8.3 5.9 4.8 4.5 
Always unemployed 10.0 4.0 2.0 2.5 2.8 
      
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
 
Table 5.4. Educational Attainment by Changes in Employment Status, Greater 
Buenos Aires, 1999-2000 (%) 
Changes in  
employment status 
Educational Attainment 









     
Always employed 72.3 71.7 79.0 87.8 
From employment 
 to unemployment 
7.6 10.0 6.2 3.3 
From unemployment  
to employment 
5.9 8.2 5.9 4.0 
More than 
one change 
9.7 8.0 5.1 1.6 
Always unemployed 4.5 2.1 3.8 3.3 
     
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
 
Poverty is clearly associated with labor instability and long-term 
unemployment. Among poor households, only 55.6% of workers remained 
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employed during the whole year, and 7.5% were always unemployed. In contrast, 
in households above the poverty line, 81.1% were always employed and 2.1% 
were long-term unemployed. Labor instability, while higher among the poor, is by 
no means limited to them. Middle-low and middle-income sectors are also prone 
to labor instability. On average, one fourth of those placed in the second and third 
quintiles of the income distribution did not remain employed during the whole 
year.     
Table 5.5 reaffirms the profound labor deterioration experienced by heads 
of households that was pointed out in the previous chapter. When compared to 
spouses, heads are less likely to remain employed during the whole year, and 
more likely to experience more than one change in employment status. Long-term 
unemployment is also higher among heads. Children show the lowest levels of 
employment stability and the highest levels of long-term unemployment. 
 
Table 5.5. Family status by changes in employment status, Greater Buenos Aires, 
1999-2000 (%) 
Changes in employment status Family status 
    
 Head Spouse Child 
    
Always employed 80.7 85.0 63.1 
From employment to unemployment 6.5 6.1 11.4 
From unemployment to employment 4.6 4.0 11.3 
More than one change 6.1 3.4 8.0 
Always unemployed 2.0 1.4 6.2 
    
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
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High and middle service workers have higher levels of job stability. In 
fact, nine out of ten high and middle service workers remained employed during 
the whole year (Table 5.6). In contrast, job instability is concentrated in low 
skilled occupations both in services and manufacturing -i.e. unskilled manual 
workers, low services, and the non-professional self-employed. Those categories 
in the middle of the occupational structure –i.e. routine non-manual and skilled 
manual workers- are particularly vulnerable to changes in employment status. In 
fact, after the most unstable class –unskilled manual workers- these two 
categories show the highest percentages of those experiencing more than one 
change during the year under analysis. Routine non-manual workers are also the 
most affected by long-term unemployment, indicating their few possibilities of re-
employment once losing their jobs -Table 5.6. 
While secular trends contribute to explaining the increasing instability and 
unemployment of manual workers, in the case of Argentina sectoral re-
composition has been clearly insufficient to absorb those expelled from manual 
occupations. In fact, industrial restructuring and sectoral change have meant that 
skilled and unskilled manual occupations have become both less numerous and 
more unstable (Layte et al., 2000). Social and producer services are the sectors 
most associated with job stability; 88.2% and 80.0% of workers respectively 
remained employed during the whole year. In contrast, construction, traditional 
industries and personal services, show the highest levels of employment 
instability. In construction only 51.6% were employed during the whole year 
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(Table 5.7).102 Construction, producer services, and commerce show the highest 
concentration of workers in long-term unemployment (see table 5.7). 
Construction, in fact, is the sector with the highest percentage of overall 
unemployment. 
  
Table 5.6. Occupational Class* by Changes in Employment Status, Greater 
Buenos Aires, 1999-2000 (Percentage) 
Occupational 
Class 
Changes in employment status 



































50.9 17.4 10.7 16.8 4.3 100.0 
(2.7) 




68.5 9.9 10.0 8.5 3.1 100.0 
(17.1) 
 
Note: The category “occupational class” has being constructed on the basis of the schema of 
Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992), which combines position in the labor market and in the work 
place. 
 Source: EPH, October 
 
                                                 
102 A recent study on non-permanent employment in the Greater Buenos Aires (Perelman, 2000) 
points out that the highest increases in the use of temporary contracts between 1995 and 1997 
were experienced in manufacturing and commerce, restaurants and hotels, where they grew from 
16.8% to 25.4% and from 7.4% to 15.2% respectively. In contrast, producer services was the only 
sector that maintained the same level of temporary contracts – 17% during the same period (Ibid). 
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Long-term unemployment in the case of producer services, whose overall 
levels of unemployment are lower, could be attributed to two main factors. First is 
the lack of dynamism in this sector in recent years. Secondly, are the increasing 
difficulties in returning to the labor market for relatively high skilled workers 
coming from better-paid jobs.  
 
Table 5.7. Sector by changes in employment status, Greater Buenos Aires, 1999-
2000 (%) 
Sector Changes in employment status 
















       
Traditional 
Industries 
















74.0 9.0 7.2 7.1 2.7 100.0 
(12.9) 
Commerce 78.9 5.8 6.6 4.7 4.0 100.0 
(13.7) 
Construction 51.6 13.9 12.6 16.8 5.1 100.0 
(10.3) 
Transport. 78.4 9.0 5.9 4.7 2.0 100.0 
(11.1) 
 
Source: EPH, October 
 
In sum, the panel analysis highlights the extent of vulnerability to 
unemployment, as well as the most affected groups.  In the Argentinean context, 
characterized by high unemployment and adverse economic conditions, job 
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insecurity is generalized.  Men, heads of households, adults older than 40, the less 
educated and low skilled workers, as well as those employed in construction, 
manufacturing and personal services are particularly vulnerable to unemployment. 
 
5.2. MOVING OUT OF UNEMPLOYMENT: PREVIOUS AND SUBSEQUENT JOBS 
The previous analysis has allowed us to identify individual and household 
characteristics associated with job instability and vulnerability to unemployment. 
This section, focusing on those individuals that during the period of one year have 
combined movements into and out of unemployment, explores the kind of jobs 
held before and after a period of unemployment.103 The panel data for Greater 
Buenos Aires are clear evidence of worsening of labor conditions when 
comparing jobs held before and after experiencing a period of unemployment. In 
fact, the likelihood to improve labor conditions in subsequent jobs appears to be 
very low for the vast majority of workers.  
When focusing on firm size we found a negative relationship between the 
size of the firm of the previous job and the possibilities of entering employment 
under equal or better conditions. As the size of the firm of the previous 
occupation increases, so too the opportunities of obtaining a job in a firm of the 
same size clearly decreases. In fact, only 5.2% of those who lost their jobs in 
firms larger than 100 workers returned to a firm of equal size when finding a job, 
                                                 
103 Movements into and out of employment include four possible combinations: 1) unemployed in 
the first interview and employed in the two subsequent; 2) unemployed in the first, employed in 
the second and unemployed again in the third; 3) unemployed in the first and second interviews 
and employed in the third; and 4) employed in the first, unemployed in the second, and employed 
again in the third interview. 
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and 73% were employed in small or micro-size firms (see Table 5.8). Thus, we 
can assume –given the higher levels of precariousness in small firms- that at least 
seven out of ten workers who lost their jobs in large firms experienced a sharp 
worsening of labor conditions when regaining employment. The likelihood of 
finding a job in a bigger firm is clearly low for those previously employed in 
micro-enterprises (1-5): almost nine in ten workers returned to this kind of firm 
after a period of unemployment. 
  
Table 5.8.  Previous and Subsequent Job after Unemployment by Firm Size, 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1999-2000 (percentage) 
Firm size of previous 
job 
Firm size of job obtained after unemployment 
      
 1-5 6-25 26-100 101 + Total 
      
1-5 86.0 8.7 3.5 1.8 100.0 
(54.8) 
6-25 43.6 37.1 12.5 6.8 100.0 
(23.4) 
26-100 30.5 30.7 25.9 13.0 100.0 
(11.8) 
101 + 57.2 15.8 21.8 5.2 100.0 
(10.0) 
 
Source: EPH (October). 
 
As different studies have shown, unemployment decreases the probability 
that one will change class categories into a more secure position (Gershuny and 
Marsh, 1994; Layte et al., 2000).   There is a trend toward downward occupational 
mobility after a period of unemployment. Own calculations show that the process 
is clearer in the middle service class as well as among skilled manual workers. 
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Among the latter, 4 out of ten were either re-employed in lower-skilled 
occupations or became self-employed. Self-employment appears as the main 
destination for almost 40% of the unskilled manual working class, and for one 
fifth of those coming from the low services. In the current situation, self-
employment could hardly be considered as an improvement in terms of 
occupational position.  The deterioration of labor conditions and increasingly 
scarce opportunities in self-employment have resulted in a significant growth of 
labor insecurity and unemployment among the self-employed. Actually, more 
than one third of the self-employed became wage-workers when leaving 
unemployment. In contrast, less than 20% of wage-workers who lost their jobs 
became self-employed when moving back into employment.  
 
Table 5.9.  Previous and subsequent job after unemployment by social benefits, 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1999-2000 (percentage) 
Previous job Job obtained after unemployment 
 Without social benefits With social benefits Total 
    
Without social 
benefits 
55.5 44.5 100.0 
(49.9) 
With social benefits 74.6 25.4 100.0 
(50.1) 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
 
The most evident sign of the downgrading in labor conditions after a 
period of unemployment is the loss of social benefits:  3 out of four wage workers 
who were protected by social security lost their benefits when moving back into 
employment (Tables 5.9). These figures, however, can be underestimating the 
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phenomenon, given that they exclude those wage-workers hat became self-
employed after losing their jobs (18.3%) and they are not covered by the social 
security system. 
Thus, in a context characterized by the low quality and insufficient amount 
of jobs generated, once losing a relatively secure job is very unlikely to maintain  
-and even more difficult to improve- previous labor conditions when moving into 
employment.  
 
5.3. THE IMPACTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT ON THE HOUSEHOLD: POVERTY, 
INCOME, AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF FAMILY MEMBERS 
Unemployment is not limited to an individual experience. Household well- 
being is usually a matter of resource pooling, and household characteristics are 
accordingly critical. The impacts of unemployment, however, will vary depending 
on the family status of the unemployed and on how important his/her income is 
for the support of the family. In Argentina, vulnerability to unemployment and the 
job insecurity of heads of household dramatically increased during the 1990s. 
This section is focused on the impacts of the head’s unemployment on household 
poverty, income levels, and simultaneous or subsequent changes in the 
employment status of other family members.104 
 
                                                 
104 With this aim I have considered those cases where the initial state of the head was employed, 
which includes two possible situations. First, the head was employed in the first interview and 
unemployed in the subsequent interviews. Second, the head was employed in the first interview, 
unemployed in the second, and employed in the third.  
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5.3.1. Unemployment and Vulnerability to Poverty 
As some studies have shown the weaker the welfare state, the more likely 
it is that the unemployed will be income-poor (Bison and Esping-Andersen, 
(2000). In fact, panel analysis clearly illustrates how the near inexistent social 
safety nets for the unemployed strongly increase their vulnerability to poverty. As 
table 5.10 shows, less than one third of those households where the head became 
unemployed were not vulnerable to poverty during the period of one year. This 
clearly contrasts with those households where the head was always employed, 
68.5% of which remained above the poverty line. At the opposite extreme, while   
13.1% of households where the head was always employed remained in poverty, 
the percentage increases to 42.9% when the head had been unemployed.   The 
percentage of households with head unemployed that fell in poverty was 20.7%, 
against 6.9% where the head remained employed.  
 
Table 5.10. Vulnerability to Household Poverty by Employment Status of Head, 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1999-2000 
Changes in household 
poverty 
Employment status of the head 
 Always employed Becomes unemployed 
   
Never in poverty 68.5 31.8 
Fall in poverty 6.9 20.7       
Exit poverty 6.8 4.5 
Always in poverty 13.1 42.9 
   
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
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Table 5.11 focuses on those households that were either out of or in 
poverty in the first interview. Among those households that were not poor when 
the head was employed –first interview- 4 out of 10 fell in poverty after the head 
entered unemployment, against 1 in 10 where the head was always employed.105 
In those households already in poverty when first interviewed, 9 out of 10 of 
those where the head moved to unemployment remained in poverty during the 
whole year. Thus, while among non-poor households unemployment of the head 
sharply increases their vulnerability to fall in poverty, among the poor it reduces 
their likelihood of escaping from poverty. As table 5.11 shows, employment 
stability of the head clearly decreases household vulnerability to poverty.  
 
Table 5.11. Impacts of Head’s Unemployment on Poor and Non-Poor 
Households, Greater Buenos Aires, 1999-2000   
Changes in household 
poverty 
Employment status of the head 
 Always employed Becomes unemployed 
Initially non-poor   
     Remains non-poor 91.0 60.6 
     Falls in poverty 9.0 39.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   
Initially poor   
     Remains poor     66.0 90.5 
     Exit poverty 34.0 9.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
 
 
                                                 
105 Spouse’s unemployment seems to have a lesser impact on the vulnerability to household 
poverty: 76% of households that were initially non-poor remained out of poverty in spite of the 
spouse’s spell from employment.  
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5.3.2. Head’s Unemployment: Impacts on Household Income and Labor 
Participation of Other Household Members 
While head’s unemployment increases vulnerability to poverty, income 
deterioration appears as a generalized process regardless of the employment status 
of the main earner (see table 5.12). Fall in income levels is obviously deeper when 
the head is out of work; however, his/her permanence in employment, does not    
guarantee income stability.106 Income levels decreased in 7 out of 10 households 
where the head experienced an unemployment spell and in 5 out of 10 where the 
head remained at work during the whole year (Table 5.12). The percentage of 
households that in spite off the unemployment of the head experienced an 
increase in their income levels (26.5%) could be reflecting, among other factors, 
that those heads currently unemployed were previously in low paid jobs and that 
other households members obtained a better paid job after his/her unemployment 
spell.  
 
Table 5.12.  Employment status of the head by changes in per capita household 
income, Greater Buenos Aires, 1999-2000 (%) 
Changes in per capita 
household income 
Employment status of the head 
 Always employed Becomes unemployed 
   
Income decreased 46.8 68.7 
Income did not change 8.4 4.8 
Income increased 44.8 26.5 
   
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: EPH (October) 
                                                 
106 It is worth pointing out, however, that we are just considering changes in household income, 
not the intensity of these changes. 
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In face of financial difficulties, household responses to “make ends meet” 
present differences depending on the employment status of the head. Sending 
more members to the labor market appears as a much more usual strategy among 
those households where the main earner is out of work: 76.2% of the latter against 
18.4% where the head remained employed, increased the number of employed 
members (Table 5.13). As other studies (Altimir and Beccaria, 1999a) have 
pointed out, there is a strong association between the unemployment of heads and 
the increases in the activity rate of secondary workers. 
 
Table 5.13. Employment status of head by changes in the number of employed 
members in the household, Greater Buenos Aires, 1999-2000 (%) 
Number of employed 
members in the household 1 
Employment status of the head 
 Always employed Becomes unemployed 
   
Decreased 14.3 6.8 
Remained constant 67.3 17.1 
Increased 18.4 76.2 
   
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Note: 1 Excluding the head of the household 
Source: EPH (October) 
 
Among those households where the head lost his job, 19.1% of the 
spouses became economically active –movements from inactivity either to 
employment or unemployment- against 9.4% when the head remained employed 
(table 5.14). The same trend, while less marked, is found in the number of 
children employed: in the former it increased 14.3% against 10.0% in the latter 
(Table 5.15). Among those spouses that were always employed, 33.7% increased 
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the number of hours worked. These trends support the hypothesis of an 
“additional worker” effect on labor supply, especially in female participation.107   
 
Table 5.14. Employment Status of Head by Changes in the Employment Status of 
Spouse, Greater Buenos Aires, 1999-2000 (%) 
Changes in employment 
status of the spouse 
Employment status of the head 
 Always employed Becomes unemployed 
   
Always employed 27.1 31.7 
Employed to unemployed 1.7 0.9 
Unemployed to employed 1.3 2.9 
Employed to inactive 5.9 1.7 
Inactive to employed 7.1 15.6 
Unemployed to inactive 2.9 2.2 
Inactive to unemployed 2.3 3.6 
More than one change 7.9 4.7 
Always unemployed 1.0 - 
Always inactive 42.9 36.7 
   
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
 
Household characteristics can operate either facilitating or limiting the 
possibilities of sending more members to the labor market. Having children below 
five years appears as an important limitation for spouse’s entry to the labor 
market.108 In fact, among these households, 7 out of 10 mothers remained always 
inactive and only 5% moved from inactivity to employment when the head 
                                                 
107 In fact, as Davies et al. (1994) points out, the “additional worker” effect would arise if the 
reduction in household living standards associated with a rise in male unemployment led to an 
increase in the labor force participation of women or to an increase in the hours worked by 
working women, in an attempt to maintain household living standards. 
108 Age of children refers to the average age of children members living in the household. This 
variable includes three groups: 1) younger than five years; 2) 5-12 years; and 3) older than 12 
years.  
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entered unemployment. In contrast, only 17.6% of mothers with children between 
five and twelve years old remained always inactive and 27% moved to 
employment. When focusing on households with children older than twelve we 
observe that in face of the lost of the head’s job, children are more likely than 
spouses to enter the labor market. Actually, 27.4% of households increased the 
number of employed children against 11% where the spouse moved from 
inactivity to employment. Interestingly, there were no cases combining both 
alternatives (increase in the number of employed children and spouse moving out 
of inactivity), which may indicate internal household decisions, limited 
employment opportunities, or a combination of both.109    
The increase in the number of family members, while more common 
among those households where the head became unemployed, does not appear to 
be a common strategy: family size remained unchanged in 77.2% of households, 
increased in 17.5% and decreased in 5%. Among households where the head 










                                                 
109 In fact, both women and young people are overrepresented among those unemployed that are 
first time job seekers.  
110 In fact, Isla et al. (1999) point out that complex households in Argentina are the result of 
economic pressure, given that, in contrast with other Latin American countries such as Mexico, 
they do not represent a desirable form of household organization. 
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Table 5.15. Employment Status of Head by Changes in the Number of Employed 
Children, Greater Buenos Aires, 1999-2000 (%) 
Number of employed 
children in the household  
Employment status of the head 
 Always employed Becomes unemployed 
   
Decreased 7.6 8.5 
Remained constant 82.4 77.2 
Increased 10.0 14.3 
   
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: EPH (October) 
 
Among those households that were initially out of poverty, the increase in 
the number of employed members appears to be an effective strategy to avoid 
falling into poverty when the head becomes unemployed. In fact, 63% of the 
households that put more members in the labor market remained out of poverty.111 
In contrast, where the number of employed members remained unchanged, 3 out 
of 4 of households with an unemployed head fell in poverty. When the household 
is already in poverty, sending more members to the labor market does not appear 
to change the initial situation. In spite of increasing the members in work, 8 out 
10 poor households remained in poverty.112 
The employment status of the spouse appears to be particularly important 
in reducing household vulnerability to poverty. Dual –or multiple- earner units are 
                                                 
111 Bison and Esping-Andersen (2000) assert that the best edge against poverty for the 
unemployed is to have employed relatives, or to be blessed by a strong welfare state. The latter, 
obviously, is not the case of Argentina.   
112 The increase in the number of employed children follows the same trend: among those 
households that were initially out of poverty, 8 out of 10 augmented the number of children in 
work. In spite of sending more children to the labor market, 7 out of ten poor households remained 
poor.  
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less at risk of poverty than single earner families, particularly when the head 
becomes unemployed. Actually, spouse’s job stability has a strong impact on 
maintaining the household out of poverty. When the spouse is always employed, 
75% of households that were initially non-poor did not fall in poverty in spite of 
the head moving out of employment. Moreover, 7 out of 10 spouses that remained 
always employed in non-poor households increased the number of working hours.  
Change in the employment status of the spouse from inactivity to 
employment, while important, is less significant than employment stability for 
maintaining the household out of poverty. Among those households initially non-
poor half of them remained out of poverty, while the other half fell in poverty. In 
those households that were already poor in the initial situation, 8 out of 10 
remained below the poverty line in spite of the spouse’s insertion in the labor 
market. The inactivity of the spouse, however, seems to have a stronger impact on 
the vulnerability to poverty: 7 out of 10 households where the spouse remained 
inactive fell in poverty, and almost 9 out of 10 remained poor.  
  The increase in the number of employed members does not seem 
to be enough to avoid a fall in income when the main earner moves out of 
employment. Income dropped in 55% of households in spite of sending more 
members to the labor market. Interestingly, the entry of children into the labor 
market seems to have a stronger effect than spouses for improving income levels, 
what occurred in 44% of households increasing the number of employed 
members: while income levels increased in 38.5% of household where spouses 
moved to employment, they grew in 61% of households that increased the number 
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of employed children. It is worth pointing out, however, that labor market 




The previous analysis has shown the importance of employment stability 
for household well-being. In fact, the unemployment of the head sharply increases 
the vulnerability to poverty and leaves poor households trapped in their initial 
situation. The most effective strategy to avoid poverty –but not to exit from it- 
seems to be the increase in the number of employed members in the family, where 
the spouse’s employment becomes particularly important. Putting more members 
in the labor market as a device to cope with financial hardship however, is not is 
not an easy one in the Argentinean context. The smaller family size in relation to 
other Latin American countries and high widespread unemployment seems to 
impose important limitations on this kind of responses. Moreover, even when 
households are able to increase the number of members at work, this by no means 
guarantee the household well-being, given that the kind of available jobs are 
mostly insecure and bad paid.  Panel analysis has also shown a marked process of 
downward mobility after an unemployment spell: once losing a relatively secure 
job is very unlikely to maintain –and even more difficult to improve- previous 
labor conditions in subsequent jobs. These processes, however, require a longer- 
term perspective able to show the impacts of unemployment, and in general terms 
of the worsening of the labor market on people with different kinds of labor 
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trajectories. Moreover, it is expected that the previous labor history will affect the 
way in which people perceived, experience and cope with unemployment. Labor 
trajectories, perceptions, impacts and household responses to unemployment are 
the focus of the following chapters. 
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PART II: THE EXPERIENCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN A 
CONTEXT OF UNCERTAINTY 
Chapter 6: Labor Trajectories of the Unemployed: Gender and 
Class Patterns 
 
The analysis of labor trajectories enables us to understand the present 
employment situation not as an isolated event, but placed in a particular history 
where individual, historical, and social processes converge.   
The extension of vulnerability to unemployment and job insecurity among 
vast segments of the working population makes it difficult to identify the types of 
labor trajectories more prone to unemployment. In contrast with other studies, 
which demonstrate a causal chain linking origin to occupation and occupation to 
unemployment (Gershuny and Marsh, 1994), the labor and life histories of the 
people interviewed indicate that the second link of the chain –which relates 
occupation to unemployment- appears to be weaker in the Argentinean case.  
The exploration of job histories represents a necessary step in showing 
both the variation in the unemployment experience and the dynamic character of 
unemployment. The argument here is that previous work experience will impact 
the way in which unemployment is experienced and perceived, as well as the 
availability of resources and strategies to cope with unemployment. Moreover, a 
longer-term perspective of the working lives of individuals provides a broader 
picture of the real impacts of unemployment on subsequent labor careers. While it 
is widely recognized that unemployment tends to result in a process of downward 
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mobility, the intensity of the decline will vary according to the type of jobs 
previously held, earnings levels, and job satisfaction attached to them. At the 
same time, labor histories appear to be the most accurate research strategy for 
assessing the real impacts of macro processes on ordinary people, which, as the 
interviews clearly show, are by no means homogeneous for different social 
groups.  
I focus on broad categories such as class and gender as the most useful 
parameters for analyzing the labor trajectories of the unemployed.113 They allow 
flexibility in the analysis, diminishing the potential bias of forcing complex labor 
and life histories into more limited analytical categories.     
 
6.1. INITIAL STATE: HOUSEHOLD OF ORIGIN, EDUCATION, AND FIRST JOB 
EXPERIENCE 
A first step in analyzing labor trajectories is related to the initiation of 
work careers. A complex combination and intermeshing of factors, such as class 
and family background as well as education affect  the first job experience. 
Household of origin can operate either as initial advantage or disadvantage in the 
first entry into the labor market. Entering the labor market is a crucial step in 
individual’s life history, affecting the work history and consequently his or her 
                                                 
113 I will concentrate on the two classes most impacted by unemployment, the working class and 
the middle class. Working class, refers to a heterogeneus group, also called popular sectors in the 
Latin American literature, which is basically made up by manual occupations, including blue-
collar workers, self-employed (both craft and low skilled workers), unskilled workers such as 
laborers, street vendors, service workers, and domestic servants; in general characterized by low 
educational levels (less than secondary school) and craft skills. Middle-class is basically a cultural 
category, based on self-identification, mostly made up of non-manual occupations with 
educational qualifications such as professionals and semi-profesionals, small-scale enterpreneurs, 
owners of small stores, and white-collar workers. 
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overall life opportunities (Barbieri et al., 2000). In general, it marks the rest of the  
working life  –either as the first step in a stable and upward labor career or as the 
beginning of a trajectory characterized by job insecurity.  
 
6.1.1. Entering the labor market: The working class experience 
  Interviews show that, in general, those coming from poor households 
grew up in large-size families. Many of them lived in one-parent families or were 
raised by another family member –mostly grandparents.  Internal migration –with 
or without their parents’ family – appears as another shared characteristic of this 
group.  
Most of their parents had very low educational levels (primary or less) and 
worked in low-skilled manual occupations, both in rural and urban activities. 
Blue-collar jobs among fathers were mainly concentrated in metallurgical 
activities, meat-processing plants, and railways114.  The self-employed fathers 
worked basically in construction, and craft manual jobs such as carpenters or 
polishers. Mothers, in general, were either housekeepers or worked in domestic 
service, cleaning, and garment housework.  
Those coming from somewhat better-off households come from smaller 
families and internal migration, while present, is not as important as among the 
poor. In general, parents’ educational levels are low, but especially the fathers 
tended to be higher skilled and with more stable labor careers, both among blue-
                                                 
114 In Lanús,   the repair garages of the railway  used to be a very important source of employment 
in the local labor market. 
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collar workers and self-employed. Mothers’ employment, in general, showed the 
same pattern as in the previous group. 
Among working class interviewees, early entrance in the labor market –
around 14 years old- results in general from the pressures to contribute to the 
family pot while still single, making them leave the school system. In the case of 
women, family responsibilities –such as looking after younger siblings or early 
pregnancy- represent a crucial factor for leaving school.  
When I was 16 I started [working] at the Capital, I used to work as a live-
in maid …I attended [Primary School] up to 7th grade.[…] No, I didn’t go 
on…No, I didn’t go on studying…because my dad didn’t…he didn’t…he 
would lose his job and I had to work, I was the only one who worked and 
the only one who brought some money…I had to start working and help 
them[…] From 12 to 16 years I used to stay at home, I helped my 
mom…to take care of my siblings.” (Ana, 28, I 6, Varela) 
 
Most of them left school after finishing primary education or dropped out 
of high school after two or three years 115. School and work appear as mutually 
exclusive activities, either because of long working hours, distance –in terms of 
time and costs of transportation- and/or lack of family support for remaining at 
school. Work appears as having a clear priority over education.116 Together with 
                                                 
115 Before the reform of education implemented in the mid 1990s primary school was seven years 
and secondary school five years. 
116 Various studies show that the value attributed to education differs by social class. In the case 
of Argentina, Urresti (2000) emphasizes that among popular sectors school never was as decisive 
as work, and when decisions have to be taken the balance tips in favor of work. This clearly 
contrasts with the high pressures for remaining at school that middle class households exert on 
their children. Focusing on Britain during the 1950s and 1960s , Furtlong and Cartmel (1997) 
assert that in contrast to the perception of education among working-class youth as irrelevant to 
their future as manual workers, those coming from middle-class backgrounds tend to develop an 
awareness that the maintenance of their social and economic advantages was partly dependent on 
their educational attainment.    
 163
the economic pressure to enter the labor market because of household needs, 
school does not appear to be relevant for their future labor careers. In fact, many 
of them entered the labor market during a period in which low-skill jobs were still 
in demand and school credentials were unnecessary for obtaining them.  
 
 […] I didn’t go on [studying] High School because I had this problem that 
my dad couldn’t support me financially and if I studied I could not work, 
do you understand? […]After you are 14 or 15 years old you have to be 
eight, nine hours at your job”…(Ricardo, 43, I 5, Lanús) 
When I arrived here in Buenos Aires, I attended school one year more and 
then my mom sent me to work at a family home [as a domestic 
servant]…when I was 14 because I was a grown up and… it was like that, 
my brothers used to work at factories…  But the fact is...I didn’t like 
[school] , you start going out with boys and I don’t know... to play hooky, 
and there was more playing hooky than going to school…at my home 
school was important... that is, it was important, but if we didn’t want to 
study we had to work. Jobs were very easy to get then…(Norma, 50, I 24, 
Varela)   
I didn’t go on [studying] High School because I used to work, I don’t 
know, I guess it was like I didn’t feel or see as I see and feel now, I didn’t 
feel I needed to study in order to survive, because I thought I would 
manage just with the job I had.”(Santiago, 29, I 25, Lanús) 
 
Among males the occupation of the father or of other family members not 
only plays a decisive role in the first work experience, but also marks their whole 
working lives. In fact, a common trajectory is to enter the labor market as 
assistants of their fathers or other family member in self-employment activities or 
as apprentices in small firms or workshops, becoming independent after learning 
the craft.   
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I used to attend [Primary] school and I used to go to learn [how to knit], I 
was finishing 6th grade, I think, at the time, I finished when I was almost 
14 years old, and I went to Berazategui, to one of my cousins’, to learn 
machine-knitting… I learned machine-knitting, my dad bought me a 
machine when I was 15. And…I went on [working] with it. I took the 
knitting machine there [to my cousin’s], the industrial machine, a Nº 8 
machine...we used to knit for wholesalers…there I talked to my cousin’s 
wholesaler and I came to work to my home. I brought the machine and I 
started working on my own; I didn’t know much but…I started making 
sweaters…[as a] manufacturer for a wholesaler. (Damián, 54, I 15, Varela) 
When I was about 16 years old I gave up studying and I began to work as 
a furniture polisher, I gave up studying then and I got down to work to the 
full. Through one of my relatives I began to work at a furniture factory, I 
became a furniture polisher, I learnt the craft and then I set up on my own, 
when I was 18 I set up on my own as a furniture polisher.” (Raúl, 48, I 17, 
Lanús) 
I used to live in Rafael Calzada, when I was 14 years old I came here and 
here I started to work with my brothers, who worked in construction ...I 
was still working with my brother... I was 18 years old when I went to live 
together [with my girl friend] and I was paid as a laborer, you see. It 
wasn’t enough, obviously it wasn’t enough to support my family...Later 
on, after several years I set up to work on my own. Sure, to work on my 
own, you see, and then, more or less”…(Agustín, 39, I 36, Varela)   
 
Together with domestic service garment factories used to be an important 
point of entry into the labor market for young women with low educational levels, 
especially among those entering during the 1970s and early 1980s and living 
closer to the capital city.  
 
6.1.2. Entering the labor market: The middle class experience 
Middle-class households of origin in my sample were, as expected, 
smaller than in the working class. Many of their parents were European migrants 
and/or lived in Buenos Aires city or on the outskirts of the city. While parents’ 
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educational levels are higher than in the previous group, the main difference 
refers to their occupational stability and mobility. In fact, most of those in wage-
employment –especially fathers- worked during their whole life for the same 
employer and in the same firm, many times experiencing upward mobility during 
their labor careers. Self-employment appears to be more formalized than in the 
previous group and concentrated in small businesses –commerce, textiles, 
transportation, etc.  Dual earner families, while not generalized, were more 
common than among those coming from working class households. Working 
mothers were mostly employed in white-collar jobs or developed their own small 
businesses. 
Those coming from middle class households - especially women - tend to 
enter later into the labor market in general after finishing high school. Among 
those leaving school during adolescence, most of them studied in private 
vocational schools –where they acquired administrative skills, such as accounting 
and typing- and/or finished their studies during adulthood. In contrast with 
working class households, school appears both as a previous and necessary step 
for entering the labor market and as a main channel of social mobility.  In fact, 
those who dropped out clearly remember their parents’ attitude toward education:  
I was, I guess, 14 or 15 years old, I wasn’t doing well [at school] either, 
because I didn’t pay much attention to it…and all right, I gave up studying 
and my dad, I always  remember what he said to me ‘It is a great anguish 
what you are causing me, a great sorrow, but, all right, if you want to quit 
studying the only thing I tell you is that here I don’t want anyone idle, in 
the sense that I don’t want you to stay at home and clean the house, 
because I don’t need you, we don’t need you to clean up. I want you to go 
out to work, not for me but for you, to see the world and to see life [as it 
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is]. It is not that easy to enter the labor market without degree studies of 
some kind, as I couldn’t manage to do it’. (Violeta, 41, I 15, Lanús) 
I dropped out of High School in third year and I went to study to the great 
schools Pitman […] It is not that I didn’t like it [school], the problem was 
that, for example, my dad was one of those Italian immigrants that hadn’t 
been able to finish their studies themselves and so his idea was that I had 
to finish some kind of degree studies. And then I couldn’t understand that 
saturdays and sundays, after I had studied and worked I couldn’t go out, 
because he wouldn’t let me, and I wouldn’t see any friends. So I got sick 
and tired and felt I had had enough of him.(Marcelo, 50, I 16, Lanús) 
 
In contrast with low-income sectors, the first job experience neither results 
from the necessity of contributing to their parents household income nor from 
school drop out. In general, the entry into the labor market appears a matter of 
choice than of constraint. Most of the middle-class interviewees began working 
because they wanted to have their own money, using their income either for 
personal expenses or for their own family projects. Parents’ marital break-up 
accelerates entry into the labor market. 
 
Oh no, I didn’t used to contribute any money at home, oh no, not before 
getting married. No, no, I used to buy the stuff that was for our married-
life-to-be because we got married with our little appartment all settled. We 
were engaged two years before we got married. (Marisa, 41, I 13, Lanús) 
I started to work when I was 16 years old, a little before my parents got 
separated. I got a job at a perfume store in Lanús…serving the 
customers…At home we had a lot of family problems and financial 
problems then, so it was like trying to become independent instead of 
quarreling with my parents […] Look, practically, I tell you, I didn’t 
contribute but I didn’t cause any expenses, either.[…] We used to make a 
living on my mom’s incomes.[…] No, no, it was my own decision [to start 
working], yes, yes…”(Graciela, 39, I 14, Lanús) 
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For middle class males who entered the labor market at an early age –
before 16- their first job experience did not have a strong impact on their 
subsequent labor careers. As many of those coming from poor households, these 
interviewees began their trajectories as laborers or apprentices in small 
neighborhood businesses –such as bakeries, grocery stores, or small workshops. 
However, in contrast to those from poor households, most of those from middle 
class households moved to formal and stable jobs after finishing their secondary 
or post-secondary studies.    
Middle class origin women tend to enter the labor market in formal jobs 
such as salesclerks in small retail stores or as clerical workers. Among young 
women –below 30 years- casual jobs (such as sales promotions in supermarket 
chains or shopping centers) or working in a family business appear as the most 
common first job experiences. Subsequent trajectories among married women –
both among low-income and middle-income sectors- are strongly intermeshed 
with their family stage and husband’s employment situation.  
 
 
6.2. CHANGING JOBS 117 
After describing the “initial state conditions” there are two main questions 
that deserve special attention in the analysis of labor trajectories. Firstly, the point   
is to explore to what extent certain labor careers anticipate present unemployment. 
Secondly, given that all the interviewees have experienced at least one 
                                                 
117 Changes in employment status include movements into and out of employment, as well as 
movements into and out of the labor market, change of employer or change in job description 
while remaining with the same employer. 
 168
unemployment spell during the last 10 years, the question is to identify previous 
unemployment experiences and the differential impacts of adverse economic 
circumstances on employment status according to gender and social class. 
Changes in employment status during the working lives of the 
interviewees appear to be the result of several factors. While changes in the 
structure of employment opportunities certainly play a key role, they are not the 
only factors intervening in job changes. Actually, the kind of jobs performed -
formal/informal, stable/temporary, skilled/unskilled, internal labor markets, etc.- 
social networks, the stage of the domestic cycle, marriage break-up, and 
migration, among other factors help to better understand the changes experienced 
in an individual’s employment history. 
Previous chapters show that women’s participation in the labor market is 
strongly related to the family cycle and characterized by an intermittent presence 
in the labor force.118 Changes in women’s employment status are less clearly 
defined than among men. While men rarely define themselves as non-employed, 
in women’s accounts non-employment and unemployment are more likely to be 
considered as non-exclusive categories. Married women’s movement in and out 
of employment is quite complex, and while strongly influenced by their child-care 
responsibilities, their trajectories are far from being homogeneous. The 
generalized conception of women as “secondary” workers tends to hide the 
complexity of their working lives. Consistent with other research studies, female 
                                                 
118 In general terms, women with children tend to present  a U-shaped employment pattern: full-
time employment until the start of the family cycle, then withdrawal and gradual re-entry 
(Yeandle, 1984; Dex and Shaw, 1986; Gershuny and Marsh, 1994 ).  
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interviewees show important differences according to their social background. 119 
However, even when the latter helps us to identify general trends, it should not 
obscure intra-group differences.   
 
6.2.1. Working class males 
Working class male interviewees, in general, spent most of their working 
lives in the labor force either as self-employed or alternating self-employment and 
wage-work -both formal and informal. Their trajectories tend to show higher 
levels of instability than their middle class counterparts and are mostly 
concentrated in middle to low-skilled jobs. 
Together with these common characteristics, job histories show important 
nuances among them. In fact, the self-employed craftspeople that maintained the 
same occupation during most of their labor careers, accumulating considerable 
skill levels and developing a good reputation in their crafts, appear to be better 
prepared to cope with shrinking employment opportunities than those that did not 
develop specific skills due to multiple employment changes –basically in easy 
entry jobs.  
Agustín and Oscar, respectively, are paradigmatic cases of both types of 
trajectories. Agustín (39) has primary education. He is a skilled construction 
worker who has been in the same activity since he was 14.  
                                                 
119 Regarding women’s labor participation in Buenos Aires, Cerrutti (1997) points out that in 
contrast to middle class married women, who are more likely to have a long-term participation in 
the labor market, women coming from low-income sectors tend to change employers more 
frequently, and to spend less time in the labor force. 
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[...] I like working in construction, I like it, I like it in my heart. I am an 
oficial albañil [skilled construction worker] and… this is something I did 
all my life and at home, for example, I have made everything by myself, 
and I like doing this, I  watch how something is done and then I come 
home and I do the same, you see, I keep on […] I have always 
worked..let’s say...in changas [odd jobs]…always, building, repairing 
houses, whatever…Specifically no [never looked for another kind of job], 
because so it happens to be that people say I work well, so I always get my 
little jobs.[…] I won’t tell you I earn loads of money but, say, I get my 
100 or 150 pesos a week. And in one way or another I have always 
managed, all my life, like this…More or less, always this or that little job, 
always like that, all my life…” (Agustín, 39, I 6, Lanús) 
 
Oscar (33) in contrast, completed secondary education but has changed 
jobs almost every year since he entered the labor market when he was 18, from 
packing, painting, construction, to blacksmith, among other activities.     
Now I am getting ready to look for a job, but what I lack  are 
references…because let’s say…I don’t have any receipts as a proof given 
by former employers [..] what I lack is, let’s say, some kind of labor 
record, that is the problem I have, […] so I don’t know how I’m going to 
do, I’ll have to get myself a little job, any kind of job, where I am not 
asked for labor records or experience, either […] I don’t know where to 
make for […] the only thing left for me is to look for a job where I am not 
asked to fulfill so many requirements, let’say […] I don’t know, a job 
where much experience is not required, and nothing like that, because I 
have no specific experience in any…I have had many different jobs, do 
you understand? Now the problem is I never remained steadily at 
any…[…] Actually, I have always been unstable, I do not remain long 
[…] let’s say...I go wherever...I’ve got no problem, me doy maña para 
todo tipo de trabajos [I manage any sort of jobs]. (Oscar, 33, I 23, Varela) 
 
For unskilled workers, informality certainly does not represent a break 
point or a step downward in their labor careers, but the only available 




After the newspaper and magazine market…I started working in 
construction  …must be because it was the only kind of job there was 
available, I don’t know, or the only kind of work where…if you don’t 
know anything...well...  you’ll end up accepting whatever there is 
available, like construction, or may be another thing...I would have done 
the same, you know? you don’t choose”…(Antonio, 42, I 3, Varela) 
 
For others, however, self-employment appears as a preferred “option” as 
compared with low paid jobs in the formal sector. In some cases, the value given 
to independence and autonomy and the possibilities of earning higher incomes 
than in wage-employment contributes to explain changes in employment status. 
Nevertheless, the stage of the family cycle appears to erode the value attached to 
self-employment. In fact, interviews show that during the first stages of the 
household cycle, income stability and social benefits provided by formal jobs –
even when low-paid- are more valued than independence and autonomy.  
Esteban (27) began working with his father after finishing primary school. 
 I have always worked in sanding floors. Well, I worked in  Coto [a 
supermarket chain] a couple of months, cleaning up…three months, more 
or less…That was in 1992, eight years ago, more or less, and I left, 
because... I had long hair and I didn’t want to have it cut, and at the time, 
there were many jobs, you could more or less chose then, so I left and I 
got down to work in sanding, which was what I liked and what best  suited 
me. 
Soon after, he married and had two children, now aged 7 and 4. In 1997, 
he worked for one year at the Municipality of Florencio Varela as a maintenance 
worker, pruning trees and assembling canopy frameworks to be used in official 
ceremonies, earning a monthly income of 240 pesos. 
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Actually, they came looking for my father to work for them, and he didn’t 
want to, because as I say to you, he is used to, all his life, he is used to 
work on his own and earn his own money, I don’t know, they told him 
‘you will earn this much’, and he didn’t want to hear about that , least of 
all having a boss. So they asked me  and as I had the children, I don’t 
know, then I said ‘I’m going to try, anyway, it is not much [money], but it 
is secure.(Esteban, 27, I12, Varela) 
Moreover, many workers used to combine formal jobs and self-
employment to make ends meet. 
I have always worked in painting... whenever I have an opportunity...Even 
when I used to work efectivo [stable and formal]. When I was on vacation 
in my [stable] job, I would take a little job, just not to stop, it is always an 
extra income”…(Ricardo, 43, 7 children, I 5, Lanús) 
 
While in general most of working class interviewees did not experience 
upward mobility in terms of their social class status, their accounts show that 
income stability and/or better earnings in a context of a more dynamic labor 
market allowed them some improvements in their living standards, basically 
related to housing conditions and an increase in their consumption of household-
related goods. 
Some twenty years ago, say, there was plenty of work [in construction], 
the ones who wanted to work got a job, there was plenty of work and the 
wages were high, although in that job you’ve got to work your butt off, as 
in everything else, you see, because there are no easy jobs. […] Yes, yes, 
[I could build my own house], I won’t tell you it is a great house, but I 
have my own house, I have 3 rooms, the kitchen, and I have all the 
comforts that I can have, that is, a fridge, a TV set, a large stove.” 
(Agustín, 39, I 6, Lanús) 
When I got a good job, I worked at the Club Ferrocarril Oeste [a football 
club]. I worked during six years at the Club Ferrocarril Oeste. Before that, 
until 1990, when I got this permanent job, I had been  doing changas in 
painting. There [at Ferrocarril Oeste] I started as a maintenance 
worker…to cut the grass of the football field, to clean up. Afterwards, 
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when I had been working there for almost a year, I was appointed to the 
job and was put in charge of the club laundry room [...]working twelve 
hours a day from Monday to Saturday. Twelve hours, but I had a salary 
that…And at the time, look, I am talking about no less than 1,500 pesos 
[monthly]. Yes, that way I could…oh well, actually, we had already 
bought a house with my wife, and thanks to that job I changed it for a 
better one, to make some progress, you see, to have something 
bigger…Selling the one I had, I made a down payment and then I had to 
pay the difference through monthly installments.” […] (Ricardo, 43, I 5, 
Lanús) 
 
Among unskilled workers their permanence in the labor force was the 
result of their “flexibility” about the types of jobs they were willing to take. 
Multiple factors appear to intervene in their job changes: dismissals, resignations, 
better income, end of a temporary job, migration, work accidents due to unsafe 
conditions, mistreatment, etc. The social networks developed during their work 
careers are dispersed, and, while helping to cope with instability do not allow 
them to obtain better jobs. In times of shrinking employment opportunities, 
however, even the most “flexible” employment attitudes do not help to get a job  
This is clearly the case of Luis (45), who worked in a vast variety of low 
skilled jobs (from canning factories, construction, bakeries, trash collection, and 
toilet cleaning) accompanied by multiple experiences of internal migration. For 
the last three years, since he moved to Florencio Varela, he has been a beneficiary 
of a public employment program (Plan Barrios Bonaerenses) with scant prospects 
of moving into work   
A changa, say, you are going to take this changa, cutting the grass…and 
you are charging them 10 pesos for that...No, then comes someone else 
who will cut the whole field for 2 pesos; so, no, they knock you down that 
way, do you understand?…Besides, watch it, if you go and look around 
you’ll see that there are people thumping each other for 2 pesos, to mow 
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the lawn at somebody’s house….Me too, I have a gasoline lawnmower, 
but no, it doesn’t pay off. Before, last year, I used to mow the lawn 
regularly for several customers, not now though, there’s nothing ... Right 
here , at family homes, and now I have lost…I don’t know how this year is 
going to turn up, there are too many people mowing the lawn…You see 
there’s no work to do, may be you go to the Capital …Cleaning firms yes, 
I looked around several of them, but you may retire, you may die and they 
won’t call you up…” (Luis, 45, I2, Varela) 
 
Short-lived and low-paid jobs have been increasingly accompanied by 
longer spells of unemployment. Among those with higher levels of participation 
in formal (or quasi-formal) wage-employment, job changes during the last decade   
far from being “voluntary” were in general the result of bankruptcies, massive 
layoffs, the end of temporary contracts or of agency jobs. Economic recession 
since 1998 has worsened even more the employment situation of these workers, 
who have entered in a spiral of precariousness in which jobs obtained –when 
obtaining one- do not guarantee even basic levels of survival. 
Orlando (44) is an internal migrant from Santiago del Estero, who arrived 
in Buenos Aires when he was 14. He did not finish primary school. He worked for 
two years in a small metallurgical firm, first cleaning and then as a welder 
assistant. After this, he worked for six years in a depot of soda doing delivery, and 
for two years doing the same activity in a depot of salt. In 1984, when he was 28, 
he began as an operative  in a big ceramic-coverings factory of 1,300 employees 
in Lanús, where he worked for 12 years, until it went bankrupt in 1996.  
 Nothing, nothing, they gave us no severance pay at all, nothing, 
nothing…, that was it…they said they were in debt with the bank and 
everything [the firm’s assets] everything was sold by auction…After the 
factory went bankrupt I was a whole year without getting a job, absolutely 
idle… And afterwrads, changas, and more changas, only, changas in 
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construction …In 1998 I had signed up at an [employment] agency, here 
in Lanús, as there was not a better way. Through this agency I was taken 
on out there in Ezeiza…at a plastics factory, the powder to make plastics 
was produced there and I stayed one year there…We were 12 [operatives] 
and there happened the same that had happened here. It was one Friday, 
the supervisor came at 8.00 and said ‘Guys, I’ve got some news for 
you...Take all your belongings’... everything, everything, don’t leave 
anything, because the factory closes down.’ The [plastics] factory shut 
down, too…No, I was not paid severance, as I had been hired through the  
agency they didn’t…We were all out of work again…and then, from 1999 
on... there we didn’t…And we stayed that way, I am that way now, 
looking for a job, there’s no work, you can’t get a job. […] The last job I 
had, some twenty days ago, was a job in construction at a family house, as 
a bricklayer laborer…And now no, I don’t have... am idle…Nothing, no, 
so far, nothing…it is a very difficult [situation]. (Orlando, 44, I 4, Lanús) 
 
 Anselmo (43) began working at 12, after finishing Primary School. His 
first job was as a street neswspaper boy. After this he had several jobs ( ice-cream 
delivery boy, dishwasher, and operative in a small factory of septic tanks). When 
he was 22 he began as a trash collector for the Municipalty of Lanús  where he 
worked for 5 years, until 1985 when he was fired. 
Because the tender term was over…I lost my job…it was around 
1985…And there I went to…I got a job in a builder’s yard… I loaded the 
trucks, I did all the loading, I stayed one year there…They went 
bankrupt…Then I went to work in another depot of building materials…in 
the Capital …and there I stayed 4 years…Well, then...during the times of 
inflation …as we were the new ones and they had to get rid of some 
people because nobody knew for certain what was going to happen […] 
Then I got a job in a supermarket, a self-service grocer’s in Lanús…I must 
have been there a little more than three years…they had problems so they 
they began to fire people because they were about to close down, so they 
fired me…Twenty days later I got a job at another supermarket, self-
service, too, next to the one that had shut down. They [the owners] knew 
me…Must have been there more than 5 years, because afterwards they 
shut down, too…I worked unloading [goods]…also supplying goods on 
the gondolas and even making errands as an office boy…That way I must 
have worked until 1998…I lost my job and I am unemployed since then 
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up to the present…[…] Since 1998 I am here, at this Lanús subsidiary 
branch…football subsidiary branch of Lanús…I am in charge of the 
physical training, and [they pay me]…as much as they can…because there 
are kids that can’t afford the monthly fees and I don’t know…And 160 
pesos a month, at least…apart from that if I do changas …For example, to 
go to a depot to unload stuff, or anything…bricklayer laborer, laborer 
worker, no, not as a bricklayer laborer, only as a laborer worker may 
be…once or twice a week sometimes…Around 20 pesos, 20 pesos a 
day…There’s no other…(Anselmo, 43, I9, Lanús) 
 
Parallel to the destruction of formal jobs, economic restructuring and 
adjustment seriously limited the possibilities and conditions of self-
employment.120 Interviews show that the difficulties for developing self-
employment activities come from different sources. On the one hand, 
paradoxically, increasing deregulation or “informalization” of formal employment 
due to reforms in labor legislation, was accompanied by mounting pressures on 
the self-employed to “formalize” their activities, pushing many of them either to 
subsistence activities or out of the labor market. The obstacles for developing 
informal activities were sharper for those working in the capital city, where the 
possibilities of evading tax obligations, at least for micro-businesses, became 
increasingly difficult. 
 
Yes, yes, I used to work in the Capital and I got a number of jobs in the 
Capital, but what happened? The time came when you had to 
have…because there was coming… how do you call it?, the IVA [Added 
Value Tax], all that, you had to have receipts and invoices to hand in if 
you were working. You weren’t allowed to work, if they got you working 
without all the requirements you were fined, because payments and 
                                                 
120  The previous chapters show that employment opportunities in the informal sector  shrink in 
parallel with the increase in unemployment in the formal sector. 
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documents had to be up to date... and I am not contributing for my 
retirement, I am not contributing for anything  […] We were always three 
or four working. […] Sure, a little firm, say, but we couldn’t afford the 
payments required, you see, it was impossible. […] Now, if you want to 
work in the Capital  you’ve got to have everything up to date, you’ve got 
to have an employment notebook, you’ve got to have IVA receipts and 
printed invoices, everything. Yes, yes, so much so [this “killed” me] that I 
couldn’t work any more in the Capital …I started working around here in 
Lanús, you see, I came to the province. Yes…sure, that meant a decrease 
in working [opportunities].” (Agustín, 39, construction worker, Interview 
6, Lanús) 
 
On the other hand, the opening up of the economy had devastating effects 
on those working in small-scale activities for the internal market. The 
indiscriminate entry of imports resulted in the disappearance or profound 
deterioration of certain occupations, whose skills became “obsolete” in the new 
economic context. Those who remained in their crafts descended to the lowest 
levels of the subcontracting chain, with the consequent impacts on the quality and 
quantity of jobs available to them.  
Damián (54) is a knitter. He has a small workshop at home. In the older 
times – and when younger –he used to alternate self-employment with formal 
blue-collar jobs and employment agency work as a way to cope with temporary 
slowdowns in textile activity. 
I have been a knitter since I was 14 years old…When I didn’t have work 
to do and I had some money…at older times, years ago I used to have  
some money… and I used to buy the material and I would go and sell [the 
goods] from house to house, I did a self-employment job, right? And with 
that [I made a living] the whole season, I didn’t even work for the 
manufacturers, but for myself and I did well, I did much better…but not 
now, because importing is open and what happens to all these little 
workshops? They are finished, they disappear…people…it is not 
profitable to manufacture the garment but to buy it already manufactured 
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and sell it instead, it is much cheaper that way …so you don’t… you’re 
discouraged to manufacture and to sell of course […] Nowaday with the 
knitting machine... may be 3, 4 months [I survive by means of] a few 
changas,  like now, until some time ago I have been making sweaters for 
the security guards, but the season is over, so I have no job anymore. For 
[supermarket] Disco, but through third parties, I didn’t work directly, like 
I used to, directly for the manufacturer, but I worked for someone else and 
I made the cloth only, now I’ve got no job, you see, I’m 
unemployed.(Damián, 54, I 15, Varela) 
 
Younger workers with low-educational levels and outdated skills, where 
retraining policies are almost inexistent, tend to be confined to the most insecure 
and lowest paid jobs. 
Santiago (29), worked during 9 years in a small workshop of toy-parts, 
until 1994. 
They opened the imports and I lost my job.[…] Yes, it closed down. These 
machines were hand operated, now everything is computerized already, it 
has nothing to do […] Imports entered and so we couldn’t get along… 
After this, he has been doing changas”, first as a construction laborer, and 
now delivering pizza.   
[…] Since I lost my job, in 1994 [I have been going] from bad to worse 
[…] I had never handled a spade nor anything like that before, my life  
was…concentrated there, there wasn’t any outside activity, I didn’t know 
how to handle a spade…anything, I couldn’t do anything else. […]Since I 
lost my job I never had a salary again, that is to say, at the end of each 
month I have an x amount [of money], I’ve been always doing 
changas...(Santiago, 29, I 25, Lanús) 
 
Income deterioration, regardless of occupational category and previous 
jobs is a common trend, basically since the mid-1990s. On the one hand, in face 
of a strong decline in the demand for their services –mostly coming from an 
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impoverished middle class - self-employed workers had to sharply reduce their 
expected earnings to gain potential clients, becoming extremely “flexible” about 
the levels of pay they would be willing to accept. On the other hand, wage earners 
were constrained to accept wage cuts –for the same or more working hours- to 
keep their jobs or to take much lower pay than in their previous employment 
when finding a job. Each change in employment status has become a step 
downward, both in the quality of labor conditions and of life.  
 
You don’t earn enough... what has changed is the fact that you can’t fix 
the price, you fix the price but they [the customers] finally pay what they 
want, and if you refuse, you lose the job and you have to accept […]That 
is what is happening now, the people at their homes, they paint  by 
themselves and that’s it. They won’t mind if it is [done] “pi-pi cu-cu” 
[perfectly] as it used to be, because [to paint] a room, for example, you 
have to apply some smoothing-down material, and that makes one room 
[painting] cost about 100 or 150 pesos, and now you have to do it for 20 or 
30 pesos, and what is your profit? Sometimes we are working for 10 pesos 
a day…Before, when I worked, I used to make 50 pesos a day, that is 300 
pesos a week, and now we don’t even make 100 pesos a week and you 
have to work your butt off […] yes, you have to accept it now, but it was 
not like that before, before, when you gave an estimate they would say yes 
or no and that was it […] They would not haggle, or if they didn’t accept  
the price you asked then you could go and get it [that price]somewhere 
else…That’s why I tell you, we are making 10 pesos a day…we can’t 
work for less than that, to work 8, 10 hours for 10 pesos, it is too 
little!!!what do they want? Do they want to give us 5 pesos? What do we 
do with 5 pesos? If I give you 10 pesos each day you survive somehow, 
it’s enough for food, but it is not only food you need, how can you dress 
the children? How can you dress yourself?” (Ricardo, I 5, Lanús) 
 “That is, he [my husband] used to work in soda delivering, with a man of 
our acquaintance, right?The man, who was the owner, and two other 
employees and my husband.... What happened? Sales began to decrease, 
so their wages began to be cut down…You see, he used to get…he started 
with 150 pesos a week, that was an excellent wage, then it was cut down 
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to 100 pesos, then from 100 to 80 pesos, then from 80 to 60 pesos…he 
ended up getting 40 pesos a week, that was so...(Lidia, 29, I 20, Lanús) 
Monthly [with bricklayer work] I used to make an average amount of 
1,500 pesos more or less, 1,500 pesos a month…After 1995…Yes, yes, 
yes, I use to earn much less than that, it decreased a lot, about a 50 % of 
what I earned before, it was not because…it was not so much for the 
money I could earn, but for the lack of jobs, the lack of jobs […] I would 
take intermittent jobs, little jobs, more or less, I don’t know, one changa a 
week may be, and that was an average of 500 pesos a month, if I got that 
amount! […] So, then, one day [here at school] they needed a doorman 
and they decided to call me, to see if I wanted to work, and when they told 
me what the wage amounted to... I felt almost like crying, you know, 
but…what could I do, there wasn’t anything else at that moment, so here I 
am…and now [I get] 390 pesos, that is my pocket wage (Raúl, 48,  I 17, 
Lanús)  
[Now]…there is less work and…you must charge smaller amounts, too, 




6.2.2. Working class females 
Labor trajectories of low-income women respond to a complex 
intermeshing of limited employment opportunities, family responsibilities, and 
household economic needs. The initial disadvantages that characterize their entry 
into the labor market tend to deepen during their working lives, further limiting 
the range of labor market “options” open to them. Pressured by the necessity of 
contributing to their parents’ household income, they leave school when very 
young and begin working either as low-skilled factory workers or domestic 
servants. Their first job experience tends to be soon interrupted by pregnancy and 
marriage. Most of them fell pregnant without planning, and the decision of 
marriage or cohabitation is usually a consequence of pregnancy.  
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The difficulties of combining paid and domestic work come from multiple 
sources: number and age of children, child-care difficulties, opportunity costs121, 
and/or traditional perspectives on the gender division of labor. The latter involve  
basically a husband’s negative attitudes toward his wife working out of the home 
as well as conceptions of the domestic division of labor, particularly related to 
child care, which is usually perceived as a mother’s responsibility.  
 
I quit working because…he wouldn’t…he wouldn’t let me. Since I got 
married, 12 years ago, I never went to work, never, would we do well or 
badly, as it were, I never went to work. ”(Elisa, 33, separated, 4 children I 
19, Varela) 
 
Conceptions on gender roles, however, far from being static and 
monolithic, tend to vary according to the economic situation of the household, 
especially the husband employment status. In face of the employment instability 
of male heads, women earnings become an essential contribution to the family 
income –if not the only one- resulting in longer stays in the labor force or in 
movements to employment when out of it. Nevertheless, and consistent with other 
research studies on low-income sectors (Jordan et al., 1992) women tend to define 
themselves primarily in terms of their care-giving role and only conditionally as 
earners, even when they become the main economic providers of the household.  
Marcela (46) is mother of three, aged 21, 18, and 10. After eight years of 
working in a small garment textile workshop in Florencio Varela, she moved to 
work at home independently as a knitter when she got married, at age 22. 
                                                 
121 Given that the kinds of jobs these women can access are in general very low paid, sometimes 
the costs of working outside home (i.e. transportation costs, child-care, etc.) are higher than the 
potential earnings the could obtain. 
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Sure, because I was educating  myself, like, I didn’t want to have a quarrel  
with my  partner, so… 
      
She explains the “advantages” of working at home in the following terms: 
 
Sure, it was more profitable, it was more productive, more 
profitable…while the children sleep, I get down to work, while the 
children are at school, 4 hours, 5 hours, I get down to work, so it is about 
the 8 hours time, instead of being outside I am at home, and when my 
children come back I put my knitting away and I become the mother and 
the wife… 
 
 However, five years ago her husband had a work accident and lost his job. 
Since then, they live with the earnings she obtains from working “out” of home – 
as a baby-sitter or doing casual work in a steak house. At the same time she 
continues knitting while at home. 
 
Why that change? Because, say, because I have more chances. In what 
sense? Why did I change things? Because I’ve got more chances to work 
than my son can have, because being 18, he has no experience. Where can 
he go?…So, it is easier for me if my son stays [at home] with his sister 
and I get the money to support the family. When will that stop? When he 
gets his job.[…] My husband…First, he is 50 years old, you see? Second, 
he has this physical problem. So, this encouraged me […] And it has been 
5 years since I maintain my home, since the accident, before that I did it if 
I wanted to, otherwise I didn’t, working was different, not now. (Marcela, 
46, I 29, Varela) 
 
Labor participation of married women does not necessarily result in dual-
earner households. In some cases husband and wife tend to alternate the role of 
main providers. Many women move into the labor force when their husbands are 
out of work, and quit again when they find a job. In these situations women’s 
 183
earnings do not appear as a way to complement husband’s low levels of income, 
but to guarantee at least one source of income in the household.  
Rosa (28) lives in Florencio Varela and has two children aged 5 and 3. 
Since she was 15, she has worked intermittently in domestic service.She quit her 
job when she got married, six years ago.  
 “[…] I quit because I already, I don’t know, he told me to quit…because 
he was working and doing well, I don’t know, I quit […] I must have gave 
up for a year or so, and then I continued […] because afterwards he didn’t 
do well at work, money was never enough and […] the fact is that it 
there’s always something you need  […] I used to work at  different 
houses, although it was not something permanent...that always... […] And 
that job my husband had, it was by contract, and the contract term was 
over, so I began to work again…And that time I must have been working 
about 3 months, more or less,  because after that it was difficult for me, 
because of the child…as he started kindergarden it was difficult for me to 
bring him up here, it was too hard a task to come up here, because 
kindergarden begins at 9 am and that was the time when I had to be at 
work…And so I quit, not long ago. […]And now, [as I am not working], 
it’s been…let’s see…It’s been 4 months since he got a job, so it is more or 
less […] No, no, he doesn’t tell me [that I should go out to work], I, 
directly…no, I don’t want to…you see, I know we need [money] because 
we have to pay for this or that, the taxes, and the kids, you see, we don’t 
want to be hard-up, and I don’t know, I try to   stand by him, we must help 
each other, and… because we are all by ourselves, the two of us. (Rosa, 
28, I 20, Varela) 
 
  After childbearing, and especially when children are below 6, 
employment “choices” tend to be limited to easy entry and exit jobs in the 
informal sector, due to the difficulties to deal with more rigid and longer working 
hours- such as factory work. In parallel, economic restructuring, has further 
reduced the employment opportunities for low-educated women, and factory work 
–one of their few job opportunities in the formal sector- is increasingly 
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disappearing as an alternative, even for young and single women. Domestic 
service and cleaning jobs, street commerce, and assembly work at home –from 
textile and clothing activities to paper bags- appear then as the only kind of jobs 
these women can obtain. The possibility of working out of home, basically when 
children are in pre-school age, is highly dependent on familial care, usually their 
mothers and sisters. When children grow older –especially daughters- they 
become responsible of looking after their younger siblings while their mother is 
working. Paid care is completely out of their economic possibilities and public 
child-care facilities are so scarce that it is almost impossible to rely on them. 
Transportation costs and the time needed to commute if working in the capital 
city, tend to limit women’s employment alternatives to the local labor market, 
which is a major disadvantage for those living in more isolated and poor 
neighborhoods. 
Changes in marital status also represent an important factor affecting 
women’s trajectories. Labor participation tends to be longer because of 
widowhood or separation, when women’s earnings become the main (and mostly 
the only) source of household income –either because their children are still too 
young to enter the labor market or because they cannot find a job.  
Margarita is a paradigmatic case of the complexity that characterizes the 
labor careers of many of these women. She combined different types of jobs 
during her working life: from factory work to unpaid family work, from self-
employment to domestic service. Family responsibilities and conflicts, 
conceptions of the gender division of labor, the impacts of economic restructuring 
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and recession, and a process of cumulative disadvantages in a context of high 
unemployment constitute convergent factors in the explanation of her present 
employment status. She is now 41 years old and entered the labor force when she 
was 15. She worked for five years as a manual worker in the garment industry, 
first in a factory and then in a small workshop, until she got married. She had two 
daughters, now aged 20 and 18.  
I used to work checking the garments and …then I got engaged, then I got 
married…when I was 20 years old…and then I gave up working…After I 
got married I stopped working… I began to work with my husband, as he 
had his workshop at home, I worked with him…I used to make leather 
bags and as he had the workshop he used to take in work, too, and we 
worked together and there was no need for me to go out to work […] No, 
no, he didn’t want me to go out to work, although there was some need for 
it, yes, but he didn’t…and …you know how they  are. To avoid problems 
you better stay and... but…no, since I was married I never went out to 
work. 
 
  After 15 years of marriage, she decided to separate. 
“[…] Because he drank, we were not doing well then…When I separated, 
I tried to go on working according to my skills, leather goods workshop, to 
make bags, to go out and sell them and, somehow I got along doing 
that…I made the bags at home […] what happened was that my uncle 
helped me, lending me the money to buy an industrial machine for this 
kind of job, and then I started to manufacture the bags by myself: bags, 
handbags, purses, all that kind of things that I could make, and [I had my] 
customers, whom I visited and I made a living on that…I used to move 
around this zone, not the Capital, but this zone [Lanús]…I used  to visit 
the stores [to sell my goods], I made my goods and I sold them, and so I 
…[…] No, I stopped doing that…No, because everything collapsed, there 
are no sales, there are no sales, this is getting worse all the time, from bad 
to worse; now they bring imported merchandise and you have to sell 
cheaper. And then you can’t, you simply can’t compete with someone who 
is bigger and comes from outside…And…I was for, say, 3 years I must 
have been with [this job of] the bags, , and then I didn’t…” 
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Since then she works in domestic service three days a week in the Capital 
city. She lives with her two daughters, and her mother (74), who has no pension 
benefits. 
 
About looking for a job, yes, yes I do it, that is, I would like to have 
another job for the other two days of the week, you understand? Because 
you find it difficult to make ends meet, with two girls and all that, you 
see? No, no…[…] The youngest is attending High School, and the oldest 
finished High School, and is looking for a job but she doesn’t get one […] 
had she found a job things would be different. (Margarita, 41, I 8, Lanús) 
 
Re-marriage sometimes means new exits from the labor force. The 
movement from working “out” to working “at” home tends to result in a 
deterioration of the already precarious previous employment conditions, both in 
terms of earnings and kind of jobs performed, in general highly monotonous and 
meagerly paid. Moreover, it seems to have a strong impact on the way women 
define their own employment status. 
The following case is a clear example of how the intermeshing of 
structural and family constraints result in highly unstable labor trajectories. 
Family breaks, age of children, work accidents, transportation costs, and sexual 
harassment appear as some of factors intervening in job changes. 
 
 María is 36 and mother of three (14, 3, and 6 months). She dropped out of 
High School when she got married, at the age of 15. She moved with her husband, 
who was 18, to Buenos Aires city where he worked as a building caretaker. She 
began working when she was 18 as a domestic servant. She had her first child 
when she was 22, and she separated 6 months later. 
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I found him with another woman, and I brought my daughter, my stuff, 
and I came, and I stayed 3 months more with my baby girl, here in Varela 
[…] I was 23 years old. After that I stayed at home with my mom until the 
girl was 9 months, and then I went to work as a live-in domestic servant. I 
worked at the Capital  for 2 years as a live-in domestic servant, because 
my parents had no other income…At the beginning I separated without 
any legal procedures, so the [girl’s] father would send her  [some money], 
or he wouldn’t, because he did as he pleased […] Then I left, because 
Romina was about to start kindergarden, and all that, and I wanted to 
be…at least a little more time with her, and I went to work for a cleaning  
firm…I stayed with them one year and a half, then I quit, and I went to 
work for another cleaning firm  […] And this…was about 1990 or 1991, 
when you could still change jobs easily. And then, when I was working for 
this other firm I fell down one day, when I was working…waxing the 
floor, I slipped and fell down so badly that I hit my spine and had to stay 
at home 6 months without working […] All right, then the firm’s social 
security service [or work-accidents insurance] paid my salary during those 
6 months, and then they waited for me one month more, but afterwards 
they said that, unfortunately, if I couldn’t get back to work I would have to 
be fired, and finally they fired me […] [Actually I got back to work] but 
they would send me [to work] to far-away places each time […] I had to 
pay for my bus tickets and I didn’t finish until 10 PM […] All right, I 
continued for some time, but it turned to be too difficult because they 
didn’t want to give me a closer place to work at […] All right, then, and I 
quit that job…I was already 30 years old. Afterwards I used to do hour-
working […] in Buenos Aires, always there, because here they paid too 
little. And that was, say, about 1992 or 1993, because after that, in 1993, I 
got a job and started working for the security firm of the Zoo, in Buenos 
Aires, and I stayed there 6 months, that is 2 contracts of 3 months each 
[…] Watchwoman, I had to watch the entrance, so that the people 
wouldn’t get inside with plastic things, that type of…contracts were for 3 
months only, they wouldn’t take on anyone through permanent 
appointment, only by temporary contracts. After that I went to work to 
another cleaning firm […] Well, there I had a problem with a man 
caretaker, I slapped him in the face and I was fired immediately […] 
Because I was cleaning up and he came and …touched me…you know 
[…] That was in 1994, and then I   met my partner and I didn’t work any 
more…Because we went to live together and we used to do well with the 
money he earned, and so he would say to me ‘Why should you work if we 
manage all right.’ […] Let’s say, these were not the kind of jobs you had 
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to go out, but the kind of jobs you could do at home: to make little bags, 
stuff more…I…all right…an income, a job outside…say, you see? That 
kind of job: to make plastic garbage bags, or cardboard bags…[…] Yes, 
20 cents, or 10 cents each bag, depending on the size, because… if they 
were envelopes there were envelopes, too they paid 1 cent of peso 
each…and Mario [her husband] used to make some changa that would 
come up. (María, 36, I 1, Varela) 
 
In contrast with men, whose work lives appear to be more affected by 
occupational characteristics, women’s trajectories show permanent and 
conflicting pressures towards paid jobs and family care. While labor instability 
appears in general as a shared feature among men and women coming from low-
income sectors, the factors intervening either in their permanence or exit from the 
labor force clearly acquire different forms and meanings during their trajectories.     
 
6.2.3. Middle-class males 
Certainly, initial advantages, basically in terms of social and human 
capital appear both to facilitate the access to better jobs and to smooth subsequent 
labor careers. In fact, labor trajectories of middle class males interviewee are in 
general stable and in the formal sector of the economy. Many of them also 
experienced important levels of occupational upward mobility in terms of pay, 
autonomy, variety of tasks, and levels of responsibility. In contrast with the labor 
trajectories of their working class counterparts, in general characterized by 
multiple break points, among middle class males, it is possible to identify a 
decisive break point, which tends to coincide with the loss of their formal and 
stable job. In most cases their histories have a clear before and after. The loss of a 
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stable job tends to be the consequence of massive layoffs due to the privatization 
of state owned companies and bankruptcies and plant closures in the private 
sector the early 1990s. Re-employment resulted in general in an increasing 
process of deteriorating labor conditions, where each change in employment 
status results in a new downward step in the occupational structure.      
In face of the impossibility to find a job according to the skills levels and 
experience accumulated during their labor careers, most of the interviewees had to 
completely change their previous occupation after becoming unemployed.  Their 
age at the moment of moving out of work, the availability of different kinds of 
capital, and the employment status of other family members –mainly of spouses- 
appear as key factors in the explanation of their re-employment experiences.122 
The latter, far from showing an optimistic panorama, are like snapshots of the 
deterioration and decline of the middle classes in Argentina.  
Self-employment appears as the most common “alternative” followed by 
those who lose their jobs in their middle ages. However, far from becoming 
relatively “successful”, the experiences of those following this road resulted in a 
chain of successive failures. 
 It happened to a guy, swell, he was delighted, he bought himself two cars 
and put them down to work […] In two years time he lost everything. 
Another guy in Morón… he bought a plot of land at a corner, he built 
premises to let, but he couldn’t manage to rent them. He set up a kiosk in 
one of the premises, the one at the cross-streets and he was robbed 15 
times, until they finally ransacked the kiosk completely: they lifted the 
metal shutter, they cleaned out the place, taking everything, and so he said 
‘That’s it.’”(Gabriel, 50, I 26, Lanús)  
                                                 
122 The importance of the different kinds of capital (social, financial and physical capital) as well 
as the employment status of other household members is analyzed in the following chapter, which 
focuses on the strategies developed to cope with unemployment.  
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The 1990s contrast with previous decades, when small-scale commerce 
represented an alternative path of upward mobility among the middle classes -or 
at least a way of maintaining their standards of living- during. In a context of 
almost permanent economic crisis, these kind of activities had in general an 
ephemeral life, resulting in the progressive exhaustion of savings and other 
sources of capital. Many of those that failed in previous attempts finished as taxi-
drivers or remiseros.  Today one can easily find at least one remiseria per block 
when walking in the Greater Buenos Aires neighborhoods. 
Marcelo (52) is an Italian immigrant who arrived in Argentina with his 
family when he was two years old. His first job was at 11, in a bakery shop, where 
he worked for 6 years. He dropped out of High School but obtained a diploma in 
accounting and typing. 
“[…] When I went to sit for the examination, which was to be done 
downtown, I passed it with excellent marks and they got me…they had an 
employment agency…And all right, I asked for a job and I started working 
at this firm. 
 He began working for a grain export firm, where he developed a long and 
upward labor career. 
 It was an Italian firm, dealing with grain exports. When I started, the firm 
was initiating its activities […] First I worked with the files; then I began 
to control the invoices; then, slowly, I began to…when they began with 
the first grain purchases, I used to deal with the applications in the contract 
records. […] And that way, I went slowly upwards, step by step, […] up to 
the time when I used to deal with the whole merchandising system, that is, 
from the purchase [of cereals] to the final settlement of the business 
operation…I don’t know which was the precise moment when they 
decided to computerize the whole system […] I was put in charge of that 
computerized system, I was promoted, I was raised hierarchically and they 
raised my salary… 
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His ascendant career was interrupted when the firm went into bankruptcy 
and he was fired, in 1993, after 32 years working for the company. By the time 
the firm closed down he was 45 and was earning 4,500 pesos a month. Soon after 
that, with the money he had received as severance pay, he and two other co-
workers decided to open a “maxi-kiosk” in a prime location in Buenos Aires 
downtown.  
Sure, to start again from the beginning, we didn’t know the first thing 
about the cost of sweets and candies, or cigarette purchase and delivery, 
not even the brands of cigarettes were familiar to us…” 
After four years, with no business partners and the impossibility of 
meeting  outstanding expenses, he had to close down.  
[…]With the maxi-kiosk we started swell, because there were no other 
kiosks nearby, so we did well…but afterwards, as time went by, other 
similar stores  opened, until there were four [kiosks] on the same block, 
so…[…] I couldn’t make the numbers fit, I had to pay the 2000-pesos rent 
plus the energy, gas and telephone bills […] the moment came when …I 
didn’t do well, at all, besides I was robbed, and…well… I sold it. 
 
  Then he opened a poultry store, which lasted just one year. 
 […] All right, I learned how to prepare milanesas, I learned how to cook 
and how to bone chicken, everything related to chicken […] we didn’t do 
well at all, besides we were robbed. 
 
  Since then he works as a taxi-driver with a rented car. 
 Then I started to look for a job again, I said to myself ‘What should I do, 
what shouldn’t I do?’, so I decided to get the professional driver’s license 
and…I started to look for a job as a taxi-driver or driver of any kind, but I 
couldn’t find anything, because the top age required was 35 Now I rent a 
car and…but the car is under my charge 24 hours, although I only work 21 
[…] Some days I bring 20 pesos, some days I bring 10, or 30 pesos […] 
and before I didn’t used to work on Sundays, since I was doing fine, more 
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or less, but now I have to go out on Sundays, too, because during the 
week…(Marcelo, 52, I 16, Lanús) 
 
 Conscious of the risks of losing everything in a highly unstable economic 
environment, others were inclined to take more “conservative” decisions. 
Frustrated in their search for a suitable job according to their previous experience 
and skills, some “opted” for working as self-employed craft-people. Retraining, in 
general, was the result of their individual initiative and effort. Their fate, however, 
was not much different than those taking more risky decisions. The excess of 
labor supply in these activities and the increasing legal and tax requirements for 
independent workers highly reduce the potential returns coming from self-
employment. 
Gabriel (50) began working at 22, immediately after graduating as a 
merchant navy officer. He worked for 19 years in the former state-owned 
navigation company. He enjoyed advantageous labor conditions and experienced 
an upward occupational career. 
[…] I served aboard for seven years […] and I said enough, enough of 
shipping at least, because I stayed at the same company […] They were 
very good  wages […] after the top position of general manager, there 
were the managers, then the assistant-managers, the department heads…I 
came to be a department head, that is, four levels [down] from the top… 
 The “good times”, however, were about to cease and the company shared 
the fate of most state-owned firms. 
 In theory, the person that had been appointed auditor of the company had 
this goal: to make the company “stay afloat”; but what he actually did was 
“sinking” the company – a maritime expression -, in fact the firm was 
disintegrated, gradually disintegrated […] On the one hand they demanded 
more efficiency, but…when we were working efficiently, there was 
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always something that didn’t work all right, so, there was a lack of 
coherence in all that, and there came the voluntary retirements and I left 
[…] 
 
However, finding a new job was much harder than expected. The first year 
after his “voluntary retirement” he tried unsuccessfully to get a job that matched 
his skill-level and previous experience. 
 
 I felt lost for about one year, because really after 20 years at the same 
place, even when I am known, and I visited many places  trying to find a 
job within the same field…but in 1992 I was 42 already, 41 years old, and 
at that time a drastic decrease in the top-age was beginning. 
 
 He began working as a self-employed electrician and plumber, 
experiencing multiple difficulties and frustrations in face of an increasingly 
adverse economic context. His initial expectations, in a context of narrowing 
employment opportunities, clearly began to slow down. 
[…]I started dealing with a different type of activity, having in mind a 
builders’ firm; I had some experience, having worked here at home, where 
I managed to make many things by myself and…all right I got myself 
down to work in construction. […] I started working with the women 
architects who had directed the building of my house…I did some 
electricity and I took courses on plastic piping, and other courses in order 
to open up the range of possibilities and I was hired to fit the plastic piping 
in some big constructions […] Afterwards that was over, too, that is, at the 
present I work as an electrician but…there’s not much to do[…] from 
1993 to 1998 I would take whatever was offered to me […] until that was 
over, about 1997 and 1998…when there began to appear the “multiple-
firms”, that is, someone who could make a small capital investment would 
set up a firm [dealing with electricity, plumbing, gas fitting, etc.], paying 
awfully low wages to their employees […]  so, for example, I would give 
a customer an estimate and may be a builder’s firm would give an estimate 
three times lower than mine [for the same job] and that kills you, that kills 
self-employment. 
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Moreover, when employment opportunities are so scarce, the costs of 
formalization are clearly higher than the potential benefits. 
  […] The problem is that all the people working in the trades involved in 
construction, like the electrician, the plumber, the gas fitter…all of them, 
have got to be registered now, have to have a registration; to work in some 
constructions, according to their size, these people are required to have a 
registration…[…] No, no, I am not registered, because you have to pay for 
the registration and… if there’s no work to do…what will you pay the 
registration with?…And…lately I must be making 300, 400 or 500 pesos a 
month. (Gabriel, 50, I 26, Lanús) 
 
 In contrast to the previous two cases, Omar (36) continued as a wage 
worker after losing his formal and stable job at 28 years. His difficulties for 
finding a job, the kind of jobs obtained, and the increasing length of 
unemployment spells show the real dimensions of the deterioration in wage-
employment and of the contraction of work opportunities during the last decade. 
After 14 years working as a railways employee he lost his job before the company 
was privatized. Since 1993, when he had to accept   “voluntary retirement” he has 
experienced a continuous process of downward mobility and labor instability, 
even though most of the jobs he obtained were in the so-called “formal sector”. 
After working in the most diverse kind of jobs, from operative   in a drugs 
company, cook’s assistant, toll road cashier, painter, security guard, and cinema 
extra, he has been out of work during the last two years. He is now a 
“discouraged” worker. 
 […] First I used to be a ticket-seller, after that I worked as a help-assistant 
and then as an assistant at the ticket-office, and then [finally] I became a 
caretaker of the same railway company office […] When I got my 
voluntary retirement there began the martyrdom. Why? Because I had 
been working for the railway company for 14 years and I had lost contact 
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with the outside world; I didn’t see the problems I would face. The 
problems had just started then, now we are right in the middle of it […] 
So, what happens? At the beginning I used to choose ‘This I won’t do, nor 
that’, and then, when I saw that I wouldn’t get any job at all, I accepted 
whatever was available […] All right, after [my job at] the railway 
company the first job I had was at a pharmaceutical products laboratory. 
As everywhere else…contract over and [I was] out. […] After that it was a 
bit more difficult to get a job. I got a job in an activity I enjoy, I don’t 
know if I am naturally bound to it or not, which is cooking. I like cooking 
and I started to work at Catering Buenos Aires, where they cook the meals 
for airliners […] When I started they told me that it was only for 3 months, 
they said ‘high season term, and that’s it, OK?’ […] So, after those 3 
months, everybody was dismissed. [Between jobs] I must have been 
[unemployed]…several months, little more than before, not quite as much 
as one year; may be 4 or 5 months […] Then I used to do changas 
jobs…but the fact is changas …there are fewer and fewer. I used to do 
some painting,…I used to fit tongue-and-groove-board wooden floors, but 
that…once in a while. We used to charge low prices to retired people, so 
that they would hire us, but now they say ‘No, my grandchildren will do 
it.’, and so not even that…[…] After that, it  got harder […] it was in1994, 
I guess. Harder and harder. I was jobless for about 8 months, and I was 
desperate…and then I got this job at the Highway Buenos Aires-La Plata 
[…] I worked there as a cashier, a toll cashier… I stayed there 1 year and 
2 months […] I had a tough row with the supervisor…and the following 
night I was fired […] I was making 950 or 1,000 pesos there, I was 
earning good money […] Much more than in previous jobs, I had been 
earning less than 500 pesos.[…] Very soon after that, I got a job as a 
security guard, which is something I’ll never do again, mind you!, because 
you have to cope with any kind of bullshit […] You find all kinds of 
people there, Armed Forces retirees, security forces retirees, nuts and little 
nuts of all sorts […] and all right, I resigned. I stayed [working for that 
firm] 6 or 8 months…I earned  600 pesos monthly, more or less.[…] All 
right, and then the last job I had, you will laugh at it: did you watch that 
film La Furia, starring Diego Torres? If you watch that film you’ll see me 
there, working as an extra, as a movies extra […] And that was 1998, I 
guess. [How come I got that?] Desperation. […] All right, since then I 
have been unemployed, it’s been 2 years or 2 years and a half now […] 
Nothing, afterwards. Afterwards it has been harder and harder, all the 




6.2.4 Middle class women 
The trajectories of middle class women present particularities that make 
them different both from middle class males and from their counterparts in low-
income sectors. On the one hand, given that women’s trajectories tend to be more 
unstable than those of men the identification of breakpoints tend to be less visible 
and affected by a complex intermeshing of factors, in general related to the length 
of their periods in and out of work, the kind of jobs performed, the stage of the 
life cycle, and changes in marital status. At the same time, even among those with 
more stable trajectories their possibilities of upward occupational mobility appear 
to be much more restricted than among their male counterparts. On the other 
hand, in contrast with low-income women, middle-class female participation in 
the labor market tends to be less intermittent and in more rewarding jobs, either as 
wage workers in the formal sector or as self-employed. While they are more likely 
to have access to paid child-care, they also usually depend on family care. 
Husbands’ attitude toward women’s paid work is in general more positive than 
among low-income sectors.  
Most of middle class women interviewees were middle-aged, with 
secondary or tertiary education. In contrast with low-income women they tend to 
marry later and have less children. Like many of their counterparts in more 
disadvantaged sectors, most of them were working when they married and have 
experienced some time out of the labor force when having children. The length of 
the latter however, is highly variable, ranging from a few months to long periods 
of inactivity. 
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Moving out of employment when having children has a strong impact on  
subsequent labor careers. Among women that held relatively good jobs before 
leaving the labor market, re-entry into the labor force becomes particularly 
difficult. Age, outdated skills, the erosion of previous social networks, a profound 
deterioration in employment conditions, accompanied by high unemployment, 
represent convergent factors that sharply restricts their re-employment 
opportunities. Moreover, when the husband still holds a relatively stable and well-
paid job, middle-class women tend to be less flexible regarding the types of jobs 
and levels of pay that they are willing to accept.   
Structural limitations in terms of employment opportunities, while playing 
a key role, are by no means the only constraints women face when deciding to re-
enter the labor market. Family obligations and conceptions of work and gender 
roles, labor expectations and previous experiences, the economic situation of the 
household, all are intermeshed in complex and sometimes contradictory ways, 
whose understanding  brings out the importance of employment in women’s lives.      
  Among those previously employed as clerical workers in relatively well-
paid jobs the period out of the labor force results in the rapid obsolescence of their 
previous skill levels. In fact, those leaving the labor market during the 1980s and 
trying to re-enter during the 1990s had to face a radically changed labor market in 
terms of employment opportunities, skills and age requirements, and labor 
conditions. In these cases discouragement plays a key role in delaying their 
movement to employment, especially when labor decisions are not constrained by 
the economic situation of the household.   
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 Estela (40), lives in Lanús, is married and the mother of three (15, 12, 9 
years old). Her husband is employed in an oil company, where he has worked for 
20 years. She entered the labor market when she was 18. Her first job was as a 
receptionist in a paper mill. Soon after that she found a temporary job as a bank 
clerk. Since the age of 20 she worked for 4 years as an administrative secretary in 
a grain and mineral trade multinational company. She was fired because of 
“personnel restructuring”. Immediately after that she found a job as a manager’s 
secretary in a metallurgical firm, where she was employed for another term of 
four years, until the firm decided to move to another province. Then she had some 
temporary jobs, as secretary, which she got through employment agencies. When 
she was pregnant with her third child, she was fired since the air-conditioning 
firm where she was employed went into bankruptcy. She remained out of the 
labor market for nine years, and returned to work recently, when she got a job 
through a friend, as an administrative employee at the state University of Buenos 
Aires. 
 […] I lived the ‘70s  and…I remember that, while  attending High School, 
I also attended courses on executive secretarial skills, obtaining my 
diploma. [On the other hand] by then I had dropped out of High 
School…you were willing to look for a job then…[…] First, that was a 
different period of time, when it was easy to find a job […] You are 
young, you are nice, you have your skills, you feel like learning and you 
start working; that was the usual way, right? Because all the girls in our 
group of friends were… all of us used to work […] Yes, afterwards I got 
my High School diploma but it is like I didn’t need it,  [although] I knew I 
would finish High School some time or other, but as I always had had 
good jobs, getting very good wages, then it is like […] I remember when I 
worked at this multinational company, I remember that sometimes, with 
one of the girls, just to have fun, we used to pretend we were looking for a 
job, you see?…and actually, the funny thing was that they would call 
us…[…] After Raquel, my third daughter, was born…I stopped looking 
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for a job, they were three kids to leave, so…but well, I used to earn a lot 
[…] the problem was that I knew the situation was not easy, I didn’t want 
my mom to look after one more child and the fact was that […] No, no, in 
Argentina, if I was working…to pay for a child care, for three kids,  I 
would spend the same amount of money I was earning; OK, you were 
exchanging money for work, isn’t it?, but…I don’t know, no, no […] I 
always thought I could get back to work […] there was something I was 
missing…but when you have children you don’t have much time to stop 
and think […] The fact is that the years were going by, and then what 
happens?, I kept on thinking that whenever I went to look for a job I 
would get it, and then there were some of my friends, who had always 
worked, single girls, with high educational levels, you see? And I used to 
say ‘What is this?’, they are going to  shit on me…[…] I suddenly felt it 
would be tough, but I knew I would start working again some time or 
other, I would start doing something…it is like… you drift apart from the 
conditions……It is difficult to explain, it is contradictory […] I like 
working […] The fact is that I didn’t give up working because I wanted 
to…(Estela, 40, I 12, Lanús) 
 
Conflicting cross-pressures with respect paid and family work during the 
early stages of the family cycle can result in the interruption of potentially upward 
labor careers. These are very difficult to take  up again after a period out of the 
labor force. Nevertheless there are cases in which women are able to overcome 
previous frustrations, and generate their own employment alternatives. In periods 
of recession, however, even the most creative become vulnerable to 
unemployment. 
Graciela (39) is a mother of three (20, 18, and 14 years old) who began 
working at 17 as a pharmacy employee. Then she worked as a secretary in a 
tourism and money exchange agency for 2 years. She found a better-paid job as a 
customs officer’s  secretary immediately after having her first child. Even when 
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she was earning more than her husband then, she had to quit her job after some 
time. 
 I used to get up at five - or a little after - in the morning, I used to leave 
the baby  at his nanny’s home, then I had to take the bus to get to the 
railway station, from the railway station I had to go by train to 
Constitución [railway station at the capital city], and then I had to take 
another bus from Constitución…after work, I used to arrive back at home 
at 8.30 or 9.00 pm, and besides the baby would cry at night […] I used to 
leave the baby with a nanny, a woman who would take care of him […] 
Yes, yes, I paid her, [yet] I had my benefit, because I earned a good 
salary…but I suffered from hemorrhages all the time, hemorrhages and 
anemia; I had long hair, and locks of my hair would come out because of 
my being anemic. So I said no, I have to take my decision now, and no, [I 
realized] I had had enough of that. 
 
She stopped working, and after having her second child, at 21, she 
returned to work, but now informally, as a hairdresser at home. Then she got 
pregnant of her third child - a daughter - and left her job as a hairdresser. Six 
years had passed since she worked as a customs officer’s secretary. 
Yes, I kept on looking for a job but the fact was that it wouldn’t be 
profitable, because I had to pay somebody to come and take care of the 
children, do you understand? All right, besides that there wasn’t much 
offered, what they offered was so little that it was not profitable […]  In 
the old times, when I used to work with the customs officer, the use of 
computers was not as usual as it is today […]..at the time when I had to 
stop working there came all that innovation of computer work …So, what 
had happened?, I had been left out of the system…  I didn’t…If I wanted 
to start studying - it has happened to me - to start learning computing 
skills, I wouldn’t have… I couldn’t afford it, I didn’t have anyone with 
whom I could leave the kids, because I had to pay someone to do that…do 
you understand? So it is like you are limited, enclosed [by your own 
problems]. 
However, she did not give up, and began studying to become a teacher of 
yoga, an occupation in which she has been working for five years.    
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[…] The period of time when we did really well was 1997, between 1996 
and 1997, we did fine, really fine, but in 1998 it began to slow down, and 
we didn’t do well at all […] It happened frequently that many teachers, 
women [Primary School] teachers who attend yoga classes… it is very 
common for them to have two different posts and so their time is 
shortened, and so they quit. And then there are others who have to take 
two different posts because… someone has to help her daughter who is 
married and has lost her job and has to pay for college fees. That way they 
have to “cover up the holes” … so, economic crisis began, and the crisis 
became increasingly evident…(Graciela, 39, I 14, Lanús) 
 
The increasing labor participation of married women as a result of the 
husband’s employment instability is by no means limited to working class 
households. Raquel (49) represents a paradigmatic case of a middle class woman 
who after a long period out of the labor market had to return to employment due 
to her husband’s employment problems. Moreover, she became the head of the 
household after her husband’s death. While her case clearly illustrates the tenacity 
and creativity of middle classes to resist a process of continuous decline, it also 
shows how the availability of certain resources –such as human capital, children 
of working age, and housing- contributes to better cope with economic adversity.    
She was widowed in 1995, and lives with two of her four daughters (27, 25, 23, 
16 years old). She graduated as a Primary School teacher and began working as a 
secretary at her uncle’s metallurgical firm, where she met her husband, a salesman 
and debt collector of the same firm until it went into bankruptcy. 
 I got engaged when I was 19 and I got married at 21 years old, and I 
stopped working. I stopped working until…1986 or 1987, when work 
began to go badly…When my husband lost his job [due to the firm’s 
bankruptcy], he was 42, 43 […] and there was no way…so we decided to 
set up a pizzería here…we did that in 1991 […] Between 1987 and 
1991…we managed, we survived…I used to work in insurance policies, 
which I still do, and…I have been working in insurance policies for 15 
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years… and then I used to sell Mary Kay products…I’ve done a bit of 
everything […] Both of us used to work, he would do some work as a 
salesman…he would sell cars, when there was an opportunity to do it, 
but…he got ill, he suffered with his nerves…he began to be depressive, to 
be depressive… […] and well… he asked for loans, he mortgaged the 
house, ah…we were hard-up as the whole [Argentine] society was at the 
time, right? [After my husband died] I continued with the pizzería, at the 
beginning I…now it’s been 3 years since I closed it down  because I went 
to look for a job, I signed up to get a job as a Primary School teacher, as a 
tutor [at High School]…anything… and was taken on in 1996 at a private 
school, a parochial school. So, there I began as a tutor first, and, being a 
tutor, I was also taken on [at the same school] as a substitute teacher, in 
another shift, and after that…the following term I was appointed as a 
teacher of 1st grade and as a tutor of the intermediate shift.[…] At that 
time, I used to have first the  school and then the  pizzería, after the school 
I would come to the pizzería and then I still worked some in insurance 
policies…The girls used to help me at the pizzería […] but then I closed it 
down because I grew tired, and anyways the three of us could manage all 
right with what I earned at the school. […] But it so happened that in 
1999, during the first week of the school term, the school headmistress 
comes and tells me that she can’t have any more employees by contract 
and so I cannot continue working there. […] I was 48 at that time…And 
so, I started to figure out what could I do with my house, with the 
premises where I had had the pizzería, which I had closed down […]And 
so, as we always manage to get along, with my daughters, because we do 
everything by ourselves, so we took the old stuff apart, we painted,  I sold 
some of the old stuff, I set up the facilities for the new store […] and all 
right, it began to work…little by little.  
 
She rented a copier machine and set up a small copier store at home, 
located in front of the University of Lanús, where she currently works with three 
of her daughters.     
 I have never thought of living without working, I guess I would never get 
used to it. (Raquel, 49, I 3, Lanús) 
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Some women have spent most of their working lives as self-employed, 
either developing their own businesses or in partnership with other family 
members. Marisa is a paradigmatic case of self-employment among middle class 
women. Initially developed as a way to conciliate family responsibilities and 
personal fulfillment, self-employment, or specifically small family businesses, 
soon became a means to cope with her husband’s employment insecurity. 
However, an enterprising, flexible, and creative attitude, social networks, and the 
availability of the capital needed to initiate new activities were not enough to 
remain in the labor market in an economic environment particularly adverse to 
self-employment. Marisa (41) is married and mother of two (aged 22 and 20). 
After finishing High School she began degree studies as a teacher in Mathematics 
and Physics, but she dropped out of college at 19, when she got married and had 
her first child. At that time she was working as a Secondary School teacher and 
giving private classes at home. 
[…] I used to get up at 5 AM on [my private students’] examination day, 
but I had students that had average mark “1” [in Math or Physics] and they 
ended up with “10” and they didn’t fail the term examinations again…so, 
you see, I had this type of satisfaction. My husband told me that I was mad 
if I thought that I would keep on doing the same after we got married, so, I 
stopped doing it, that is why afterwards I went to look for a job […] Not 
because we had a strong need for a better income, it’s just that you always 
want to make a little progress, or to have some more…And all right, I 
didn’t want to be idle, I had always been used to…[…] After my son was 
born I got crazy about going out to work, I simply didn’t want to stay 
enclosed at home. 
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 Almost immediately she found a job as an accountant assistant in a 
metallurgical firm, where she worked for one year and a half, until she had her 
second child and decided to quit her job, in 1980. 
 […] There were two kids for my mom to take care of, it was too much 
[for her], so I couldn’t…so I stayed. 
 
Since then, when she was 21, she began working as self-employed in 
commerce. Her first experience was a short-lived ice-cream store, which failed 
after three months. She began selling clothes for a fashion clothes store. After a 
short period she became independent and set up her own clothing business at 
home. 
[…] I used to sell a lot, a terrific lot !!!! […] I had many 
acquaintances…you see, I was teaching at school, so I had many 
[customers among] school teachers, both from Primary and Secondary 
school, and my private students’ mothers, and many women in the 
neighborhood, there was a bunch of them […] at that time you could 
sell…they would pay …and you could sell to be paid in the term of 2 or 3 
months. 
However, as  to many other small business owners, her success was short-
lived. Unable to compete with cheaper imported clothes, she had to close down 
her business in 1994. 
 […] until the Korean businessmen appeared and then the profit became 
too small. You would buy a t-shirt [from the wholesaler] at 5.00 pesos and 
it was a joke trying to sell it at 10 pesos […] because at the Korean stores 
they would sell it [and people could buy it] at 5.50 […] then the business 
wasn’t worth while anymore. 
 
Soon after that, she and her husband in partnership with her brother, 
opened a small supermarket, which failed due to family conflicts when her 
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brother divorced. Therefore, the store was closed after one year. Two consecutive 
family-business failures - first a remiseria and then a small firm of repair 
services- accompanied the increasing employment instability of her husband, a   
technician who was working as a bus driver. 
 […] After that, I wanted to start again selling clothes but…from having a 
very well supplied boutique, full of garments [like the one I used to 
have]…to having just 10 t-shirts to sell, it was like I didn’t like it, you see? 




  Labor trajectories not only show clearly that unemployment in Argentina 
affects a wide range of workers with the most diverse labor trajectories but also 
help us to assess the real dimensions and impacts of longer term processes such as 
economic restructuring and adjustment policies on different categories of workers.  
 Even when the trajectories of working class males tend to show higher 
levels of instability than their middle class counterparts, two different types of 
trajectories can be identified.  Among the less skilled, unemployment has sharply 
deepened their already precarious insertion in the labor market. In face of the 
increasing deterioration in and reduction of employment opportunities, 
unemployment, though present in previous stages of their working lives, has 
become longer and re-employment possibilities progressively more difficult. 
Previous forms of coping with labor instability have become increasingly 
ineffective such as  low -paid jobs in the formal sector and self-employment  . For 
those in their middle ages, the accumulation of disadvantages puts them under 
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serious risk of becoming permanently excluded from the labor market. Younger 
workers with low skill levels and the lack of educational credentials, are being 
confined to the most precarious jobs in the service sector – either as wage-
workers or as self-employed.   In contrast with older generations, factory work is 
nowadays so limited that it does not represent a possible source of employment 
for them. The self-employed with craft skills, who in previous decades had   
improved their standard of living, face a sharp decline in their employment and 
living conditions. Their occupational limitations come from two different sources. 
One is the impoverishment of the middle class, which has sharply reduced their 
potential clientele. The other is the tax pressures on independent workers that 
have further restricted their job chances, now limited to subsistence activities.  
Middle class males, with higher educational levels, are characterized by a 
prior history of steady, well-paid employment, and upward occupational mobility. 
Unemployment –mostly the consequence of plant closings, bankruptcies and the 
privatization of former state-owned enterprises- represents a break point in their 
trajectories, resulting in an accelerated process of downward occupational 
mobility and a sharp decline in their income. Most of them lost their jobs in their 
middle age and could not find a job -if they found one- in accordance with   their 
skill levels and previous labor experience. Severance and voluntary retirement 
payments buffered and delayed at first the drop in income. Consecutive failures in 
the attempts to develop small businesses resulted in the draining of savings, and 
many ended as taxi drivers or remiseros, clearly illustrated by the over-supply of 
this kind of services in Buenos Aires city and in Greater Buenos Aires.  
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Women’s labor trajectories are strongly affected by the household cycle, 
and characterized by intermittent labor participation. Labor trajectories of low-
income women show the effects of limited employment opportunities, family 
responsibilities, and household economic needs. Their job histories are mostly 
characterized by instability in low paid jobs, and their participation in the labor 
market, especially during the last years, has been pushed by the precarious 
employment status of their husbands, and by the difficulties that children of 
working age have in entering the labor market. At the same time, as the interviews 
show, moving from paid work outside home to working at home –usually doing 
some kind of assembly work- results not only in a profound deterioration of 
income , but in a process of progressive isolation.  
Middle-class women show lower levels of intermittency in their 
employment, and the greater availability of social and human capital resulted, in 
the past, in more rewarding jobs –either in self-employment or as wage workers. 
They easily become discouraged workers. The higher levels of skills required for 
the jobs they used to have in the past and the time spent out of work appear to 
have greater impacts on their careers than among their counterparts in the lower 
classes.  
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Chapter 7:  Coping with Unemployment: The Market, the State, 
and the Family 
 
If the immediate effect of a change is deleterious, then, until proof the contrary, the final 
effect is deleterious. 
Karl Polanyi, 1957 
 
Labor trajectories have shown that neither employment nor unemployment 
are homogeneous experiences. Different initial conditions certainly affect the life 
chances of individuals. Subsequent employment experiences can result for some 
in opportunities of upward social mobility, while for the more disadvantaged, 
these experiences appear as part of their permanent struggle for survival, or as 
Selby et al. (1990) suggest, for looking after themselves. 
Even when strongly limited by a structure of constraints, responses to 
unemployment appear to differ between and within social groups according to the 
kind of resources available and the different ways in which individuals and 
households make use of them.123 Individuals and households are faced with 
alternative courses of action over which they have to take decisions. Actually, 
these alternatives may vary considerably in the degree of choice they offer.124 
                                                 
123 Household refers to the unit of co-residence whose members may or may not be kin. Coping 
strategies, which involve organizing the household to get by in the short and medium term, are 
likely to be a source of differentiation between and within households because of disparities in 
aspirations resulting from different stages in the household cycle and divergencies in the life 
chances of household members (Roberts , 1991). 
124 It is not the intention here to repeat what has already been an exhaustive debate on household 
strategies. Some of its main contributions in the Latin American context can be found in Selby et 
al. (1990, 1994); Gonzalez de la Rocha (1988); Roberts (1991); and Cuellarr (1996), among 
others. .    
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Household decisions are always context bound, where the characteristics of the 
labor market, state intervention in welfare provision and previous standards of 
living play a key role. 
The Argentinean case is characterized both by weak or inexistent form of 
public social provision for the unemployed and the lack of employment 
opportunities offered in the labor market. In this context, the household appears as 
the main space where individuals and families cope with unemployment and 
employment insecurity. Interviews show that even in an overwhelmingly adverse 
context, households use different kinds of resources to cope with unemployment. 
However, the growing pressure on the household is resulting in a progressive 
exhaustion of resources. 
This chapter analyzes the different ways in which individuals and 
households cope with the unemployment experience, affected by the opportunities 
and constraints provided by three main spheres: the market, the state, and the 
family. Two main issues are analyzed regarding the “opportunities” offered by the 
labor market: the first one refers to the characteristics of local labor markets, 
showing how spatial factors, such as the employment opportunities at the local 
level and spatial segregation affects the experience of unemployment. The second 
issue refers to the mechanisms and obstacles for finding a job, highlighting that 
job search represent the harshest expression of present labor market conditions. 
The analysis focuses on two main questions with respect to state provision. 
Firstly, it assesses the experiences of participants in public programs of direct 
employment creation targeted to the poorest sectors. Secondly, it shows the 
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profound lack of protection faced by the middle class unemployed, as a result of 
increasingly difficult access to social services and benefits that were traditionally 
attached to formal employment. Finally, household responses are analyzed 
showing how resources coming from different sources are combined, as well as 
the obstacles households face in mobilizing the scarce resources available.     
 
7.1. THE MARKET 
 7.1.1. Local labor market 
Spatial factors, particularly the characteristics of local labor markets are 
important factors in the experience of unemployment. The sharply reduced 
employment opportunities in a context of widespread job insecurity should not 
obscure the nuances and differential impacts on the experience of unemployment 
that result from the characteristics of local space, particularly physical access to 
what can broadly be termed as ‘urban satisfiers’ (Ward, 1990).   
Proximity to the capital city acquires particular relevance in terms of the 
possibilities of access –although increasingly limited- to low-skilled service jobs, 
especially when the once traditional industrial belts sourranding the city –which 
suffered the heaviest employment losses- are now offering meager employment 
opportunities. This is the case of Lanús, where, in face of the declining 
availability of jobs in the local labor market, its closeness to Buenos Aires city 
becomes an advantage because of the lower costs of transportation. This by no 
means guarantees re-entry to employment, but at least increases the possibilities 
of rebusque (jobs on the side).  At the same time, when compared to the more 
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homogeneously poor situation of Florencio Varela, the greater social 
heterogeneity of Lanús appears to diversify the range of employment 
opportunities.   
Yes, [it has been convenient to live in Lanús to get a job]…because I have 
everything handy…I live just one step from the Capital  […] If I lived in 
Ezeiza, which is all open ground… when you have to come up here, how 
do you manage to come in this direction?…[I wonder] how those people 
live out there !!! because sometimes one thinks of oneself, right?, but there 
are people out there who maybe are  worse […] because here, at the 
Capital, with the minimum bus ticket  you can go around the whole city, 
but when you are within the province no, then.. how do you manage?…   
(Ricardo, 43, I 5, Lanús) 
[…] Here, for example, the advantage is that you are close to the Capital   
and close to every place, to begin with…you see, and then here you can 
manage better than in other places, that is […] here, you always manage to 
get by … (Agustín, 39, I 6, Lanús) 
 
In contrast, for those living in more distant locations from the capital city   
characterized by scarce local employment opportunities, distance becomes a main 
limitation on getting a job, basically because of the lack of  money for 
transportation.  Urban zones, such as Florencio Varela, commonly characterized 
as “dormitory towns” (ciudades dormitorio) become increasingly segregated, not 
only due to the concentration of poverty, but because of the high levels of 
concentration of poverty and unemployment.  
 
[…] It was always called like that, ‘dormitory city’, the city from which 
the people goes out looking for a job somewhere else, no…because here, 
no…because here, never, never…I don’t know if there used to be any 
industrial activity, some time in the past, but…here, the only activity they 
can work at [now] is vegetable farming…but no, in general, a big industry, 
a big…a big supermarket…I don’t think that there has ever been here. 
(Ruben, 28, I 8, Varela)  
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[…] Here, you live with your money in your hand… if you have money 
you are  poor, if you don’t have money you are a bag of garbage, let’s 
say… because you can’t move, you understand? I have 5 pesos right 
now... I don’t know…you have to go to the Capital …and you spend  
these 5 pesos to go to the capital because you know may be there you can 
find something to do […] If you don’t have any money you can’t go 
anywhere. (Luis, 45, I 2, Varela) 
  
 Moreover, transportation costs do not only represent a main obstacle for 
job search, but also a desincentive when getting a job given the evident imbalance 
between them and wages.  
 
They summoned me from a cleaning firm in Caballito  to work at Hospital 
Durán, cleaning up… it was an 8-hour job and they would give us 235 
pesos plus benefits allowances for family, children, all that and the other 
benefits, right?… But the was 235 pesos a month and they didn’t pay 
transport expenses, and so I didn’t like the idea, it wasn’t profitable, 
actually…to go from here to Hospital Durán  the bus ticket costs 4 pesos 
and so, how much  would I get, really? and so I didn’t go.(Esteban, 27, I 
12, Varela) 
 
The main “advantage” of living in Florencio Varela is the housing market, 
given the “opportunities” it offers in terms of the access to ‘private informal 
systems of supply’ (Ward, 1990) such as cheap plots and invasion of land. 
 
The fact is, the problem is, actually, financial… always financial, isn’t it?, 
because one thing is to have a plot of land in Varela, and a different thing 
is to have it in Bernal, in Quilmes or in some other zone, right?, or if you 
go upwards it becomes yet more expensive, so …well, we decided to 
come to Varela (Andrés, I 14, Varela) 
[The plot of land]… we occupied it, yes. It had no wire fence, it had 
nothing, so…we had had no problems so far […] We always watched this 
place  because nobody ever appeared…we asked the neighbor out there … 
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and she said ‘It is 12 years since I am here, more or less, and nobody ever  
appeared ’…This used to be a scrubland!!! Even the neighbors told us to 
get in here, because it was full of rats, sheer rats… Besides, as I tell you, 
we didn’t usurp, because this ground didn’t have any wire fence, nothing, 
it was a waste ground…and we didn’t break into it…we didn’t break 
anything to enter here. (Ana, Interview 6, Varela) 
I occupied it, yes…afterwards they came to take down my particulars 
…and when we were about to start with the monthly payments I lost my 
job…that was when I used to work at the wax-candle factory…And so we 
couldn’t pay anything…and we are still there, we still live there . (Pablo, I 
16, Varela) 
 
Employment opportunities and labor traditions are clearly different in both 
locations: formal industrial employment and dynamic small businesses in Lanús 
clearly contrast with informal and casual jobs for those living in Varela. For 
Varela’s residents less jobs are in general equivalent to less changas, and 
generally speaking, less informal jobs. 
Years ago there were a lot of jobs [available], right there, 
immediately…For example, I used to take the Río [bus firm] to 
Quilmes…and as the bus was passing by, may be I would see a sign 
somewhere, for example ‘Auto bodyworker needed’, and so, instead of 
going on to Quilmes [on the bus] I would get off right there, I would go 
into the workshop and say ‘You need…? And so I would go back [home], 
I would just pick up my working-clothes and go to work, that 
easy…(Ignacio, 53, I 4, Varela) 
 […] I sell stockings and dish towels [in the streets] and sometimes I have 
no sales at all…[…]  There were stands at the side of the road…selling 
vegetables and all that…[…] I was working at one of those fruit 
stands…selling water-melons…always, always doing something […] but 
now it is hard…last year there were no more stands already…because the 
police took them away and as they  were taken away many people lost 
their jobs…(Ernestina, 34, I 7, Varela) 
[…] There are many [garment] workshops here in Varela, but at the time 
when I was working, when I had my house built…there was a lot of work 
to be done…I used to earn 300 or 400 pesos monthly…[…] Lately, they 
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paid nothing. They would pay you every 2 weeks, but most of the time 
you were idle […] No, there is no work [now] and they pay you worthless 
wages […] Recently, I used to be sitting  8 or 9 hours a day, and I got 5 or 
4 pesos a day […] (Norma, 50, I 24, Varela) 
[…] Sometimes I go out looking for changa, but now there aren’t any, not 
even changas are there any…not even for sweeping side-walks. (Mario, 
50 I 11, Varela) 
 
In contrast for those living in Lanús, the “good times” are associated with 
a dynamic labor market, where industrial factories and small businesses –from 
commerce to workshops of different kinds- used to be important sources of 
employment for local residents.  Many of the interviewees commented, as does 
Violeta, on the local industrial employment that used to exist in Lanús 
 
 This used to be an industrial belt, there used to be industries, there were 
smokestacks…and smoke coming out constantly…and you would see all 
the people working  at 8.00 in the morning…Here, where we are standing 
now [University of Lanús’ building], at the railway company, here…a lot 
of people used to work…and where I live, more people yet…that’s why 
they called it ‘Villa de los Industriales’ …Precisely, going back to history, 
because there were all kinds of industries here… textile industries, 
metallurgical industries, glass industries, there were such a great number 
of them…[…] This used to be an industrial belt…[Now] everything is 
closed down…there is nothing left, absolutely nothing, and there are 
entire families out of work…(Violeta, 41, I 15, Lanús) 
  
In fact, the once industrial center of Lanús is today among the locations 
hardest hit by unemployment in the Greater Buenos Aires. 
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7.1.2. Job search 
Seeking a job, when there are no jobs, is probably one of the most 
frustrating experiences that the unemployed have to face. It is one of the crudest –
and many times humillating- market experiences, where individuals experience a 
daily confrontation with labor market hardships. 
In a context of high unemployment the traditional mechanisms of job 
search, such as newspaper advertisements and social networks become 
increasingly ineffective.125   The Buenos Aires labor market not only generates 
few vacant jobs but has no publicly provided job centers for finding jobs. Thus, 
job search represents an entirely individual experience.  
 
[…] I have many acquaintances that own or have owned business 
firms…My cousin, for example, he owned a workshop in lathe-worked 
metal products…I have a friend who owns a builder’s yard…I have my 
uncle who manufactures matrices…he is a matrix-maker […] No, no I 
didn’t get [a job]…My uncle, now, he wants to blow his head off, he is 
ruined because the bank has…and my cousin, too, he is working as a 
welder at the shipyard docks, so…from that side…I couldn’t expect 
anything…(Raúl, 48, I 17, Lanús)  
   I have many friends who are teachers…my uncle is a lawyer, he works 
at the bank…I have a  friend who is a psychologist, that is… I also have 
friends who are professionals….and…nothing. (Graciela, 39, I 14, Lanús) 
 […] Because it’s all lies, I refused to believe even Clarín [Buenos Aires 
newspaper], they were all government’s lies inventing non-existing 
                                                 
125 Social capital is important not only in finding jobs but also in determining the type and quality 
of employment to which they gain access (Granovetter, 1973, 1974; Coleman, 1991). The 
effectiveness of social resources is strongly influenced by the context in which they have to be 
mobilized. Among other factors, the extent of job creation and the degree of public labor market 
regulation – that is, the role of the state in managing the match between job seekers and vacancies- 
represent crucial factors affecting the role and importance of social capital (Barbieri, Paugam, and 
Russell, 2000). 
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jobs…I got busy making contacts through my acquaintances, to see if 
someone knew, but everybody said the same: ‘Look, they are dismissing 
people where I am, they are dismissing people here…’ And,  I said 
‘enough’!!! I quit looking for a job, because the only thing I am doing is 
spoil my brains, my health… and I know I won’t get any job, there are no 
opportunities here…(Nora, 52, Interview 28, Lanús) 
 
The multiple mechanisms of job search tried out by the unemployed and 
the length of time spent on it calls into question a key aspect in the definition of 
unemployment, which assumes that the unemployed are those actively looking for 
a job. This is also related to the different forms that the category of discouraged 
worker can take. As the interviews show, discouragement is expressed in different 
ways: while sometimes it results from the perception that there are no jobs 
available and that in a highly competitive environment job search is just a waste 
of time and money, in other cases it emerges after long periods of active job 
search. 
I can’t go out looking for a job because although I have had a good 
education…from the times when I attended school …I haven’t acquired 
any computing skills, and I have learned very little English, and so…what 
am I going to get out there? (Marisa, 41, I 13, Lanús) 
I used to buy the newspapers, through the newpapers…I used to go to 
some offices…To clean-up, usually to clean-up […] and they used to 
make me fill in application forms all the time, to fill in application forms 
and wait, wait for them to call me up, but they never called me up […] 
Yes, I got tired…I must have gone twice a week, during one year. (Juan, 
30, I 5, Varela) 
[…] I used to look for [jobs] through the papers…through my 
acqaintances, through… tiré el gancho de todas maneras [all ways and 
means] […] And during these last two years…look, what I have got, the 
only thing I got was frustration and to get worked up into a state... because 
every time I went out …I got badly worked up… they drived me mad for 
one reason or the other […] I don’t want to go through that again, I don’t 
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want to get depressive again. I got over that situation already and I don’t 
want to go back to it, you see, to do the same I used to do. Then, as I 
already know that…so, you will probably say: ‘Such a negative 
guy!’…You read the papers and it says  ‘not older than 32 ’, what am I 
going to [bother and] spend my money for?… If I get there I know they’ll 
say to me: ‘Hey, man, you are 36, not 32, what do you come here 
for?’OK, you’re right, then…(Omar, 36, I 29, Lanús) 
 
In low-income sectors, the chances of getting a job for married women 
with young children are even more restricted. Their household responsibilities 
sharply reduce the amount of time they can devote to job search, generally limited 
to “passive” mechanisms through their more immediate social networks. Their 
low educational levels and the nature of their contacts increase their vulnerability 
and contribute to locking them into the most disadvantageous positions in the 
labor market. Moreover, together with the difficulties in combining work and 
family duties, working mothers have to face employers’ discriminatory practices 
when looking for a job.126 
 I used to go to the work agency to get a job in a cleaning firm […]… and 
they always ask you your particulars and when you state that you have a 3-
year-old child and a baby, they say ‘No mum, not with little kids, because 
then you have to stay at home and…’ [It is OK] if the children are older 
than 6, in which case if they’ve got a fever they can stay alone, but not 
when they are so young’.(María, 36, I 1, Varela)  
Employment search does not finish when finding a job. When labor 
insecurity is so generalized, job-hunting becomes an almost permanent practice. 
I must have been…at least 9 months looking for a job…when I was 
looking for a job…and I couldn’t get one…Actually I would get a job, but 
it wasn’t what I was expecting […] [I would get jobs as] As a sales 
                                                 
126 Esping Andersen (1999) points out that when the state provides little provisions to alleviate the 
double burden of employment and famiy responsibilities the concept of de-commodification is 
inoperable for women unless welfare states help them become commodified.  
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promoter or selling [goods] on a commission basis, that is to say, the 
amount of my wages would vary according to the amount of sales I 
had…And…no, I say ‘What if I spend my money travelling [to get there] 
and I have no sales?’…(Lorena, 27, I 21, Lanús)  
[…] I was walking up and down the 9 de Julio [main street, downtown 
Lanús] …and there are a lot of ads…but the jobs offered are temporary, 
for 1 month, for Christmas and New Year time…at stores […] In factories, 
[jobs offered] are generally for 3 months or may be they take you on for 
several months, only until production is over and no more than that. 
(Laura, 24, I 22, Lanús) 
 
While increasingly ineffective for finding a job, social contacts still 
represent the main mechanism of job search, particularly for the access to casual 
and low-paid jobs. Kinship and friendship as well as length of residence in the 
same neighborhood facilitate word-of-mouth from friends, relatives and neighbors 
about the availability of changas. 
I have many acquaintances, many family homes where I have worked and 
sometimes they tell me ‘Call up that week or other.. that day or other… or 
pass by… or look on [some other time]…Sure, I look around, you see? I 
go somewhere, then I go somewhere else and I always get something, you 
see?, may be by sheer chance…someone comes up and says ‘Che, they 
called you up because they have some work to do, why don’t you go and 
see what’s up?’ (Agustín, I 6, Lanús, 39) 
[…] A guy from [a house] out there at the back came and…he is a painter,  
he came and said to me ‘Look, they told me you are out of work…I’ve got 
a job of at least one week.’…And so I went to work with him, he paid me 
30 pesos a day […] I used to get by in that way, like that…May be there 
would come a guy to my home and say ‘That one  wants us to lay some 
bricks…and he asked me how much he should give us…and I said 20 or 
15 pesos to each one of us…’ And so we went there, we laid the bricks, or 
we carried inside a load of sand, or whatever there was to be done […] 
Afterwards, my dad’s brother called me up and… as they are truck 
drivers… I told him ‘See if they need someone to wash the trucks, up 
there, at the garage…I can wash the trucks for them.’And so we went 
there one day, it was Saturday…I talked to them, to his mates… they all 
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know me, I talked to them…‘give me a hand, I can wash the trucks’…‘25 
pesos…it’s OK’…and I used to wash 7 or 8 trucks […] Sure, I can work 
wherever […] But I always had someone to offer me a job […] because 
always, the people who I worked for…I made a good impression on 
them…(Humberto, 25, I 17, Varela) 
.  
In contrast, those networks coming from higher and stable occupational 
positions during previous labor trajectories do not seem to facilitate re-
employment, especially for those entering unemployment in their middle ages. In 
fact, the effectiveness of social networks is related to the structure of employment 
opportunities. The decline of formal job opportunities in a context of economic 
crisis certainly erodes the efficacy of this kind of social resource.  
 
I started looking for a job, to work in a grain export firm again […] and so 
one day I put on my suit, my tie, I picked up a bunch of copies of my CV  
and I went to the [grain] Exchange…I go in there, I go into the meeting 
room, I ask for someone, I don’t know…Sure, I know some [people 
there]… ‘Is such and such here?’, ‘Yes, he is right here’, I beckon to him 
and he comes …  ‘Hey!!’…all right, he comes and then when another one 
passes by he says ‘Che, look who is here!!’…It was…to tell you the truth, 
I left [the Exchange] feeling self-confident […] because I had entered the 
place a little afraid of not being welcome after four years […] No, that was 
swell, I felt great because suddenly, there I was…there were about 20 
firms represented there, with all the people I knew…all of the [grain] 
exporters were there and all of the agents [grain salesmen] and all of them 
asked me to leave [a copy of] my CV…[…] And so I said to myself ‘By 
the end of the month I am working in cereals again’[…] and… no, it has 
been 2 years since then…(Marcelo, 52, I 16, Lanús) 
  In 1997 there appeared a newspaper ad, offering a post at the port as a 
cargo operative inspector, which was a job I had worked at.   They were 
the same group of guys who had been one or two classes after mine at the 
school of navigation and had worked with me at the port. That is, [I knew 
this guy] who had taken my place when I left that job…we knew each 
other quite well…[…] I call him up directly and I say ‘Che, how are you 
doing’- and this and that – ‘I’m calling you up about the ad…’[on the 
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paper]  ‘All right, look’- he says – ‘you are fully qualified for that post, but 
there is a requirement that the applicant must be 35 or under…’  (Gabriel, 
50, I 26, Lanús) 
 
 
7.1.2.1. Obstacles for getting a job 
Most interviewees coincide on the over-selectiveness and over-demanding 
criteria of current employers’ recruitment policies, which do not appear to match 
with the kind of jobs offered. The most evident –and discouraging- of these 
criteria is age. In describing their job searches, many workers, both males and 
females, said they faced age discrimination. While various studies on 
unemployment point to the negative relationship between age and the chances of 
finding a job, basically when job seekers are close to retirement 127, the 
unemployed in Argentina seem to experience a process of “premature aging”: 
they are considered “old” if they are over 30. 
A person who is 30 years old or older than 30 is considered disposable in 
this country… you  are given the lowest, the worst…and then when you 
reach the 40s, I don’t know, then...(Violeta, 41, I 15, Lanús) 
Yes, yes, I feel I am out of the system because of my age […] Nowadays 
you don’t see older people in any company or firm, I am speaking about 
45 or 50-year-olders…unless they are working at high posts, with high 
salaries, who are the very fewest…that is to say, normally, very few 
people in normal work are older than 40. (Gabriel, 50, I 26, Lanús) 
Employment agencies at the Capital ...I’ve been to all of them […]  If 
there are 500 applicants for a job, all of them with a university degree, all 
of them in their 20s…and they can’t get it ...being 41, a decrepit 
woman…what can I get?…I’m a good-for-nothing, already…(Celina, 41, I 
23, Lanús) 
                                                 
127  See Gallie and Vogler (1994); Barbieri, Paugam, and Russell (2000); Bernardi et al. (2000). 
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Impotent, impotent…I felt really bad, awfully bad, because you are 30 
years old…yes, you are 30 or 31 years old and they tell you that you are 
no good any more or that you are exceeding the age-limit, but…with 14 
years of experience behind a cash register, you understand?…they tell me 
I exceed the age-limit!!…(Omar, 36, I 29, Lanús) 
No matter how much of [work] experience you have, after 35 you are old 
in Argentina […] Up to 30 or 35 years old [you can work]…after 35 you 
lose your job and you are a young retiree…you are too young to retire and 
too old to work…What can you do, then? What are your options? None 
[…] it is the same as if you got shot right in the middle of your head… 
because you go there  “with your batteries recharged” [con todas las pilas] 
and a 25-year-old boy says to you ‘You are no good for this job, because 
you are old’…and they kill you . (Luis, 49, I 27, Lanús) 
  
While hiring practices appear to privilege young workers, the experiences 
of employment search among younger job seekers do not appear to be particularly 
satisfying. They have the required age, but not the required experience. 
[…] They ask you experience, at least one year of experience…to be 21 
years old or younger than 25, you understand?…and may be you have 
never worked before because they never allowed you to get a job, so you 
have no work experience, and so they won’t hire you…(Laura, 24, I 24, 
Lanús) 
 
While   higher educational levels certainly do not guarantee getting a job, 
the lack of the required credentials blocks access even for dead-end-jobs.  
 
[…] Lately, you are required degree studies up to third grade of Secondary 
School for cleaning jobs … what for ? to clean-up urinals?… I can’t 
understand them, I don’t think you need a third  grade diploma to clean-up 
urinals. (Ricardo, 43, I 5, Lanús) 
[…] Why do they discriminate? Why  so many fastidious requirements to 
get a job?…because it wasn’t like that before, years ago they didn’t used 
to pay attention to your age…and if you had no degree studies and they 
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needed you they would hire you right away…now there are so many 
requirements. (Orlando, 44, I 4, Lanús) 
[…] If you don’t have a High School diploma or a profession, there’s no 
place to go and look for a job, because factories…there are no more, and if 
you work for a cleaners firm they’ll take you on for short terms…(Flavia, 
25, I 26, Varela) 
 
Even personal appearance can become an obstacle for finding a job -or an 
advantage when a person satisfies the expected requirements. Marisa’s and 
Martín’s comments illustrate what various interviewees stressed. 
 
[…] Besides I am fat, you see?… Now, to be able to get a job you have to 
be slim, you have to look terrific, you have to wear the best clothes, 
because they watch even the clothing trade-mark you are wearing, they 
measure everything. (Marisa, 41, I 13, Lanús) 
[…] Lately, according to what I have heard from my mates-waiters they  
don’t require references so much as they require young, slim guys …My 
mates, who are 40 or 45 years old…once, some time ago…they were quite 
angry because they had gone somewhere looking for a job and they had 
been told that at their age it was difficult to be taken on...40 years old, 39 
or 40 years old… and because one of them is a little bit plump....(Martín, 
27, I 21, Varela) 
 
The results of job search are clearly expressed in the kinds of jobs 
obtained after unemployment. As the analysis of labor trajectories have shown 
there is a marked process of downward occupational mobility, a profound 
deterioration of labor conditions, and increasing risk among the least skilled of 
becoming permanently excluded from the labor market. The lack of employment 
opportunities, the low quality of the few jobs available, and the almost 
nonexistent forms of social protection, place the individual in such a 
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disadvantageous position that any kind of job becomes suitable, especially for 
those that do not have other sources of income than work to cope with 
unemployment. 
  
7.2. THE STATE 
The frustrating experience of the market is accompanied by limited public 
provision to guard against misfortunes in the labor market. Unemployment 
benefits are so restricted  that they cannot even be characterized as providing a 
‘sub-protective welfare regime’. The lack of protection for the unemployed  not 
only increases their vulnerability to income poverty, but leaves vast segments of 
the population unprotected in terms of their access to social services and benefits 
traditionally attached to formal employment. 
 
[…] I knew I had my wage by the end of the month…I had my obra social 
[health care plan] when I was ill…I had a place where I could take my 
children when they needed a doctor, I knew I had pension contributions 
and all that. (Juana, 49, I 18, Varela) 
 
7.2.1. Targeting the Poor: Public Employment Programs 
The limited and weak safety nets provided by the state are limited or 
“targeted” to the poorest unemployed. The low levels of compensation clearly 
operate as a mechanism of “self-targeting”. For many poor households, the 
participation of one (or more) of its members in a state work program such as the 
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Plan Trabajar (national) and Plan Barrios Bonaerenses (provincial)128, become 
their only chances of obtaining some income, both in the most disadvantaged 
neighborhoods of Lanús and in locations such as Florencio Varela. Poor 
households are also participants of a food distribution program called Plan 
Vida129. 
The limited coverage of employment programs in terms of reaching an 
increasing number of jobless people is accompanied, as the interviews show, by 
the lack of transparency and a strong clientelism both in the recruitment of 
beneficiaries and in the administration of programs by local institutions –usually 
the municipalities. The distribution of program benefits are a major source of 
power for local political bosses. Contacts with the punteros or neighborhood 
agents of the  political party in power at the local level (which both in Florencio 
Varela and Lanús is the Justicialist Party) become a key resource for coping with 
poverty and unemployment in poor neighborhoods.130 These networks of the poor, 
which provide them with key information on how, where, and when social 
program benefits will be distributed, acquire particular significance in a context of 
what Auyero (2000) calls “organizational desertification”, in reference to the 
                                                 
128 The Plan Barrios Bonaerenses is an adaptation of the national government Plan Trabajar that 
began on 1997 financed by the provincial government of Buenos Aires and is coordinated by the 
Provincial Institute of Employment (Instituto Provincial del Empleo, IPE). 
129 Plan Vida is a provincial government plan that distributes a weekly ration of milk, eggs, cereal, 
and rice to pregnant women and children through age 6. Food is delivered by the manzaneras or 
block captains, women volunteers who also have had a key role in the recruitment of work 
program participants.  
130 This is consistent with other research studies. In his work on clientelism in the Greater Buenos 
Aires, Auyero (2000) points out that the contacts with the punteros or local agents of the 
Justicialist Party, who operate as mediators between the ward bosses (with direct access to state 
resources at the local level) and the clients, represent one of the main channels through which 
people living in poor neighborhoods satisfy their basic needs of food and health care. 
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weak functioning of community organizations and  increasing isolation among 
local residents. This “organizational desertification”, at least in Florencio Varela 
and Lanús, does not mean that there are no community organizations at all, but 
that most of them are coopted and tightly controlled by the official political party 
at the local level. In fact, most of the work program participants were interviewed 
in local community organizations –such as sociedades de fomento, soup kitchens, 
etc. 
I got [in the program] because of politics...as I am an militante 
[activist]...as, I used to be… militante …of the PJ [Partido Justicialista] … 
so I signed up and we started working, both of us [my husband and 
I]…Yes, I started working there through an acquaintance, a town 
councilman […] We have always worked for Pereyra [Mayor of Varela at 
the time] but I got it through a town councilman who was someone else’s 
friend, and so he told him : ‘Look, we have these vacancies, the people 
who were expected didn’t come, and we have to fill them today, this 
number of vacancies’ […] and he says ‘OK, then, send me some 
militantes. And I was there because I had gone with Pepe [her  
husband]…yes, he is also a militante of the PJ, but he got in through the 
manzaneras ...Yes, yes, both of us got in together…because it was the 
same day when the survey took place [...] Moreover, the mayor and his 
wife are the padrinos [godparents] of my eldest son...so....(María, 36, 
former beneficiary of the Plan Barrios Bonaerenses, I 1 Varela) 
No, I signed up but I was always left out…And, you see…you have to 
suck up to them [the municipality’s people]…Otherwise you don’t get 
anything (Ignacio, 53, I 4, Varela) 
I got in through the manzaneras  […] I am like a ...puntera del barrio 
[neighborhood agent] …I help my husband […] If we weren’t agents in 
the neighborhood…..no, there are many people who worked for three 
years with me here in this plan  and they are not any more […] We have 
the neighborhood agents’ support…they are sort of the mayor’s right-hand 
women…if it weren’t for these women we would be already out of the 
plan (Luisa, 36, participant in the Plan Trabajar, I 9, Varela) 
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Participation in road blockages (cortes de ruta) aimed at demanding  
employment programs, a practice of collective action widespread throughout the 
country since 1997, represents another important channel of access to program 
benefits.  
 
We [my husband and I] got in because they used to have meetings at a 
house , then we started taking part in road blockages and all that…and this 
way, during these roads blockage, all of us got in, and my husband and I 
got in, too […] We used to go to the road blockages [at the road] with our 
children, we went there to participate, to be seen by those who were 
enrolling people  …so that they saw we were supporting them […] I did 
that for the children, because we had nothing. (Ana, 28, former beneficiary 
of Plan Barrios Bonaerenses, I 6, Varela) 
The idea was to try and create genuine labor sources with the Movimiento 
de Trabajadores Desocupados [MTD, Unemployed Workers Movement], 
that is…not just sweeping streets and…how do you call this?…painting 
lamp posts or telephone poles, or painting the curb-stones of the side-
walks and things like that […] Well, through that fissure the Movement 
for the Unemployed breaks apart […] and then, they end up running the 
Plan Trabajar […] so, they fixed a limit for dignity, didn’t they? They put 
a limit to dignity…to go there and fight for those Planes Trabajar…it is 
sad, isn’t it? (Andrés, 43, I 14, Varela)131 
 
In a context of lack of job opportunities at the local level, employment 
programs have no real effects on job chances. As interviews show, the kind of 
activities performed by program participants –usually limited to cleaning and 
maintenance of public spaces-  and the types of training courses when offered –
such as gardening or knitting- do not appear to improve the “employability” of 
                                                 
131 In spite of many attempts to interview some of the current leaders of the MTD during my 
fieldwork, I was unable to access them. Nobody seemed to know who the leaders were, or where 
to find them.  
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low skilled workers.  Moreover, the conditions under which such activities are 
performed seem to lack even the most basic safety and sanitary conditions  
 
I used to walk the streets, cleaning up; I used to clean up the streets […] 
The entire day in the streets…First it was from 8.00 in the morning to 
12.00, and then it was from 7.00 to 12.00, 5 hours […] We used to make 
street crossings, we had to dig through the very street…it didn’t matter if 
you were a woman, anything…you had to work with a spade… to dig 
ditches, we were digging ditches all the time…cutting the grass […] you 
know what that means? They looked like those milking yards, you 
know?…all full of grass, and we had to clean up…to leave them all real 
tidy…it seemed that we had to work our butt off for 200 pesos [a 
month][…] No, no [we didn’t learn anything]…We went there to get dirty 
and that was all, because sometimes, truly, we had to work on those rainy 
days, with mud all over […] and the same about…when we had a 
feminine period…you had to go to work, how can you go to work in the 
streets when you have a feminine period? […] There was no 
bathroom…you had to be 5 hours in the streets without a bathroom, 
without water […] Sometimes we were like dogs, because we had to pee 
on the streets, because sometimes the people wouldn’t let you go inside 
their houses to go to the bathroom, and…trully…with so many awful 
things happening, who is going to let you in, nowadays? Nobody…(Ana, 
28, I 6, Varela)  
 Learn? …No I didn’t! To clean other people’s filth, nothing else.(Luisa, 
36, I 9, Varela) 
[…] I think, for example, they get me out of the plan now and I don’t 
know how I am going to get by from now on…because you get 160 pesos 
and that money is to pay the grocer’s bill, the electricity bill, for this…and 
that is all…I don’t have any money left to buy a ticket, to get a newspaper 
and look for a job, no money left for that…(Ernestina, 34, I 7, Varela). 
 
 
7.2.2. “When formal work disappears”. The middle class unemployed 
Among middle class interviewees, the feeling of defenseless in face of the 
lack of state protection is highly generalized. While some of those losing their 
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stable and formal jobs until the mid 1990s were temporarily entitled to 
unemployment benefits, in a context of extended job insecurity and shrinking 
formal employment opportunities, the access to these kinds of benefits has 
become even more restricted.  
 
[…] The government says there comes the Plan Trabajar, plans such and 
such…but they believe the unemployed people are only from the lower 
classes…and I think this is done with the purpose of gaining votes, 
because I do not belong to the lower class and I am also out of work […] 
And so it is like…they have us right there, in the middle, and they 
abandon us to our fate […] That’s why I feel unprotected. (Omar, 36, I 29, 
Lanús)  
 
At the same time with the loss of formal jobs they lost most of the social 
benefits they were entitled to, such as health insurance and pension benefits, 
resulting in a longer-term drop in their living standards. 
 
Here, if you don’t have a job you don’t have a right to anything: no right 
to health care, no right to a pension, nothing. What I have got, I got it by 
myself, with my work… the state never gave me anything. (Nora, 52, I 28, 
Lanús) 
 
The difficulties in meeting the expenses of private health care, 
accompanied by the resistance to attending  the run down and overcrowded public 
health services, poses the middle classes with new dilemmas.132 
  
[…] We lack  everything, completely…we have the house, but we can’t 
eat the bricks, we can’t eat the range or the TV set…We don’t have any 
health insurance, we are not contributing for our retirement […] I had a 
health care insurance plan and I had to drop out of it because I was paying 
                                                 
132 For a recent analysis of the redefinition of the strategic practices of  impoverished middle 
classes in Argentina, see Kessler (2000). 
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a fee of 200 pesos a month […] and I said to my husband ‘Don’t worry, 
I’m going to the public hospital, but, of course, he becomes upset because 
I have to go to a  public hospital, to wait in line, to bear the poor service, 
to bear all those inconveniences…because the personnel working at public 
hospitals, poor people, they also earn low salaries and have their own 
problems…(Violeta, 41, I 15, Lanús) 
 
The access to pension benefits is probably one of the most dramatic losses, 
and under present circumstances, the most difficult to reverse. In fact, most of the 
interviewes stopped contributing to social security after losing their formal jobs as 
wage-earners, and those that embarked on some kind of small business, in 
general, could not afford the costs of contributing as independent workers. Social 
security requirements, based on the assumption of some kind of “life-time formal 
employment”, do not reflect the changes in the labor market.133  
       
[…] I don’t want to think about my future …because the years of 
contribution to the social security …I have lost them all […] because I 
couldn’t make any contributions during the last 10 years. And I have 
contributed, more or less, during 23 years …I’ll lose these 
contributions…They are completely useless to me…it is money that the 
government has kept…or whoever, and it’s completely useless to me [I 
have lost it]. (Armando, 56, electromechanics technician, sells take-away 
meals, I1, Lanús) 
The future? Awfully bad, dreadful…we are a group of people aged 40 to 
45, who have no job and no social benefits for tomorrow. You need to 
contribute to the social security system at least 15 or 20 years more, and 
you know you won’t be able to do that. You weren’t contributing to your 
pension as autonomous worker …You know you will get the minimum 
pension payment, which will never be a decent one, but you don’t have 
those 100 or 200 pesos…[that you need to contribute monthly for a private 
                                                 
133 Under the present pension legislation minimum age for retirement is 65 both for men and 
women provided they can prove at least 30 years of service and having made the due 
contributions to perceive full benefits. Unemployed workers cannot contribute to social security 
and workers over 55 cannot be registered as independent workers.   
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retirement fund]…( Marisa, 41, small commerce owner, unemployed, I 13, 
Lanús) 
[…] I have 19 years of certified contributions... I have 15 years more to go 
before I reach the age of 65  and I have to contribute to my retirement fund 
for 11 years more. I will start making new contributions when I have 11 
years more to go …if I can, I don’t know […] Now, if you don’t have a 
code number in the Anses or if you don’t have your c.u.i.t. number 
[tributary identification code]…If you don’t have your c.u.i.t. or your 
Anses number, you practically don’t exist… that is to say you are out of 
the system…(Gabriel, 50, merchant seaman, unemployed, informal jobs as 
an electrician, I 26, Lanús) 
 
7.3. THE FAMILY 
Income loss due to unemployment increases the vulnerability or finantial 
hardship at the household level, especially in a context of very weak -and far from 
universal- welfare institutions. The extension of unemployment through different 
social segments shows that the financial vulnerability experienced by unemployed 
people varies with respect to their individual and household characteristics, and 
with the availability and kind of resources they are able to mobilize. Rather than 
establishing generalizations about the different types of household strategies 
developed to cope with unemploymentm this section explores some of decision-
making “choices” that households face in a context of economic adversity and 
uncertainty. It also looks at the main coinstraints that adversity and uncertainty 
impose on the effectiveness of such choices. Situational imperatives, previous 
experiences, subjective definitions, and the social, psychological, and the 
available material resources shape the repertoires of responses that households are 
able to deploy.  
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When analyzing the responses to unemployment in households from 
different social backgrounds, we have to be aware of two phenomena that do not 
necessarily overlap: poverty and unemployment. While income loss resulting 
from unemployment clearly increases vulnerability to poverty, not all the 
unemployed are poor. The impact of the drop in household income due to job loss 
depends, among other factors, on the type of household, the family status of the 
unemployed, his/her previous earning power and employment stability, the 
presence of other income earners, as well as on the availability of other resources 
such as financial and physical capital. Many of the households of the 
interviewees, particularly those living in Varela, were in poverty even when the 
head was in work. In cases of a highly precarious insertion in the labor market, 
unemployment deepens the levels of financial hardship, further worsening 
material living conditions.134 Among middle class interviewees, however, while 
unemployment usually resulted in a sharp decline in their previous living 
standards, they did not necessarily fall into income poverty.  Thus, strategies to 
cope with unemployment do not necessarily coincide with strategies to cope with 
poverty, particularly when considering middle-class households.  
Among poor households, where survival basically depends on selling 
one’s own and/or one’s family labor cheaply and under whatever conditions are 
offered in the labor market, the financial difficulties due to unemployment and 
employment instability of the head are particularly harsh during the first stages of 
                                                 
134 The low level of household resources is likely to reflect the fact that the currently unemployed 
were previously in low-paid jobs and were not in a position to build up levels of savings, which 
could help cushion them against the sharp fall that accompanies unemployment (Gallie, Jacobs, 
and Paugam, 2000). 
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the household cycle, when the possibilities of increasing the number of working 
members are much more limited.  
 I would want to get..I don’t know... a changa ...to last, I don’t know…2 
months, 1 month, 15 days, and to get another job like that, I don’t know… 
I don’t want to stay idle…because I have no means of support…once my 
money is all gone I have nowhere to get some more to feed my 
children…(Pablo, 29,  3 children, I 16, Varela) 
 
In face of the meager job opportunities and widespread employment 
instability, having at least one household member with a relatively stable job, 
even when low-paid, represents a highly valued resource because it contributes to 
reduce the uncertainty about making ends meet.  
Now I have three daughters and one son, I have 4 children; I have my wife 
and 4 children…and the only one who is working now, this year she 
started working…is my eldest daughter, who is 18 years old…and so we 
get by, more or less, with her help, you see, she gives us a hand […] It is 
the way to manage really, not just getting by temporarily, because she has 
got a steady job. Yes, she started working in a garment factory…they 
make swim suits and she has a steady job there […] Now she is making 
200 pesos every two weeks […] …she spends 50 pesos in food and 
travelling [tickets] every two weeks…so she has 150 pesos left…she gives 
100 to her ma and keeps 50 for herself, to buy clothes or to go out […] 
She is not the kind of girl who will tell you ‘no, I’ll keep my part ’…[…] 
no, in that sense…she has been brought up right. (Agustín, 39, 4 children,  
I5, Lanús) 
My wife works for two firms that sell [leather clothing] and she assembles 
the leather garments…[…] Some time ago they used to give her, for 
example, 5 winter coats to fix, but now they call her for 2 […] The issue 
of our survival depends on our elder son, who helps us…He lives with us, 
he is single…He works in a metallurgical firm […] it’s been 3…4 
years…must have been, now […] he gives his wage to her ma, he helps 
her…He must be [earning] around 600 or 800 pesos, monthly[…] He 
helps us a lot. (Luis, 49, I 27, Lanús) 
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Dual earner households are better prepared to cope with income loss due 
to the unemployment of one of the partners. In fact, a stable labor insertion of 
professional and semi-professional women previous to their husband’s 
unemployment, as well as their work intensification appear as crucial elements in 
lowering the impact of financial hardship among middle-classes.  
 
My wife is a biochemist and she used to work on duty, at a private 
clinic…From then on she has been lucky, she achieved so many things in 
such a short period, may be because she was trying so hard […] A woman 
who was at the same private hospital got a job [for my wife] at Hospital 
Evita in Lanús. She is still working there but then she was offered to teach 
classes at the school of nursing, in the same place …and later she was 
offered to work as a lecturer at the University of Lanús, and she stayed 
working there, too. That is, she always got jobs...besides, she deserves that 
because she is an excellent professional […] Well... she is working at the 
university and at the hospital, I think she is [earning] about 1,600, 1,700 or 
1,500 pesos a month, it depends …her monthly pay is not always the 
same…(Gabriel, 50, I 26, Lanús) 
[My wife] kills herself, she is killing herself. Some days she leaves at 7 in 
the morning and returns at 7 in the evening. Because she is…as it is 
everywhere…she is a “taxi teacher”, she has 3 [teaching] hours here, 4 
hours there, 6 hours somewhere else, the same as every teacher, you 
see…she has 4 schools now  […] and she is getting a total amount of  
about 1,000 pesos, more or less, more or less […] But, as I was telling you 
1,000 pesos, with 2 kids and the taxes and…you can’t manage…you can 
just get by …tightening up. (Omar, 36, I 29, Lanús) 
 
Coping with unemployment sometimes involve the combination of 
multiple sources of income, both from the state and the market. The following 
case clearly illustrates that even when the degree of choice is certainly limited, 
household members face alternative courses of action over which they have to 
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take decisions, which as Selby et al (1990) point out, are “efficient enough” to 
survive. 
[…] When they fired me [at a cookies factory] I received the 
unemployment insurance during one year […] With the last payment I 
bought the cart and now I make a living out of the cart…I go around the 
streets… and everywhere, cirujeando [garbage picking] …Lomas de 
Zamora, Lanús, Avellaneda, Wilde …Cardboard is what you get the 
largest amount of…but now even to work with the cart is hard…there are 
many, we are too many!!! We are more and more all the time…poverty is 
showing up more than before […] My wife signed up for the Plan Barrios 
Bonaerenses  …She’s been there for 2 or 3 years already…It is the first 
time she has a job […] Yes, I signed up, too…but it would take the whole 
morning…so, it wasn’t enough 200 pesos a month, and so… as she saw 
that with the cart alone was not enough either, she signed up [for the Plan] 
and I go around with the cart […] Besides you can take the vegetables that 
are still good and you get by this way, practically living on garbage, right? 
(Ramón, 37, 5 children, I 11, Lanús) 
 
Sending more members to the labor market present serious obstacles in 
contexts of high unemployment. Certainly, the availability of household members 
in working age by no means guarantees they will get a job. Moreover, the 
unemployment or job instability of the head, both among poor and middle-class 
households, usually results not in an increase in the numbers of earners, but in the 
increase in the number of unemployed household members.  
[…] My youngest [daughter] is still attending High School  and the eldest 
already finshed High school. She is looking for a job but she doesn’t get 
one, that is, they make her fill in application forms and all that, but they 
have never called her up [so far] and…if she worked it would be different, 
you see?…[…] What I really want is that she can get a job, because she 
wants to get a job, she is already 20 years old and…if she were working 
my life would change, it would be a turning point in life… it would be 
different, to have another income, I would manage better at home. (Mary, 
41, I 8, Lanús) 
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[…] Yes, my wife thought of going out to look for a job 
immediately…but...there was no way…there was this other matter, that 
they offer misery wages …and to be all day long out there for such low 
wages, no…Yes, she tried, she went out to look for a job, she sent letters, 
she sent her vitae […] no, she couldn’t get anything […] My son is 
working in a saving-and-loans benefit society …he has been there for 2 
years now…he takes charge of some home expenses…He is earning a 
little more than 700 pesos a month …And she , poor girl, [20-year-old 
daughter] can’t get a job, either, because…they require young people with 
experience…(Marcelo, 52, Interview 16, Lanús) 
 
 
Similar results where found in complex households. The so-called 
“Mexican solution” (Selby et al., 1990, 1994) to cope with economic crisis, which 
involves a large household made up by multiple small families developing 
economies of scale in consumption and income pooling, does not seem to work in 
the Greater Buenos Aires. Interviews show that those households that increased 
its size did not necessarily increased the number of earners able to contribute to 
“collective” expenses. On the contrary, in some cases taking in kin appeared to 
enlarge not just the size of the household, but also income uncertainty due to the 
growth in the number of unemployed within the family. 
 
 […] We went to live at my ma’s, which is where we are living at the 
present, at my ma’s, at the back…So, there we live…my brother that lives 
in the front room, with his wife and 2 children…[then] my sister, her 3 
children, my eldest daughter and my father, live in the middle room, in the 
same room, because the house is small […] My mother died last year…my 
sister did not work at the time, only my sister-in-law did…my sister-in-
law used to work hourly in domestic service, and she has the 2 children 
with my brother and 5 children with her first husband…No, no, her 
children from her first marriage are with their father…because the father 
[of the 5 children] is out of work, and so what my sister-in-law earns…she 
has to divide it between the kids out there and the kids here and my 
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brother, who doesn’t have a job, because he suffers asthma…(María, 36, 
I1, Varela) 
[…] They live all at my house…Also my married daughter lives there. Her 
husband, who lost his job, now, too […] and…we are twelve, thirteen […] 
Income, I can’t tell you for sure, because there are days when there is no 
[income at all]…With 5 pesos we can get by: you buy a piece of beef, 
some bread for the kids, and with that you can cook something, already 
[…] you have to learn how to keep your money, to use it and not just 
waste it. (Ricardo, 43, I 5, Lanús)  
 
Reciprocity, in contexts of extended insecurity and hardship, is difficult to 
maintain, and networks of social exchange become increasingly eroded.135 
Exchange of material aid among kins and friends, when all are in the same 
situation, does not seem to operate as a buffer when the household’s own 
resources are inadequate for survival.  
No… neither family nor friends, we try and manage on our own, you see, 
and this way we get by, that is, with the changuitas he gets…and so we 
gather the money to pay the electricity bill, to avoid a cut-off […] because 
we are all in the same situation, my father is out of work, my father-in-
law, my brothers-in-law…all of them are out of work, so…I have nobody 
to whom I could ask some money. (Ana, 28,  I 6, Varela) 
You can’t count on your family…to ask for help, because nobody can 
help…there is no one who is doing well and so can say ‘All right, here, 
take this 200 pesos, I can lend them to you and then you’ll give them back 
to me next week or next month’… everybody has got only enough to eat 
and no more. (Agustín, 39, I 6, Lanús) 
 
Among some middle class interviewees the variety and quality of 
resources available, helped them to cushion –at least initially- financial hardship 
resulting from unemployment. However, due the depletion of resources 
                                                 
135 See Kessler (1998) and Gonzalez de la Rocha ( 2000) 
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accumulated when enjoying significant levels of social mobility, their responses 
soon became shorter- term, developed as a buffer against the continued decline in 
their living standards. 
 
  
At that time the amount was 45,000 pesos [severance payment]…which 
we made last as a reserve, until now, until the last month […] We made 
some investments like fixed term deposits, and government exchange 
bonds, and we managed to make it last almost 8 years. [We used to spend 
the money] to cover very special expenses, or things like that, otherwise 
we tried not to touch the fund, and not even think it existed…Afterwards, 
when there was no money left [at home] we had to use the money to cover 
other needs. (Gabriel, 50, I 26, Lanús) 
[The house is on sale] because it’s huge, besides this [what you see] it 
continues at the back, I have a backyard, I have a thatched arbor, 
everything…I am sorry for them [the children]…they learned how to ride 
a bycycle here, how to roller-skate, at the back, on the yard,…the dogs I 
have…they have never gone out to the street, they live at the back […] 
Now the value of property has been adjusted and real estate taxes 
increased an awful lot…one payment of the estate tax [they are 3 or 4 in 
one year] amounts as much as 170 pesos…[We have thought] of selling 
this one and buying a smaller house […] no, no, you can’t afford 




Restrictive practices (Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1999) develop, aimed not to 
increase household resources, but to reduce expenses through changes in 
consumption patterns. These practices represent not just a way to cope with 
unemployment, but an extended and well-known strategy among the 
impoverished middle classes since the 1980s to cope with their increasingly 
sharper downward slide.136 
                                                 
136 See Minujin and Kessler, 1995. 
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Look, I don’t like that much going to the movies , but I love going to the 
theatre…and we used to go to the theatre. We used to fight with my 
husband, because going to the theatre meant [for me] also going out for 
dinner, going to dance, everything the same night […] or to go shopping 
and buying gifts […] [ Now, I’ll tell you] only one thing…last Sunday we 
were going to buy [fresh] ravioli …we are seven in our family, at 2 pesos 
each box of ravioli it makes 14 pesos…with 14 pesos, how many [dry] 
pasta boxes can I buy? And how long will they last? At least it would be 
enough for 4 meals…and the ravioli are enough for only one meal…so we 
chose the [dry] spaghetti option. It wasn’t like that years before…when we 
wanted sandwiches we use to go and buy them, now we just look at 
them.... (Marisa, 41, I 13, Lanús) 
When we had a long week-end we used to go on vacations …we 
enjoyed.We used to belong to the well-to-do middle-class, more like an 
upper middle-class than a lower middle-class […] No, I don’t go to the 
supermarket any more…We used to go to the supermarket and we used to 
buy what we needed and what we didn’t actually need […] Now I only 
buy what is strictly necessary…we’ve changed our eating habits, we’ve 
changed everything…Well, sometimes I buy a pizza or some take-away 
food, of course, because I have no time…We are at the store all the time, 
but we have some places nearby, where the food [you buy] is cheaper than 
cooked at home. And then, right opposite the store I have a wholesale 
supermarket, so I can buy goods there [at good prices]….the food we eat 
now is the simplest kind. (Raquel, 49, I 3, Lanús)  
 
 
7.4. SUMMARY  
This chapter has provided evidence of the heterogeneity of responses 
developed by individuals and households coming from different social 
backgrounds, going through different family stages and living in different local 
contexts. The acknowledgement of this heterogeneity, however, by no means 
invalidates the possibility of identifying certain general trends. In fact, the various 
responses to unemployment show that lack of social protection from the state and 
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the meager employment opportunities provided by the market are exerting an 
overwhelming pressure at the household level. This pressure not only results in a 
progressive depletion of resourses, but also introduces new sources of conflict as 
previous conceptions of work, gender and family roles are challenged by the new 
and harsh realities of the market. From a wider perspective not only are previous 
social mobility strategies abandoned but shorter-term responses to cope with a 
sharply adverse context seem to be increasingly unable to buffer the decline or to 
ensure basic levels of survival.  
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Chapter 8:  Work and Unemployment: Meanings, Perceptions 
and Impacts 
The concept of unemployment is inseparable from that of work. People 
will tend to define their employment situation according to the kind of activity 
that they regard as having a true value. Therefore, the perception of employment 
is not only affected by the individual’s previous labor experience but also by a 
work culture and labor traditions that permeate the way in which work is defined. 
Argentina -and especially Buenos Aires- in contrast with other Latin 
American countries, was characterized by a strong tradition of formal work to 
which labor rights were tied. The later, in a context of a profound worsening of 
the labor market, appears nowadays as part of a collective memory that goes 
beyond the individual labor experience. In fact, interviews show that labor rights 
are attached to the meaning of work even among those workers who never fully 
enjoyed access to them.      
This, however, does not imply a socially homogeneous definition of work 
and unemployment. The unemployed are not a homogeneous group enmeshed in 
the same set of restricting conditions. As previous chapters have shown, they 
differ by social background, labor trajectories, educational and skill levels, 
gender, family status, life cycle, etc. They find themselves living in local areas 
with different social and economic structures of opportunity and coinstraints. 
This chapter attempts to provide a wider picture of the complexity of the 
unemployment experience focusing on perceptions, meanings, and impacts of 
work loss both at the individual and the household level. Firstly, it explores the 
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meaning of work and how it affects perceptions of unemployment. Secondly, it 
analyzes the impact of unemployment on the private sphere, emphasizing its 
psychological effects as well its consequences for family relations and the 
domestic division of labor. Finally, this chapter assesses the perspectives on the 
future, pointing out how the deterioration in employment, a context of economic 
recession, and the profound erosion of previous mechanisms of social mobility 
result in feelings of permanent uncertainity and lack of alternatives. This blocks 
the possibility of thinking about the future beyond the immediate coinstraints.  
 
 
8.1. MEANINGS AND PERCEPTIONS: WORK AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
Perceptions of work seem to be affected by several factors: conceptions of 
gender roles, family stage, previous labor experience, and a labor tradition 
centered on formal work. Definining unemployment from within reveals the 
complexity of the phenomenon, which goes beyond narrow “institutional” 
definitions. Actually, some authors assert that unemployment is like an elephant: 
easier to recognize than to define.137 Another key issue to consider in the way in 
which unemployment is experienced is the social representations of its causes.138 
Thus, the ways in which work and unemployment are perceived and the meanings 
attached to them will affect the experience of being out of work. 
                                                 
137 Cited in Burnett (1994). 
138 Basically these representations can be grouped in two kinds of explanations: structural and 
behaviorist or individualistic (Howe, 1990). The first one conceives unemployment as a result of 
social, economic, and political forces that escape from  individual control. The second kind of 
explanation places most of the responsibility on the individual due to his personal characteristics 
and behavior –such as work attitudes and general instability, and is predicated on the distinction 
between the deserving and the undeserving. Murray’s (1990) essay on the underclass is probably 
one of the clearest expressions of the latter perspective.  
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 8.1.1. The Meaning of Work: Gender, Class, and Labor Tradition  
The way in which work is perceived is affected, among other factors, by 
how gender roles are conceived. The traditional male breadwinner conception is 
certainly stronger among working-class interviewees. On the one hand, a wife’s 
paid labor that results from the husband’s employment instability is felt by some 
males as a failure to meet their family responsibilities.                         
 
I felt in debt with her…that she had to work ‘cause I didn’t get a job…I 
felt really bad, ‘cause I wanted to be the one bringing in a meal, to say it 
someway, and when my kids need a pair of sneakers I want to be the one 
buying them…I don’t know…I felt really bad, I wasn’t used to 
that…(Santiago, 29, I 25 Lanús) 
 
On the other hand, family responsibilities alter priorities and choices for 
workers, especially when they have young children. Work, mainly among the 
poor and less skilled, does not represent a matter of choice or self-fulfillment, but 
the only way of providing income to the household. Work and jobs among these 
workers are just means to an end, which is defending themselves and their 
families (Selby et al., 1990).  
[…] I’ve no problem,  I do anything, as many hours as I am asked to, but 
what I want is to be rewarded for my efforts […] If  I am told to go and 
pick up some shit with a spade I’ll do it […] but, I don’t know (I want 
someone) to reward me for my efforts, to admit that not everybody, not 
anybody will do that […] I’ve no problem, but reward 
me…otherwise…don’t crap on me. (Esteban, 27, 2 children, I12, Varela) 
[…] Everybody asks me: what is your craft? And  I always tell them the 
same, I am ready to work cleaning up… in all that…, whatever means 
work. (Pablo, 29, 3 children, I16, Varela) 
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In contrast, for middle class males work -besides income- appears as a 
source of identity and self-fulfillment. They tend to mark a clear division between 
what they consider suitable and unsuitable jobs; suitability usually responds to 
their professional qualifications and experience accumulated during their labor 
trajectories. Esto no es lo mio (this is not my thing) is a common phrase for 
referring to the jobs obtained after unemployment.                           
 Because to me it was always a matter of pride when someone asked me 
‘How long?’ And …it’s been twenty…when I reached twenty-eight:  
‘Twenty-eight years at the same company!’ and they said that with an 
exclamation […] Sometimes, chatting with one of my passengers [in the 
taxi], when I get a long trip like that, so that we have time to chat….So I 
say ‘Truly, I don’t like this, but I’ve got to do it because I make a living 
from this’…and mind you, I don’t treat people badly, you see? But I…if 
they ask me whether I like it…I don’t like it, it is not my…[…]A good job 
is the one I used to have before […] it used to give me security, comfort, 
wellbeing…and a smile […] I am an expert in grains, that is, I have a 
profession but, I can’t work in it, so…that is a good job, to work in my 
profession…and I always did it…(Marcelo, 52, I16, Lanús) 
I am looking for a job according to my skills, because I’ve acquired office 
skills, otherwise…as I tell you, I would accept whatever… 
within…certain, I’m not saying certain  status, but … let’say, a certain 
level […] a certain level , that is to say, may be…I wouldn’t work as a 
garbage collector, for example, or as a road sweeper, either, at least so 
far…(Luis, 49, I 27, Lanús) 
 
Trust, reputation, and friendly treatment together with autonomy appear as 
the main sources of work satisfaction among self-employed males.  
 
[…] Because, say… I come and do some job for you, and then comes a 
friend of yours and (he asks)…’Who did it?’, and… someone recommends 
you to someone else and […]Besides …trust and respect, one also…places 
like that where I am working right now…places where I am 
working…and…we have the house’s key…we go in, we’ve got the 
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key…we have their complete trust that nothing will be missing …and 
today, that way of trusting and giving the key to anybody is not 
usual…So, we already have a number of clients, because there are no 
problems […] It is like a friendship we have with that people, isn’t it? 
(Ricardo, 43, I 5, Lanús) 
 […] The fact is I got used to…we are used to working as self-employed, 
without giving any explanations to anyone, without schedules... that is, we 
go to work early but may be we come back at midday, or may be we come 
back at…and we don’t have to report ourselves to anybody […] Up to the 
present day I was used to that…and no, now it’s hard for me to go to work 
to a place like that, under a boss. (Esteban, 27, I 12, Varela) 
 
In the case of women, the range and complexity of their roles is clearly 
reflected in their conceptions of work. For women living in poor households, 
work tends to be the result of economic pressure, oriented to supplement domestic 
spending, basically to satisfy their children needs and reduce the demands on the 
man’s wage. Even when the earnings they obtain from paid work is the only 
source of income of the household, they tend to perceive themselves as secondary 
workers.  
 
[…] I am looking forward to working, at least to help my husband 
to…Besides, sometimes, it has happened to us…[the children] need 
sneakers or even food sometimes, and so it is like I am driven to despair 
[…] As long as I have a job, so that I can give my children a treat, to dress 
them, to see that they don’t lack of anything…I don’t mind where it be. 
(Ana, 28, 6 children, I 6, Varela) 
Oh! [if I could choose] I would stay at home, but…if I have to go to work, 




Among middle-class households, mostly characterized by dual earner 
couples, women’s paid work appear not just as a way to satisfy the immediate 
needs, but also to secure the long-term well-being of the household. 
[…] I was earning good money, I could give myself the treat of buying a 
book – at that time- at 100 pesos, and not only the book, I am talking 
about those parameters…I used to go out, to dress, to buy stuff for the 
children, my capacity was that… I could go out with my friends… I used 
to go downtown, we used to go out for dinner, or to have a drink… I could 
dress, buy something for the kids and buy expensive books for a treat. ( 
Graciela, 39, I 14, Lanús) 
I bought myself a little Fiat 600, I had my own house, my children…I 
didn’t need to go out to work, you understand? And I used to say all right, 
by selling clothes I’ve changed the car…to me, a car…to have a little Fiat 
600 at the time was like having a Mercedes now… Then I bought myself a 
coupe Fiat 125, which was bigger… with that coupe then I bought a plot 
of land  that was 56 x 9 meters, just 5 blocks from my house, and that was 
all purchased by selling clothes. (Marisa, 41, I 13, Lanús) 
 
Contributing to household income, while crucial for women’s employment 
decisions is by no means the only reason for working. Certainly, women have 
their own needs. Many of them perceive full-time childcare and housekeeping as 
monotonous, isolating, and frustrating, and see paid work out of the home as 
providing a necessary break and the opportunity of social contact. At the same 
time, work represents a source of independence and autonomy, basically among 
lone mothers and married women in who have spent most of their working lives 
in the labor market.  
Those three years that I stayed home without working I felt badly, but… 
from all aspects: financially, due to the financial loss, due to the loss of 
belonging to society... because a woman remains secluded at home for the 
fact of having children… as I have to be with mine, who I adore … 
(Graciela , 39, I 14, Lanús) 
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Sure, there’s a need for…[…] Not only the need for money, but the need 
of being out , you know?…to feel well, to feel useful, or to say all right… 
here it is…or I bought this, you know? […] besides you feel fine when 
you work, because being at home all day long, also, it is like…you get fed 
up... You get sick and tired of it…I have three children, and I have worked 
out of home since I was a very young... I have always liked working, and 
now, to be secluded inside here… you know?…You feel impotent... 
(Carmen, 26, I 13, Varela) 
I like going out to work…because I don’t like to be all the time secluded 
at home, no […] I know many people and I like, I like…to manage by 
myself, not to have to ask anybody…I like to get along…by myself. 
(Alejandra, 34, separated, I 19, Lanús) 
[…] To me, separating was like a liberation, first because I could go out to 
work and second because… when I said no, it was no…and when I said 
yes, it was yes, and there were no undefined situations or insecurities […] 
Working gives you freedom, independence…it gives you…you become 
totally independent, you don’t have to report yourself to anyone or to bear 
anything you don’t like. (Celina, 41, I 23, Lanús) 
 
Work is associated to the idea of stability and of minimum level of rights 
that have to be respected. There are certain formal obligations that every job has 
to or at least should follow. This does not affect just the perception of what a good 
job is –or should be- but also the definition of what can be considered as work.    
 
[…]The fact is I don’t know if it can be considered…I don’t consider it a 
job, right?…I had once acquired hair-dressing skills…and so, sometimes 
there would come some neighbors... […] I do not consider that work, since 
I never paid the  required contributions …I considered it a changa [odd 
job] what is commonly called changa, precarious work. (Graciela, 39,       
I 14, Lanús) 
No, I didn’t work…No, I just did nonsense…Like selling cosmetics…that 
stuff…I used to sell cosmetics, and Tupperware, nonsense, so that…you 
see? […] Yes, it was work, but I mean…to me, to have a job… is having a  
monthly wage that you earn, and…all right, what you can do besides that 
you do it as extra…(Lucía, 56, I 7, Lanús) 
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[…] I want to have my own obra social [health insurance plan], I don’t 
want them to seat me on a chair  in the future... and I don’t want them to 
become bothersome with me when I am an old woman. I want to be on a 
par with the rest of society…(Marcela, 46, I 29, Varela) 
 
The threshold of rights, below which a worker’s dignity begins to erode, 
becomes highly flexible in the context of shrinking employment opportunities. In 
fact, the interviews show that the conception of rights attached to work and the 
image of the once privileged position of Argentinean workers in the Latin 
American context, conflicts with the reality of a labor market that has sharply 
deteriorated and the urgency of obtaining some earnings.   
 
For the employers…it is more convenient to have one of those people 
…than having you, because they know that you will cause them 
trouble…because at work I’ll cause them trouble, because I have my rights 
and a foreigner does not claim for rights, he will work anyway, he lowers 
his head and works…(Ricardo, I 5, Lanús) 
[…] The Argentinian is used to to making his work worthy…an 
Argentinean  won’t work…he won’t make three 3-metre deep wells for 10 
pesos a day as they  do… and they’ll do it […] And you know how they 
get along?… Chewing coca leaves…(Lidia, 29, I 20, Lanús)  
Really, I don’t know how they manage… because the Bolivians, for 
example, how can I say it?…sometimes they work for 15 pesos a 
day…It’s all right, we also do that now, I now understand it, because if I 
have to work for 10 pesos a day now, I’ll go, I have no problems to do that 
[now]…It wasn’t like that before…years ago, if I didn’t get at least 40 
pesos a day I wouldn’t work, because I have to earn 40 pesos a day, 
because I am a skilled construction worker. (Agustín, 39, I 6, Lanús) 
 
The disciplinary effect of unemployment on the labor force result in 
feelings of defenselessness against employer demands and lead to adaptive 
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behaviors in face of unfair labor conditions. In this context, the respect for labor 
rights appears as part of a collective memory of a “golden past” now lost, 
especially among older generations.   
 
We used to go to the trade union, say…if you worked in a factory, or 
wherever you worked there was always a delegate [a representative] who 
spoke on behalf of the  workers… but at the present there is no use in 
doing that…even if there is a delegate in the factory or in a commerce, or 
wherever…they  will not respect you, there’s no use, it won’t do any 
good… (Anselmo, 43, I 9, Lanús) 
And…who are you going to complain to? There is nobody to complain 
to…they are the bosses, if you complain…if you make…if you want to 
make trouble, they fire you at once (Mario, 50, I 11, Varela) 
At the beginning I felt badly, afterwards I had to take it as an everyday 
fact […] If they tell you ‘Come at 4 o’clock in the morning’, you’ll go at 4 
o’clock in the morning…if you have to stay until 10 in the evening you’ll 
stay until 10 in the evening, and you’ll try to do it the best you can. (Luis, 
49, I 27, Lanús) 
 
Labor stability and the possibility of obtaining regular earnings appear as a 
top priority for the vast majority of the interviewees. The increasing difficulty of 
getting changas among the self-employed and the mounting job insecurity in 
wage employment explain the importance attributed to stability -usually 
associated with social benefits.  
[…] I knew I got up every day, I went to work…it was a job that I thought 
would be life-long lasting, that I’d retire there…that my children would 
never lack of anything, that they would have, may be , what I had never 
had myself, that I could give them more than I was given by my parents. 
[…] But now, when you have a job they ask you to work  may be  12 
hours, or 14 hours…and you earn misery wages and they pick on you all 
the time ‘keep up, and keep up, and keep up’, or they take you on for a 3-
month trial period and then bang!, they fire you because  they don’t have 
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to contribute to your pension, which is the most important matter of all. 
(Ricardo, 43, I 5, Lanús) 
 
Uncertainty and the sensation of a permanent vulnerability to joblessness 
is probably one of the most significant and generalized perceptions that people 
have under the present economic conditions. 
When I got married, in 1968, it used to be like…once you were engaged 
and you got a job, mainly the man got a job, you could get married, 
because that job was life-long lasting…To start working in a company 
was…‘OK, from now on I’ll have all my problems solved, I am going to 
retire after 30 or 40 years working for this company’…Because many 
people used to get married once they had a job […] In those days you’d 
never have to worry about a job, you didn’t need to worry…And 
nowadays you can’t plan ahead… not only for the future of tomorrow, but 
for the future of tomorrow Friday [You can’t plan ahead even for the 
following day]…Because you don’t know whether you’ll still have a job, 
whether inflation is coming next …or devaluation…(Nora, 52, I 28, Lanús) 
 
8.1.2. Defining unemployment from within 
People’s definition of unemployment is much more complex and broader 
than the one conventionally used in official statistics. The unemployed are not just 
people without work and actively seeking a job. Other employment problems, 
such as discouragement, underemployment, short-term temporary jobs, changas, 
and in general terms, most labor situations generating labor and income 
precariousness are perceived as unemployment.    
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Certainly, underemployment includes more than “involuntary part-time” 
work. Firstly, not everybody is unemployed on a full-time basis. Secondly, having 
a precarious job is not necessarily perceived as synonymous of being employed.   
                                                                  
I consider myself a ‘happy-medium’ man, half unemployed and half 
employed, because…I work on Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays and 
sometimes mondays or Tuesdays, that is 4 days, only, and then what do I 
do?…And the rest of the time…I am looking around to see if I can get a 
job to work everyday. (Santiago, 29, I 25, Lanús) 
[…]May be 3 or 4 months, a couple of changuitas [odd jobs], like now, 
some time ago, I have been making sweaters for the security guards…but 
the season is over, and now I have no job […] I don’t have a job now, you 
see? I am unemployed […] Sure, I do changas, that’s the word, I do 
changas, I don’t know how you call this: ‘underemployment’?…I am 
underemployed, because I don’t make any pension contributions, because 
I don’t have obra social …[and on these changas]…I survive. (Damián, 
54, I 15, Varela) 
 
Unemployment, as the analysis of labor trajectories has shown, does not 
inevitably represent a break point in the working lives of those experiencing it.  
Those with more unstable carrers, who have experienced repeated unemployment 
spells during their working lives, appear to be “better prepared” to deal with it.  
Most of them conceive unemployment as a “fall” that requires an immediate 
“recovery”.  
 
Yes, I am used to it [to not having a job], yes…I don’t know why, but 
no…I don’t fear that. What I fear is seeing my children ill, that is what I 
fear, otherwise no…I don’t know, I guess I have always been this way, if I 
am down [if I have fallen down] I have to stand up on my feet and get 
going if I can, keep going… getting through it the way I can…(Antonio, I 
3, Varela) 
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 […] It is not that I feel immediately defeated because they fired me, and 
so I’m going to…I don’t know, commit suicide…There are many of those[ 
persons], but no [I am not like that]… I think, I adapt myself soon, I try to 
look for…to get through it, you understand?, not just staying 
there…without reacting. (Ramón, 37, I 11, Lanús, 37) 
 
For others, however, losing a job after decades of continuous work 
represent not only a shock, but also the beginning of a process of cumulative 
losses in multiple aspects of their personal and social life.  
[…] Right on the following Saturday there was this party…I wanted at 
least this last party…because there I began…‘this is going to be the last, 
this is going to be the last’… Because now you’ve got to control [your 
expenses] in a different way […] and so, as we had this party the 
following saturday, I say all right, even if it is the last party  I want my 
wife to enjoy it, without worrying…and, I told her  on Sunday, it was no 
difference to say it on Friday or to say it on Sunday…the difference was 
that at least she could enjoy herself better on that Saturday…for if I had 
told her on Friday: ‘Look, I lost my job’, how would she have gone to the 
party? (Marcelo, I 16, Lanús) 
 
Work, and specifically formal work, used to be the main mechanism of 
social integration. In fact, for those that enjoyed the “privilege” of formal and 
stable employment, unemployment is perceived as exclusion and degradation, 
sometimes accompanied by feelings of worthlessness and inferiority. Being out of 
work appears then as a synonymous of social destitution, of being out of the 
system. This is basically the case of those losing their stable jobs in their middle 
ages, for whom re-employment becomes extremely difficult. 
 
You feel like crap, the worst shit on earth [being unemployed]… it throws 
you out of your condition of human being, it makes you feel the dregs of 
society […] To know that you share the same fate with many people 
doesn’t make you feel better, you still feel like a jerk [Mal de muchos 
 252
consuelo de boludos]… I may feel sympathetic to you if your foot hurts, 
or if you have a toothache, but it is only you who knows how bad the pain 
is […] Nobody becomes conscious of the degradation it means for  human 
beings, because beyond everything, [beyond] the psychological and 
physical harm it causes, there is the total unwillingness it produces…they 
take the air, they take your breath out from you, they take your dignity, 
they steal your dignity, little by little…(Celina, 41, I 23, Lanús) 
[…] We can’t blame globalization if a number of us, middle-agers 
[jovatos], lose our jobs, or are left outside the system. (Gabriel, 50, I 26, 
Lanús) 
[..] To me…that they have taken my dignity out of me, because to me, in 
this country they take your dignity out of you when they fire you at 
work…you become nothing, nothing, nothing […] you feel that you don’t 
belong to society any more, that you are nothing, that you are no good for 




  8.1.3. Causes of Unemployment: Social Representations  
Certainly, a decisive factor affecting the way that unemployment is 
viewed refers to how generalized is labor insecurity. In contexts where the 
vulnerability to unemployment is extended to vast segments of the population, a 
discourse of blaming the victim looses legitimacy. Moreover, when welfare 
provisions for the unemployed are almost inexistent, the “state dependents” 
argument explaing why people do not work does not have credence. As expected, 
interviews show a clear predominance of structural over individual explanations. 
Structural causes include a vast range of economic, political, and social 
processes and factors, which, in general have deepened during the last decade. 
First of all, unemployment is perceived as a collective problem. Most of the 
interviewees, regardless of social class and neighborhood, talk about friends, 
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neighbors, acquaintances, and other family members who have lost their jobs. No 
hay trabajo (There are no jobs); the unemployed can be found everywhere.        
 
It doesn’t happen to everybody, but it happens to most of the people, I 
guess…because I have my brother-in-law who…also…worked 16 years in 
the railway company and he got fired at once, suddenly, you 
understand?…OK, he got his severance pay, but how long can they live on 
that money they gave him? […] My sister’s husband, the same…he was 
working in Costidial, in YPF [formerly state-owned oil company] and also 
lost his job […] Then, my neighbor, the man next to my house…18 years 
working in a bank, cleaning up at a bank, in maintenance, suddenly he got 
the letter of dismissal…18 years we are talking about! (Lidia, 29, I 20, 
Lanús) 
No, now is worse, much worse, much worse, so much [worse] that, for 
example, in yesterday’s Clarín [Buenos Aires’newspaper]…I was 
watching…‘on sale’ ads: TV sets, computers, walkmans, CDs…and, for 
example, they sell a TV set plus a video player at 300 pesos…and they 
write down ‘To sell out of stock’…but, who has those 300 pesos to go 
there and buy…? […] Years ago at least, I remember,  in times of 
Alfonsín,  for example, the prices of everything were increasing 
constantly, but you had money to buy things, people had money to buy 
things…if they couldn’t afford 1 kg.[of any kind of food supplies], then 
they would buy ½ kg., or ¾ kg….but they had money, because they had a 
job. (Marcelo, 52, I 16, Lanús) 
[…] All  have decreased, that is to say…the locksmith used to sell, used to 
make 50 keys a day, and now he makes ten or eight, or whatever he 
makes, but it’s that kind of  relation…not only in that activity, but also in 
electricity, in construction, everywhere the sales dropped … there are less 
jobs, it’s amazing. (Gabriel, Interview 26, Lanús) 
 
Technological change is perceived as a major cause of unemployment 
among low-skilled manual workers who lost their formal factory jobs. As 
Seabrook (1982) points out, the idea of redundancy has a resonance now that goes 
far beyond the laying-off of workpeople in a given industry.  
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They went into bankruptcy, the factory closed down…We were less 
workers then, we were less already…from 1,700 we used to be, there must 
have remained 450 of us left…because they fired many people, because 
they brought furnaces from Italy, automatic furnaces, and everything...The 
furnaces we had when I started used to be operated by 6 workers in each 
shift and the new furnaces they brought were operated by two men 
[instead], one at the entrance and one at the exit, and no more…they were  
computer-operated, completely. (Orlando, 44, I 4, Lanús) 
And I was lucky [at the brewery] I was doing the loading and 
unloading…they don’t do that any more now, because they have brought 
in all robot machines, and so they do all the loading…robotized…[This 
way] they save labor force…not in those days, when the brewery was still 
at a period of transforming and development and they had…the loading 
was made manually and so, they used to hire a lot of people. (Damián, 54, 
I 15, Varela) 
 
Among low-skilled informal workers, mainly those working in 
construction and domestic service, immigration from neighboring countries 
appears as an extended explanation of unemployment and a factor in depressing 
wages. 
 
Because you go there, say, you take a job and…you tell [the client] how 
much you are going to charge him… the Bolivians, all of them…they 
lower the price to a half of the amount […] Now, yes, it is becoming 
harder to get changas because there’s too much competition…(Evaristo, 
30, I 10, Lanús) 
The fact is that there used to be more opportunities, I don’t know, 
nowadays even at Aguas Argentinas [privatized water supply company], 
now …you go there, looking for a job, and they will offer you pennies, 
because there are many foreigners all around…What  we consider to be 
misery wages, just a couple of coins, is a fortune to them…Bolivians, 
Paraguayans, Peruvians […] they fill the work vacancies…and 
so…Argentina is running out of work jobs […] (Santiago, I 25, Lanús) 
Domestic service jobs, there are no more… because there are many 
foreigners working by the hour and sometimes you…In Varela and also at 
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the Capital [city] a Paraguayan or a Bolivian citizen, who works as a live-
in maid, as she hasn’t got a house, or anything, she can work for 200 pesos 
a month […] An amount like that is worth while for them, but to us, who 
live here, it is not. (Ernestina, 34, I 7, Varela) 
 
Rampant inflation, the indiscriminate entry of imports, the role of 
transnational companies and big supermarket chains, and tax policies are some of 
the factors that contribute to explain the exhaustion of domestic industries and of 
small and medium commerce, perceived as one of the main causes of 
unemployment. 
 
No, no, no… I think everybody is…unfortunately here, in this country 
everything is going wrong, I think there are many people like me…The 
truth is…I don’t know how to explain this… but I guess this [situation] is 
due to the fact that many companies from abroad come to work here and 
nobody considers worthy what we have in Argentina …the industries and 
all that, the companies that used to work here, they  all closed 
down…medium-size business […] mostly the firms that are still working 
are the hypermarkets and hypermarkets are run by people from abroad, 
most of them. (Anselmo, 43, I 9, Lanús) 
[…] Many closed down, gradually…first at hyperinflation times, when the 
costs problem arouse […] Then, what did all that uncertainty cause? Many 
said: ‘The hell with it! I am selling everything, I’ll deposit my money in 
Zurich, at the Hoffman Bank there and…I’ll never invest here!’ And so 
they began to close down, and close down and close down…I don’t know 
if investing abroad, living off interests …And then all this matter of the 
firms, the multinational firms, that come here, they make fortunes…and 
they hire you, they pay you couple of bucks…and when their companies 
cease to be profitable they simply leave…There are no jobs, there are 
no…(Nora, 52, I 28, Lanús) 
 
[…] First of all there is no work, no market. I used to work years ago… in 
the times when I used to work people could build their own houses 
working on their sewing-machines…then all the imports entered...the 
policies...all the imports entered... they started bringing clothes from 
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Korea, Brazil, wherever from, and our industry fell damned down. 
(Felicia, 36, I 28, Varela)  
 
 
  Corruption and the discrediting of politics and of “the politicians” in 
general are other pieces of the puzzle of the attitudes that unemployment 
generates. 
 
What can I say? The crap  politics we are bearing…because it is not a 
matter of…the years before with the peronistas  and now with the 
radicales …it is always more of the same shit, in so far as corruption goes 
on, in so far as stealing goes on, since the peronistas and the radicales and 
whoever comes next will go on stealing…(Celina, 41, I 23, Lanús) 
I blame the political leaders [for this situation]…who didn’t have have the 
guts to say : ‘No, stop, wait a minute, things have to change at once here… 
here, things have to be this way and that way…’, no matter what we are 
demanded to do, from up there…from the Monetary Fund …There are 
things…if this country hasn’t got a national project, there’s no 
globalization that matters, I don’t give a damn about globalization!!!… 
There are things, specific things  that are to be made by the state itself. 
(Violeta, 41, I 15, Lanús) 
 
Some interviewees, however, while recognizing unemployment as a 
collective problem, consider their current joblessness as the result of their “lack of 
commitment” to stable employment and to the work ethic. 
  
 […]It has happened to me whenever I lost my job…you feel awful, 
like…you are no good, like…‘what an ignorant guy!’, I don’t know… you 
insult yourself, you tell yourself ‘what a stupid!’…‘why didn’t I stay at 
that job?’ or ‘why didn’t I keep on…why didn’t I insist on… more…?’ 
The guilt is there...or ‘what did I do wrong?, I must have done something 
wrong since they have fired me, since they have thrown me out’. (Joaquín, 
28,  I 8, Varela)  
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It happens to me, more than it happens to others, I guess. Because no... I 
never had constancy in a job […] Yes, yes, unemployment there is a lot, 
yes.That, too…but I guess it is worse with me because of my instability… 
I am not the kind of materialistic guy that has thought of making money 
…no, no. (Oscar, 33, I 23, Varela) 
 
8.2. IMPACTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT ON INDIVIDUAL AND HOUSEHOLD 
Unemployment has profound implications both for the individual and for 
the quality of household relations. The understanding of the way in which 
unemployment affects an individual is closely related to the way in which 
unemployment is perceived by the individual.  The household level needs to be 
looked at separately since the effects of unemployment seem to be affected by a 
complex mix of factors such as the family status of the unemployed, duration of 
unemployment, stage of household cycle, conceptions on gender roles, and 
employment status of other family members among others. Certainly, an unstable 
equilibrium characterizes most “strategies” developed at the household level to 
cope with unemployment. Their impact on household relations show that 
responses to economic adversity do not necessarily involve consensus and 
cooperation, and in many cases may end in family break-up. We begin by looking 
at individual perceptions of the impact of unemployment. 
 
8.2.1. Psychological and Personal Impacts 
The effects of unemployment are neither homogeneous, nor can they be 
equated with the direct economic consequences of the loss of income. While the 
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later represents a major source of distress, the implications of unemployment for 
personal stability are much wider ranging. 
When unemployment affects the main provider, especially in working 
class sectors, where a male breadwinner culture remains strong, job loss can result 
in the erosion of masculine identity. Unemployment appears to be particularly 
disruptive during the first stages of the family cycle.  
 
When you have a family, it is worse, you feel worse. For example, 
something that was most touching, and that I won’t forget as long as I live, 
is that my daughter’s first baby food… it wasn’t me who paid for it, but 
my parents; that is…I am eternally thankful for that matter, and I am in 
debt, personally, right? […] That is…the problem is that you feel 
unuseful, no good for anything. And so, strange ideas come to your mind, 
like…for someone so structured with this matter of work, so financially 
independent as I had been…ideas like blowing out my brains came to my 
mind, that you are no good for anything any more… You can’t support 
your daughter, your wife, you should kill yourself, more or less […] Look, 
I always say that I am not machista, but there appears your machismo, 
isn’t it? It is me who has to support my family...(Ernesto, 25, I.30, Lanús)  
 
Among middle class males, the challenge to individual identity as a result 
of unemployment seems to be related to a strong personal identification with 
professional employment.  
 
It is a strange situation, somehow…a merchant seaman without merchant 
navy…he has got nothing, that is to say, Profession? What am I? ‘What do 
I write down here, dad?’ …I don’t know, put down whatever you want, 
it’s the same…No, it was a problem of identity that I could never, I could 
never get through it […] I still feel a little frustrated, that is to say, above 
all… the identity matter, I am not a merchant seaman any longer, and 
then… what am I now? That is to say, generally  I put down electrician 
but…it is not what…it is not my greatest ambition to become an 




The loss of work, usually experienced as a fall, leads to a marked rise in 
anxiety and depression. 
 
[…] Recently my health collapsed seriously, and that happened 
twice…one was at a psychological level, I won’t say I was mad, but I had 
bad headaches all the time... all worries, right?The second health break-
down was cholesterol. I went to the doctor and he said to me ‘The third 
one is your heart’. So, you see, now I take it easy, I don’t worry… if I see 
that I am falling down I try to make myself comfortable in the air while 
I’m falling down, because I’m falling down anyway, you see? No, I can’t 
avoid falling down, I can’t avoid it…(Omar, 36, I 29, Lanús) 
At times you become depressive, because you feel badly, you feel like an 
old man… you feel like working but you don’t get a job, and so you want 
to contribute [money] at home, but you know you can’t and you feel 
badly…I am not used to being helped, to being supported... let’s say. 
(Luis, 49, I 27, Lanús) 
 
For many women, especially for those who have spent most of their 
working lives in paid employment and whose financial contribution to the 
household income has been crucial, the homemaker role does not seem to provide 
an alternative source of identity; unemployment appears to be as problematic and 
as disruptive as among males.  
 
When I lost my job, in 1995, I suffered from serious depression, I was 
deeply depressive because I thought: ‘My God, we are going to starve 
now!!! What  are we going to do?’ I was so scared, so so scared…because 
up to that time we used to have two salaries [my husband’s and mine] and 
the highest was mine […] I started to feel badly, from bad to worse…I 
ended up watching Indiscreciones on TV like a stupid, right…I even 
started changing my personality…because…you see, whenever Jorge [my 
husband] got home from work…I felt so thankful to him, because he was 
supporting me that I …you see…I felt like a sort of geisha that had to take 
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his shoes off and put his slippers on […] because I started to feel thankful 
to him, because I was being fed by him…(Nora, 52, I 28, Lanús) 
 
 
Among women with the most demanding domestic role, those with pre-
school children, joblessness appears to be less problematic, reducing –but 
certainly not eliminating- women’s employment deprivation. 
 
At the beginning I used to say ‘Ah…’  but actually I didn’t 
realize…because it was like all right…going to school, coming from 
school, taking my daughter to kinder…I had one in Primary School and 
the other in kinder…and the baby-girl, and so it is like…all that coming 
and going, no great change…but, definitely, there was something missing 
…that was compensated by my husband compensated  by my work to the 
kids, the house and all that […] and so I felt self-controlled from that point 
of view. (Estela, 40, I 12, Lanús)  
What has changed is that you don’t have your own money to be able to 
say OK…I’ll do this…you are free to spend your money...  that is what 
really bugs me, but then the rest, I don’t…because I don’t get bored at 
home all day long, I have my daughters that…(Verónica, 30, I 18, Lanús) 
 
Most male interviewees said that they have time on their hands, and 
characterized idleness as boring and destructive for identity and self-steem. They 
describe themselves as active, highlighting the differences between being 
unemployed and being idle.  
I always say that I am unemployed, but not idle, because I always have 
something to do. I am unemployed, I don’t have a job… but I am 
occupied, always, I am always doing something, always something... 
(Omar, 36, I 29, Lanús) 
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Some ways of being active while unemployed are to make improvements 
and repairs to their houses and/or cultivate their own vegetable garden, 
experienced as therapeutical activities.  
 
 Sometimes... for example, last week… I changed all the electric 
wiring…I had the wires, so I installed the new electric wiring, and that 
way, you see…[also] I removed the backyard floor and I made it again, 
the concrete floor, because I had to make a well in the bathroom …And 
then there were two trees out there…that week I didn’t have a job…two 
trees, I am talking about the ombú…you know? […] As a way of getting 
rid of stress, of course…(Agustín, 39, I 6, Lanús) 
[…] And…look, when there was some money I used to paint parts of the 
house, to do some repairing here and there,  to tidy up the backyard. 
Once… this was some time ago, as a sort of therapy, I arranged a little 
vegetable garden, as a therapy I tell you… I had some peppers and 
tomatoes….all as a sort of therapy. (Omar, 36, I 29, Lanús)         
 
 
Participation in community organizations, while less common, appears as 
another way of doing a “useful activity”, especially among working class males.   
 
To belong to the Sociedad de Fomento  is a relief, in the sense that…in the 
evening, about 6.30 or 7.00,  I have football practice with the kids…And 
so you have an activity…you are doing something, and so you don’t feel 
useless if you don’t work …you are doing something.OK, you don’t make 
any money out of it…You don’t obtain any earnings, but you feel that you 
have responsibilities, you have something to do.(Agustín, 39, I 6, Lanús) 
 
 
Continuing college education emerges as a substitute for employment 
among some middle-class males and females with employed partners. In contrast 
with other research findings on unemployment in Argentina (Valverde et al., 
2000), those following this strategy are not the younger but those in their forties 
 262
and early fifties. Moreover, their main motivation for study does not seem to be 
investing in human capital as a way to improve their employability, but to enjoy 
having a time structure for the day, and to prove to themselves their capacity to 
face intellectual challenges, self-discipline, and responsibilities. 
      
It’s been one year since I am studying…I don’t know if it will be useful to 
me in any sense, but at least it keeps me busy. I want to have fun, I want to 
study having fun, not being distressed…I don’t want to be under pressure 
to obtain a diploma…[…] at least this way I feel I am ‘on the run’[…] 
Yes, yes, yes, it makes me feel good, so good that…I get nervous on the 
days I don’t have to attend classes at college.(Gabriel, 50, I 26, Lanús) 
Look, to me it is gratifying, personally gratifying, basically…and besides, 
it is a hope of having access …my last hope. (Violeta, 41, I 15, Lanús) 
 Go back to study…I took at it as some kind of therapy…The doctor says 
to me once: ‘Do something, otherwise you’ll get mad…keep your mind 
busy’[…] I started [college] as a kind of therapy, and I ended up taking it 
seriously, I like it, otherwise I would have dropped out of it. (Omar, 36, I 
29, Lanús) 
 
As this section has shown, anxiety and depression appear as the most 
evident and widespread signs of psychological distress resulting from 
unemployment and job insecurity in a context of generalized uncertainty. The 
intensity of the disruptive impacts, however, appears to vary according to 
previous employment experience, social class, gender, and stage of the family 
cycle. With the partial exception of women going through the first stages of the 
family cycle, unemployment do not appears as a less disruptive experience among 
women. Unemployment erodes previous sources of identity: being the main 
provider among working class males, personal identification with professional 
employment among the highly educated middle classes; self-reliancy among 
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women with a long-term labor participation. Different “therapeutical” practices 
are developed to cope with ‘free time’ and with feelings of worthlessness and 
aimlessness emerging from job loss: from simple improvements and repairs to 
their houses and cultivate their own vegetable garden, to more structured activities 
oriented to provide a longer-term course to their lives.   
 
8.2.2. The domestic division of labor: role reversal, equity, or double burden? 
Unemployment, and specifically male unemployment, appears to have 
important impacts on the domestic division of labor. Perceptions on the actual 
distribution of domestic tasks, however, tend to show important gender 
differences. While men’s accounts show an increasing “democratization” within 
the household, women’s description of the actual distribution of domestic chores 
seems to present a much more traditional scenario.  
Initial resistance of males to perform housework seems to lessen when the 
period of unemployment becomes longer. Sometimes the apparent role swap is 
just a temporary arrangement. In other cases, however, it becomes more 
permanent, and males show a significant degree of adaptability.  
 
For example…to clean up, to take care of the kids, to see that they go to 
school, to look after them…At the beginning it bothered me…Because I 
guess I had the idea…that it was the kind of work a woman should do, 
isn’t it? houseworking, but then I took it on, because I think…if I don’t 
take her place when she is not here…it isn’t fair…(Anselmo, 43, I 9, 
Lanús) 
Look at that washing-line out there…who did the washing?…I don’t care 
if they are my grandaughter’s panties, or my grandson’s pants, or my 
daughter’s panties – she is a teen-ager, the little one -, or my wife’s… or 
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whose clothes they are… I wash them all myself […] And…how can I say 
this?, I’m not ashamed of that, because it is most normal to me. When I 
didn’t have a job?… I felt normal, like any housewife…I felt […] All 




Dual earner middle class households that used to pay for domestic service 
are forced to reorganize domestic tasks, especially when the wife becomes the 
main provider. New arrangements appear to result in a relatively equitable 
distribution of housework, especially when children are older. 
 
 The one who is at home, the one who is at home does the cooking…Yes, 
yes, yes, me too. Also the cleaning-up, we take turns, and the one who is 
free…Some time ago, [when I used to work] we had someone to come and 
do the cleaning-up. Now…someone comes for a thorough clean-up every 
20 days....and before…up to twice a week […] No, it doesn’t bother 
me…it gets on my nerves to wash the dishes, but apart from that I do it, if 
I have to do it I do it […] At the present we have to see that Flavia [his 
wife] is not overloaded with work, …she gets back home, she must be 
served. That is to say, I won’t let her do the dishes, because she is 
probably tired… in general her housework load must be lightened. 
(Gabriel, 50, I 26, Lanús) 
 
Sometimes, in face of male’s long-term unemployment and in spite of the 
resistance to accepting it, households experience a role reversal, where the man 
takes over the traditional woman’s role. 
 
[…] I think it is me who should be working instead of her; she should take 
care of the children, she should be here at home, but…Yes, [I get bored], I 
don’t want to do anything, any more…to be with the kids, to do the 
washing, the cooking, nothing… I want to go out, I want to work, to clear 
my head, because everyday is the same routine […] I never leave this 
house, I am inside all day long (Juan, 30, I 5, Varela) 
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 The female breadwinners in the sample appear as paradigmatic cases of 
the double burden of being both caregivers and providers.   
 
Because, let’say, I used to come back from work, I used to come tired, 
exhausted, you know?… And I had to do all the housework…he had gone 
into a depressive state…like…he used to cook the children’s food and 
didn’t…I used to come tired and I had to clean up…and our girl, he sent 
her to school just… not the way I used to send her, you see?… I like the 
kids to look good and neat, with the hair combed, with a nice hair-cut, that 
sort of thing […] I feel lonesome, I feel lonesome about these matters, 
because I feel so tired, by the end of the week I am so tired, so exhausted, 
to tell you the truth…[…] No, I can’t count on my husband’s support…I 
guess most women can’t count on them…(Marcela, 46, I 29, Varela) 
 
Women’s accounts contrast with those of males. Instead of active men 
performing a wide range of household tasks, they describe their husbands when 
out of work as passive and reluctant to make a commitment to regularly 
performing particular domestic tasks. 
Nothing, when he’s at home he doesn’t do anything, he’s worse than […] 
Nothing, he does nothing, he sits down, he lies in bed […] he watches the 
telly, he drinks some […] Sometimes he helps at home a little, when he 
feels like it, when he has a job, look… then he helps a little with the 
housework…he helps me bathe the girls…and things like that… But when 
he doesn’t have a job he stays quiet there, numb, as if afraid of becoming 
bothersome…(Lidia, 29, I 20, Lanús) 
                             
Given the heterogeneity of domestic arrangements and the fact that many 
changes are still in process, we have to be very cautious about establishing quick 
generalizations. Nevertheless there are certain factors that allow us to identify 
some emergent trends, basically related to a greater involvement of males in 
domestic chores, which do not necessarily result in changes in their conceptions 
of gender roles. The temporary nature of many domestic arrangements tends to 
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reflect widespread labor instability. Labor insecurity and the increasing labor 
participation of married women seem to be transforming the parameters of of 
what could be considered as “normal gender roles”, slowly eroding the traditional 
division of domestic work. 
 
8.2.3. Impacts on family relations 
Together with changes in the domestic division of labor, unemployment 
appears to have strong impacts on family relations. Again, research findings show 
important differences, which tend to vary according to the impact of job loss on 
household income, duration of unemployment, family status, stage of the family 
cycle, previous division of roles, and conceptions of gender roles among others. 
The intermeshing of these factors can result either in the erosion or the 
strengthening of family relations.  The erosion of household relations due to 
employment problems cannot be limited to unemployment, given that job 
insecurity can be as stressful as joblessness. 
When job instability affects the head of household during the first stages 
of the family cycle joblessness can result in marital dissolution, especially when 
unemployment spells tend to be longer.139 However, even when unemployment 
spells are shorter income instability appears to have a strong impact on the 
stability of family relations. 
 
                                                 
139 Focusing on Great Britain Lampard (1994) finds that postmarital unemployment appears to 
cause a significant number of marital disolutions which would otherwise either not have occurred 
at all, or would have occurred on a later date; however, he also points out that the causal 
relationship between unemployment and divorce is not all one way. 
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Now it’s been a year and a half since we separated…and I went back with 
my ma, to my ma’s [We separated] because of this matter, I 
guess…because I  didn’t have labor stability, we needed things... I don’t 
know […] At the beginning we managed to cope with it because she had 
the guts, she had the will […] she couldn’t understand me, she 
couldn’t…back me up, I don’t know…And…[we used to argue] because I 
didn’t feel well, I was in a state of deep depression…Because I wasn’t 
used to live a situation like the one we were living…She demanded from 
me something that didn’t depend on me…To have a job…[…] She made 
me feel that I didn’t try hard enough to get a job…however, I was trying 
beyond my capacity…She worked sometimes and sometimes she didn’t 
[…] The situation was tense , I don’t know, everything bothered me and 
she didn’t understand that I felt badly because I didn’t have a job […] I 
felt badly because there were many things that we needed and we couldn’t 
have, I feared it would happen what finally happened, I feared that…what 
actually happened: stop seeing my children everyday, [as before] when I 
had a job and came back home from my job and my children would be 
there with me…that’s why I feel great sorrow now, because I come back 
from work and…they are not here, I see my dad and my ma, but not my 
children […] If I had had a stable job this wouldn’t have happened, I am 
absolutely sure it wouldn’t have happened…(Santiago, 29, I 25, Lanús) 
[…] Now, for example, these days, when I don’t have a job…for 1 week, 
2 weeks, that drives me mad, I get mad against myself and…she asks me 
for something…and my reaction is upsetting because I’m nervous all the 
time […] We argue because we have no money […] She tells me to go 
and look for a job and I go out looking for a job and I can’t get one…and 
she is not being realistic about the situation we are going through….it is 
not just me…there are millions of people  who are like this […] We 
separated twice […] and then we got together…whenever I had a job, 
everything OK, we got on well with each other. Then I lost my job again 
and chau [bye, bye]…(Pablo, 29, I16, Varela) 
 
 
In dual earner households, the employment stability of the other partner as 
well as the availability of savings clearly reduces the levels of family conflict. 
Moreover, in some cases, unemployment appears to result in a strengthening of 
family relations. This is basically the case of middle class families where wives, 
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in face of their husband’s unemployment become the main providers of the 
household. 
 
  […] At home we [my wife and I] always got on very well; Flavia always 
backed me up a great deal…She always stood by me, she used to say: 
‘Don’t lower yourself to what…’[…]I have the guts to get through 
because of her, that is… we complement each other well […] When we 
had our first baby she didn’t have her diploma as a drawing and painting 
teacher yet. She was about to give up studying and I said: ‘No, you don’t 
drop out…you have only one year more to go. Are you crazy, to give up 
for only one year?’…and so, with my help she could finish her degree 
studies. But now… if she hadn’t finished studying we wouldn’t be as we 
are, we would be worse…(Omar, 36, I 29)  
 
8.3. THE FUTURE: PERCEPTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
Certainly, a context of high unemployment and deep economic recession 
like the one experienced by Argentina during the last years, does not leave much 
space for optimistic perspectives regarding the future. The sharp worsening in the 
labor market has resulted in the erosion of the centrality of work as a key 
mechanism of social mobility. Perceptions on the future are particularly dramatic 
among impoverished middle class sectors who perceive their continuous decline 
and the lack of social mobility opportunities as an irreversible process.  
 
I think a great deal about the future, I have enough time for that while I am 
on the tacho [cab]…while I am driving around and nobody gets in, I think 
about the future…[…] Black, black, I see it black  because I have no…I 
can’t see any lights in my way ahead…Let’s say it metaphorically, right? 
Imagine a tunnel…you can see the light ahead of you, so…that means the 
tunnel has an end…but I can’t see any light out there, so.. that means that 
the tunnel will go on and go on, because there are no future prospects of 
any sort. (Marcelo, 52, I 16, Lanús) 
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I would like to think that this [situation] is going to change…Let’s accept 
the fact that nowadays the situation is more and more chaotic…You say: 
‘Now I am like this  …I wasn’t like this a couple of months ago…no, I am 
worse now. Then, what is happening to me? Will I have something  to put 
on my table for Christmas and New Year time? What is going to happen 
next Christmas Eve? What is coming ahead for the new generations? What 
kind of life are my children going to have? What kind of life are my 
grandchildren going to have? What must be done?’ […] Because the idea 
of living in a ‘rich country’ is over…a country that generates 
wealth…with the little cows all over, producing milk…it’s all over 
(Marisa, 41, I 13, Lanús) 
 […] the fact is that those who used to be hard up, those who were always 
hard up, now are doing worse…and the ones who were doing fairly well, 
now are doing awfully bad…(Estela, 40, I 12, Lanús) 
 
The erosion of the traditional channels of social mobility and the reduction 
of time horizons to a continuous present emerge as a constant in most of the 
interviews. The perceptions on the future of Lucía, who recently lost her job as a 
domestic servant, and of Nora, a school teacher who used to work as a skilled 
secretary, are clear examples of how generalized is this perspective across  
different social sectors.  
I don’t know, at this moment I can’t think about the way I see it [my life, 
my situation, looking ahead in time]…I don’t know about the way it will 
be, because if I can’t get a job I don’t know what I am going to do, I don’t 
know… […] I think about the present, I think about the debts I have ...and 
I think about the time when I can’t work any more…because…all right, 
may be I can work now, but the time will come when I can’t work any 
more and… what will I do then? (Lucía, 56, I 7, Lanús) 
What do I think about my future? Look, I don’t know, that is to say, now I 
avoid anticipating [the future], because when I look ahead I become so 
upset, when I begin thinking about it […] Look, I have always foreseen 
everything in life, I have always tried to anticipate the future, to make the 
future, to plan ahead, so that when the hard times would come I would be 
ready…Not today any more, though, not today any more…I live the 
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present, I live for today and I hope nothing dreadful happens to us (Nora, 
52, I 28, Lanús) 
 
Among adults, the loss of previous achievements and the consequent 
feelings of defenseless –which increases when they get closer to retirement age- is 
accompanied by impotence about offering a better future to their children.  Even 
when children’s education still represents a high priority, it does not appear as a 
channel of social mobility, but as a buffer against the fall.  
 
In my opinion, it is fundamental [that my children can have degree 
studies]…Because a lawyer can work as a street  sweeper, but a street 
sweeper can’t work as a lawyer, ever!…(Celina, 41, I 23, Lanús) 
[I never thought about my daughters giving up studying]…because I knew 
they had to study. Even if I had to go out cleaning family houses so that 
they could go on studying… I would have done it […] No, I wouldn’t 
have even thought about it …Moreover…when the youngest one failed 
her year examinations and she had to repeat the year course, she said: ‘I’ll 
quit’…and I told her: ‘Look, yet with a walking stick …you will finish 
school…’ Maybe I won’t leave them money, but I will leave them their 
degree studies. (Raquel, 50, I 3, Lanús) 
 
In low-income sectors parents fear that their children will never have jobs 
and the latter worry that they will not even be able to attain the minimum levels of 
well being achieved by their parents. 
 
I don’t know, I don’t think [that my children will have better prospects 
than I had], I think at their age…when I was their age I had more 
opportunities, better opportunities…which they don’t have now […] 
Because whenever you have to leave a job you would find another job, 
right next to the first one, where they paid you a higher salary, and the 
following job was even better, and so on, but now it is not like 
that.(Ricardo, 43, I 5, Lanús) 
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[…] I believe I am doing worse than my parents…Because they worked 
hard and they could buy their own [place to live]…when we grew up we 
helped them to finish building their house…because we used to live at a 
ready-built timber house that my dad had made…and they have their own 
brick house now […] I guess now is harder. Because there are less jobs 
now, and I am alone, and they were always together [instead] […] A brick 
house [of my own]…I think about it, but I don’t know if I’ll be able to do 
that. (Alejandra, 34, I 19, Lanús) 
 
Migration certainly has different meanings for older and younger 
generations. For the former, many of them children and grandchildren of 
European migrants, Argentina used to be a “land of hope”, a dynamic society 
where hard work and formal education were rewarded by real opportunities of  
social mobility.  For the latter, in contrast, migration appears as the result of the 
loss of hope of becoming an “insider” in a society with no prospects on social 
mobility.  
 
[…] I regret the fact that anybody can have better prospects abroad than 
here, in our country… that is what bugs me[...]because my grandparents 
were Spanish, all four of them, and my father was Spanish […] My 
grandfather was a shoemaker, he was a painter, too… I don’t know but I 
admire them, I admire them  because thay came here to get on their feet. 
He had practically no education except Elementary School, which he 
could have…I don’t know if he did really, I never asked my mother if my 
grandfather had finished Elementary School. But his children, all of them 
finished - at least – Elementary School. My mother finished Elementary 
School, High School and degree studies [at college] on High School 
teaching. Her sister had degree studies on music teaching, and one of her 
brothers started studying engineering, but he dropped out before finishing 
his studies. The other one ....I don’t know…I don’t know about him, but 
he did finish High School, that is, all moved upward . (Gabriel, 50, I 26, 
Lanús) 
 
Look…I have my hope, my prospects…in travelling abroad. I have my 
cousin  who left 20 days ago…she went to Miami… just like that, also, 
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just without thinking it twice…She is single, 21 years old, she saved some 
money and she went to Miami to test her luck… and in three days she got 
a job as a waitress […] I hate that, to know that I have to go somewhere 
else to get a job, to leave my country, to go so far away …To me…I 
would have liked that my children stayed here and on the other hand I 
would also like that my children were there, because they are going to be 
better off than here… I have my cousins, I have my relatives, who are 




Impotence, pessimism, and a sensation of permanent instability is 
probably one of the most significant and generalized perceptions that people have 
under the present economic conditions. Moreover, a precarious equilibrium 
characterizes most “strategies” developed at the household level to cope with job 
insecurity. The impact of these processes on household relations show that 
responses to economic adversity do not necessarily involve consensus and 
cooperation, and in many cases may end in family break-up. The mounting 
constraints to cope with their present situation and the increasing depletion of the 
few resources available in a context of an unprecedented crisis certainly result in 
an overwhelming sense of vulnerability and uncertainity with regard to the future. 
The feeling of defenseless in a scenario where even the most basic mechanisms of 
social protection have been eroded is probably one of the most apparent signs of a 
society –once perceived as a land of promise- that appears to have lost its way. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions  
In contrast to the privileged position the Argentine society used to enjoy 
until the mid 1970s, during the 1990s it became a paradigmatic case of economic 
failure and of the crudest experiment of economic orthodoxy in the contemporary 
Latin American context. After a long decade of convertibility, Argentina is today 
a country devastated, where nothing seems to be left. Employment in the private 
sector declined 9.6% in the last year and the GNP is expected to drop between 
10% and 15% by 2003.140 Unemployment rates in Greater Buenos Aires increased 
from 14.7% to 19% between October 2000 and October 2001, and 1 in 4 
households is today living in poverty. 
Formal and stable employment and the social benefits tied to it were 
replaced by rampant unemployment, widespread job insecurity and the 
dismantling of the previous mechanisms of social protection, which imprints on 
the social structure will be hard to be reversed.141 While the current situation is 
much worse than the one –already profoundly deteriorated- described in this 
work, the erosion of the Argentinean social and occupational structure is by no 
means a new phenomenon. As this dissertation has shown, Argentina’s downfall 
began in the mid 1970, becoming particularly dramatic during the 1990s when the 
fiction of ‘stability’ radically broke with the past, dismantling of the entire 
                                                 
140 Clarín, 4/18/02 
141 During the last year, almost 1.3 million people stopped paying their monthly contributions to 
the social security system. Currently, only 33% of those registered in the social security system are 
actually contributing, what means that in the future 2 out of 3 workers will not be entitled to 
pension benefits or will receive a minimum pension (Clarín, 4/15/02). These figures are just 
reflecting the situation of those registered. If we add to them those who are unregistered, future 
prospects are certainly dramatic. 
 274
economic and social structure. In this context, one of the main contributions this 
research provides is a better understanding of how do people react to social 
collapse. 
 
9.1. COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY 
The disruptive impacts of unemployment at the individual and social 
levels acquire particular dimensions under the present Argentinean context where 
previous certainties have disappeared. This dissertation has shown the differential 
impacts of unemployment according to gender, social class, household 
characteristics and stage of the family cycle, pointing out that different 
employment opportunities and labor traditions at the local level have an important 
role in molding the experiences of work and unemployment. Thus, while in poor 
and spatially segregated contexts unemployment means less changas, in others it 
means massive factory closings and layoffs and the disappearance of the once 
dynamic small businesses.  
The analysis of previous employment experiences represents a necessary 
first step for understanding the impacts of unemployment. As the experience of 
both men and women in precarious jobs demonstrates, work does not necessarily 
represent a universally rewarding and structured activity. Labor trajectories also 
provides a clearly evidence that previous forms of coping with labor instability 
among working classes –such as low-paid jobs in the formal sector and self-
employment- have become increasingly ineffective. Among middle classes, 
characterized by more stable labor careers, unemployment represent a break-point 
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in their working lives toward a process downward mobility that in most cases 
appears as irreversible. The job histories of working class females, especially 
during the last years, show that their participation in the labor market has been 
pushed both by the precarious employment status of their husbands and by the 
difficulties that children of working age have in entering the labor market. 
Discouragement appears to be particularly important among middle class women. 
The higher levels of skills required for the jobs they used to have in the past and 
the type of jobs offered under the present conditions operate as important 
disincentives for looking for jobs and as strong obstacles for getting them.  
 After analyzing the heterogeneity of responses developed by low-income 
and middle class households, some common trends were identified, the most 
important of which is the overwhelming pressure that households are 
experiencing as a consequence of the lack of social protection from the state and 
the meager employment opportunities provided by the market. This pressure does 
not only result in a progressive depletion of resources and deterioration of living 
conditions but also introduces new sources of conflict, as previous conceptions of 
work, gender and family roles are challenged by the new and harsh realities of the 
market. Labor insecurity and the increasing labor participation of married women 
seem to be transforming the parameters of what could be considered as “normal 
gender roles”, slowly eroding the traditional division of domestic work. 
Both panel analysis and interviews have shown that sending more 
members to the labor market present serious obstacles in a face of the lack of 
employment opportunities. The unemployment or job instability of the head, 
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instead of resulting in an increase in the numbers of earners, leads to more 
unemployment: more household members looking for jobs and not finding them, 
or getting highly precarious and low-paid jobs when finding one. In the same 
sense I found that those households that increased its size did not necessarily 
increased the number of earners able to contribute to “collective” expenses. On 
the contrary, this ‘strategy’ sometimes seems to lead to greater income uncertainty 
due to the growth in the number of unemployed within the family. In fact, 
uncertainty and the sensation of a permanent vulnerability to joblessness is appear 
as one of the most significant and generalized perceptions that people have under 
the present economic conditions. 
Moreover, my research findings appear to challenge the image of the poor 
as socially active in their communities, in making contacts and doing whatever 
jobs they can find to survive. In contrast, I found that many unemployed –
basically males- living in poor neighborhoods suffered from severe depression,  
with few or no relatives, friends or neighbors to rely upon.    
The strong internalization of a conception of work tied to dignity and labor 
rights and the image of the once privileged position of Argentinean workers 
conflicts with the reality of a labor market that has sharply deteriorated and the 
urgency of obtaining some earnings, resulting in feelings of defenselessness and 
adaptive behaviors in face of unfair labor conditions. At the same the loss of 
formal jobs –especially among middle classes- together with financial hardship 
resulted in the lost of the social benefits they were entitled to, such as health 
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insurance and pension benefits, resulting in a longer-term drop in their living 
standards and increasing uncertainty regarding the future. 
  Seeking a job, when there are no jobs, is probably one of the most 
frustrating experiences that the unemployed have to face. It is in such situations 
when the feelings of worthlessness acquired their real significance. As interviews 
have shown, age discrimination is probably one of the most humiliating 
experiences  that middle-aged job-hunters have to face: too young to retire, too 
old to work.  
The experience of unemployment under the current process of 
disintegration of previous social and occupational structure appears as particularly 
disruptive because the basis of people’s previous frames of reference to think 
about work, social belonging, and the possibility of moving ahead in the social 
ladder have vanished. It is against this background that the feelings of destitution, 
defenselessness and worthlessness expressed by those out of work have to be 
framed. The sensation of being left out of the system expressed by many middle 
class interviewees appears as one of the clearest signs of a society where previous 
mechanisms of social integration have collapsed. The lack of future perspectives 
and the sharp skepticism regarding the future appears as a perception shared both 
by middle and working classes but acquire different forms in generational terms. 
For older generations, skepticism and frustration comes from the downfall of their 
parameters of reality: a dynamic society where hard work and formal education 
were rewarded by real opportunities of social mobility. For younger generations, 
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in contrast, hopelessness arises from the uncertainty of what ‘belonging’ or ‘being 
part of society really means.  
 
9.2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In terms of the policy implications of this research, it is clear that a public 
policy oriented to guaranteed minimum levels of well-being to those either 
temporarily or permanently excluded from the labor market cannot rely upon 
targeted policies. The latter do not appear to be particularly effective in a context 
of widespread vulnerability. An unemployment insurance scheme based on 
universal criteria is probably the most urgent protective measure to avoid the 
deepening in the already eroded social fabric. If, as some authors argue, the lack 
of unemployment insurance means that “to be unemployed is to starve unless help 
can be obtained from family and friends” (Roberts, 1989: 356) something have to 
be done to avoid starvation of vast segments of the population in a context where 
neither family nor friends (many of whom are also unemployed) appear as 
effective alternative sources of welfare provision. As Marshall (1997) points out, 
and as my own research reaffirms, active labor market programs offer just 
temporarily relief to a small segment of the unemployed, and generally end 
sending back the participants to unemployed. Besides, they are more effective in 
reproducing clientelistic practices than in providing relief to the unemployed. 
Some emergent issues deserve deeper exploration in future research. First, 
job insecurity, its incidence, and the form it takes in particular contexts require 
further research. A better understanding of the forms taken by job insecurity and 
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its impacts at the individual and household level in the Latin American context 
requires comparative studies oriented to assess how certain aspects of social 
structure impinge on personality to the problem. Secondly, a deeper exploration 
of the local space, understood as social and economic structures of opportunity 
and constraint, is needed to assess the variability in employment practices and 
perceptions. In this direction, further research need to be done focusing on 
regional variations at the national level. Thirdly, more specific studies should be 
conducted to assess the real impacts of job insecurity on the domestic division of 
labor, examining to what extent gender roles are actually undergoing a process of 
change or if, on the contrary, such changes are just the result of temporary 
household arrangements.    
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Appendix. Sample Composition and Interviewees Characteristics 
 
Sample composition by gender, age, education and family status 
 
 Florencio Varela Lanús Total 
    
Gender    
   Male 15 16 31 
   Female 14 14 28 
Total 29 30 59 
    
Age groups    
   25-30 10 8 18 
   31-40 8 7 15 
   41-50 8 11 19 
   51+ 3 4 7 
Total 29 30 59 
    
Educational level    
   Complete Primary or less 22 11 33 
   Incomplete Secondary 5 8 13 
   Complete Secondary 1 1 2 
   More than Secondary 1 10 11 
Total   59 
    
Family status    
   Head 16 17 33 
   Spouse 12 10 22 
   Child 1 3 4 
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